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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the implications of tax and transfer policy on income
and employment, with emphasis on the low end of the income distribution.
It also compares the labor market outcomes of recent veterans to those of
veterans who served prior to 2001, when military utilization rates were
much lower.
The first chapter observes that many overlapping income support pro-
grams exist in the United States, each with the goal of transferring re-
sources to low income individuals with minimal employment disincentives.
Each of the programs considered addresses this tension in a different way,
potentially creating differences in the degree to which labor supply adjusts
in response to program changes. I separately and simultaneously estimate
labor supply elasticities associated with the income support programs in
the context of a discrete choice model. The differences in elasticities I
document across programs can inform both policy and optimal taxation
theory.
In the second chapter I reassess whether the optimal income tax pro-
gram has features akin to an Earned Income Tax Credit or a Negative In-
come Tax shape at the low end of the income distribution, in the presence
of unemployment and wage responses to taxation. I derive a sufficient
statistics optimal tax formula in a general model incorporating unemploy-
ment and endogenous wages. I then estimate the parameters using policy
variation in tax liabilities stemming from the U.S. tax and transfer system.
Using the empirical estimates, I implement the sufficient statistics formula
and show that the optimal tax at the bottom has features that resemble
those of a a Negative Income Tax relative to the case where unemployment
iv
and wage responses are not taken into account.
In the third chapter, I compare labor market outcomes of veterans with
post-2001 service time to those of similar veterans whose service did not
extend past 2001. Veterans who served post-2001 are at a higher risk of
long tours of duty, many of whom return with mental or physical disability.
I find that veterans with post-2001 service are underemployed; conditional
on employment however, veterans with post-2001 service earn at least as
much, relative to veterans without post-2001 service.
v
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Part I
Do Workers Respond Differently Across Sources of Income: Evidence
from Multiple Income Support Programs
1 Introduction
Most countries provide income support programs to transfer resources
to low income individuals. Programs in the United States include the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies (TANF) which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly
Food Stamps). Each of these programs faces an important tension: provide
resources to those who need them while minimizing erosion of work incen-
tives. Providing income support to the non-employed may entice workers
to leave the labor market and capture the transfer. On the other hand,
transfers contingent on working create extra incentives to work, though
work requirements might simply result in fewer resources to those who
cannot work and are in most need of support.
Each of the programs listed above addresses this tension in different
ways. For example, EITC provides benefits to low income wage earners,
sidestepping the work disincentive altogether. However, EITC payments
are disbursed through the tax code on an annual basis and there is some
question regarding how well claimants understand incentives created by
the tax credit. Survey evidence suggests that while most people are aware
of the EITC, relatively few understand the nuances of the program, or
how to maximize the credit (Romich and Weisner, 2000). However, peo-
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ple’s earnings do bunch at the kink points created by the EITC (Saez,
2010), especially earnings of the self-employed who can more easily ad-
just their reported income, suggesting a sophisticated understanding of
the rules. The degree of salience, even among taxes as prominent as sales
tax, have real effects on behavioral responses (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft,
2009). AFDC did not have work requirements or time limits but relied on a
caseworker determine eligibility. TANF introduced a stricter set of eligibil-
ity standards, time limits and work requirements when it replaced AFDC
to disincentivize otherwise able bodied workers from reducing their labor
supply. Given these differences, there is little reason to believe workers
respond similarly to changes across programs.
In this paper, I test the hypothesis that labor supply elasticities across
various income sources need not be equal. I focus attention on the labor
supply response of low income single women. Focusing on single parent
households simplifies the question; measuring the labor supply response
of married couples requires modeling the joint work decision. The focus is
on women since many of the transfer programs considered in this paper
are a function of the number of children in the household, and there are
far fewer single fathers than single mothers. I restrict attention to low in-
come individuals due to their exposure to several different income transfer
programs. Finally, I limit the labor supply decision to the extensive margin
(to work or not to work) as a simplification; assuredly, this simplification
is data driven. While high income individuals appear to respond signifi-
cantly to changes in after tax wages along the intensive margin (Feldstein,
2
1995, Auten and Carroll, 1999, Goolsbee, 2000)1, labor supply responses
for low income women are concentrated along the extensive margin (Eissa
and Liebman, 1996, Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001a).
I begin by setting up a tractable framework to study the individual’s
choice to work. The amount of income from each source or program the
individual is eligible is a function of her the work decision. Each income
source is represented flexibly to allow for the possibility that changes to
income programs elicit differential labor supply effects. The individual
maximizes utility over the choice to work or not. Since transfer programs
target different sections of the income distribution, variations in labor sup-
ply responses could be due to income effects. I explore parameterizations
of the model both with and without income effects.
From the model I derive labor supply functions that I estimate empiri-
cally. Using a welfare benefit calculator that I constructed from a database
of program rules and a publicly available tax calculator, I exploit policy
variation from several income sources over time and across states to es-
timate the effect that each policy has on the labor supply of low income
single women. I find significant differences in the labor supply response
across these transfer programs. Specifically, I estimate labor supply re-
sponses from programs associated with the tax code (e.g. EITC) to be
larger than welfare type programs. I also estimate small but potentially
important income effects.
Measuring and understanding the differences in the way workers re-
spond to these programs is important for at least two reasons. First,
1See Chetty (2012) for a review of these papers.
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the labor supply responses determine how effective each program can be.
Lower labor supply responses means smaller distortions. If workers to do
not adjust employment decisions to capture transfers to non-workers, a
government can target transfers to different income groups with minimal
distortions. Higher labor responses increase the ability of a government
to attain an aggregate labor supply goal. Second, models of optimal tax-
ation often rely on the magnitude of the labor supply elasticity of income
(Mirrlees, 1971, Diamond, 1980, Saez, 2002). These models optimize the
envelope of all tax and transfer programs. The optimal shape of the result-
ing budget set faced by workers depends on a labor supply elasticities that
represent an average behavioral response to change in the of the under-
lying income sources. However, if the underlying programs elicit different
elasticities, then two identical aggregate budget sets, with different com-
positions of income support programs, may deliver different welfare and
labor supply outcomes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the
income support programs I consider. Section 3 defines the simple discrete
choice labor supply model I use to derive labor supply functions. Section
4 describes data that I use to estimate the parameters of the labor sup-
ply functions, and contains a discussion of the identifying variation each
program provides. In Section 5.3 I estimate the parameters of the labor
supply function, allowing for differences in responses across programs. In
Section 6 I discuss some of the policy implications of the results. Section
7 concludes.
4
2 Income Support Programs
2.1 Federal Taxes
Federal tax liability for single women has evolved immensely since the
1980s. EITC expansions have been the major source of changes to federal
tax liability. The EITC is a program that subsidizes the wage earnings of
low income parents (and to a much lesser degree non-parents). Though
EITC began small, following several expansions in 1986, the mid 1990s
and again in the late 2000s, federal spending on EITC exceeded $65 billion
for the 2013 tax year2. Obtaining EITC benefits, conditional on eligibility,
is relatively simple and eligibility is straightforward. Benefits are disbursed
along with taxes as a refundable credit; the claimant receives a refund for
any benefit in excess of tax liability. To be eligible, the tax filer must have
had positive earned income within the eligibility range, which depends on
the number of children in the household, and investment income must be
below the threshold ($3,350 in 2014). Claimants and their children must
have a valid social security number and the claimant cannot be married
filing separately.
The amount of the credit initially increases with income, and is phased
out at higher earnings levels. In addition to earnings, the credit is de-
termined by the number of dependent children in the tax filing house-
hold. Figure 1 displays the federal EITC schedule for various years, re-
flecting some of the expansions over the previous thirty years. Some of the
EITC expansions created differential changes to the maximum benefit lev-
2http://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/eitcstats
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els across the number of children in the household. Figure 2 displays the
evolution of the maximum benefit by the number of children in the house-
hold. Notice that up until the early 1990s benefits were not dependent on
the number of children (beyond one); by the mid 1990s households with
two or more children were eligible for substantially higher credits than
families with one child. In the late 2000s families with three or more chil-
dren became eligible for higher benefits than families with two children.
Beyond the EITC, income taxes and child tax credits also determine
federal tax liability. The child tax credit was created in the Taxpayer Relief
Act (TRA) of 1997. Initially the credit was for $400 per qualifying child.
The credit was increased in phases and as of 2015 the maximum credit
is $1,000 per qualifying child. As income passes a threshold ($75,000
in 2015) the credit is phased out $50 for each additional $1,000 of in-
come. Currently 15% of income over $3,000 is refundable. Individuals
with income below $3,000 do not receive the child tax credit3. The rules
have changed since 1997, but the magnitude of these changes are much
smaller than the EITC expansions. A third important piece of the federal
tax code is the income tax. The bounds of the brackets are adjusted for
inflation and marginal tax rates have changed very little for low income
individuals over the past 30 years. Furthermore, while changes to EITC
and child tax credits differentially affect mothers depending on the num-
ber of children she has, changes in income taxes do not differentially affect
mothers across any observable (like number of children). The inclusion of
year fixed effects in an empirical specification will absorb the time varying
3See US code 24, accessible at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/24
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aspect of income taxes. Changes to the EITC program represent the vast
majority of the changes in tax liability, especially for low income single
women.
2.2 State Taxes
State taxes vary both across state and within state, across time. State
tax liability is primarily determined by income tax, EITC supplements and
in a small number of states child tax credit supplements and rent or home-
owners credits. The largest changes in state tax policy have been in the
form of state EITC supplements. State EITC programs work much the
same as federal EITC program; low income workers receive a supplement
to their wages, on top of what the federal EITC program provides. Twenty-
five states and the District of Columbia have implemented state EITC pro-
grams. Implementation dates range from 1986 (Rhode Island) to 2015
(California). Figure 3 is a chart of the state EITC implementation dates.
Implementation across states has been steady since the mid-1980s. Most
of the EITC supplemental programs are disbursed as a percentage of the
federal EITC value and are typically refundable (as is the federal EITC).
State income taxes are another source of cross-state variation in post-tax
income. For single filers with $25,000 in taxable income in 2015 marginal
tax rates range from zero in seven states to nearly 8% in Maine4. As of
2015, only five states have child tax credit supplements paid as either a
percent of the federal child tax credit or as a fixed amount.
4http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-individual-income-tax-rates-and-brackets-
2015
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2.3 AFDC/TANF
Prior to 1996, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) made
up the bulk of what is often referred to as welfare in the United States.
Created as a part of the Social Security Act of 1935, AFDC provided cash
payments most often to low-income single mothers. Monthly benefits are
maximum at zero income, and are phased out after an income disregard.
The effective phase out rate depends on how low long an individual has
had positive income. States are allowed to set maximum benefit levels
but the income disregard and phase out rates were federally standardized.
Figure 4 shows a typical AFDC schedule an individual would face when
enrolling in AFDC.
By the mid-1990s, over 14 million individuals – or five percent of the
population – depended on AFDC payments that totaled over $22 billion in
nominal terms5. With phase out rates as high as 100%, critics of AFDC
suggest that the program creates a strong disincentive for mothers to join
the workforce. McKinnish, Sanders, and Smith (1999)estimate effective av-
erage tax rates of 35 to 40% for AFDC recipients over the years 1988-1991,
exceeding marginal tax rates for the top income bracket (28-31 percent)
over the same years 6. Employment rates measured around 60 percent
among single mothers between 1992 and 19957.
Partially as a response to the low employment participation of AFDC
eligible individuals and an increase in recipiency, many states applied for
5Department of Health and Human Services, Indicators of Welfare Dependence Annual
Report to Congress 2008. Accessible at http://aspe.hhs.gov/report/indicators-welfare-
dependence-annual-report-congress-2008
6http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=543
7Tabulation from the Current Population Survey.
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and were granted waivers to the federal program, increasing program flex-
ibility in an effort to encourage work and reduce caseload. The earliest
waivers were implemented in 1992 and by 1996 over half of the states
had implemented an approved program8. In 1996 the US government
passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA). PRWORA replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), a program that created time limits and work re-
quirements for many single mothers seeking assistance. Stated goals of
the PRWORA include “end[ing] the dependence of needy parents on govern-
ment benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage”.9 Like
many of the AFDC waivers that preceded, TANF afforded states much more
flexibility in of terms eligibility requirements, time limits and the benefit
calculation formula. Figure 5 shows a sample of four states that selected
very different benefit schedules by 1998. In general, states do not adjust
benefit levels for inflation annually, and though discrete increases in bene-
fits occur irregularly, the real value of TANF benefits has eroded over time.
In the five years following the passage of PRWORA, the number of families
receiving income assistance from TANF fell from 4.5 million to 2.2 million.
Welfare reform was largely perceived as a success as caseloads fell while
consumption levels remained constant or perhaps even increased through
the early 2000s (Meyer and Sullivan 2004, 2008).
8For details see http://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/state-implementation-major-
changes-welfare-policies-1992-1998
9Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Accessible
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ193/html/PLAW-104publ193.htm
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2.4 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known,
and commonly referred to as Food Stamps, is a federal program providing
additional resources to low income individuals with the requirement that
the benefits be used to purchase food. Implementation of the food stamp
program began state by state, beginning in the mid 1960s. By 1974 the
program was operating nationwide. Originally, benefits were disbursed as
physical coupons to the recipients. During the 1990s many states went
to electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards. As part of the PRWORA, states
were required to use EBT for disbursement of SNAP benefits by October
1, 2002. The maximum benefit is allotted to families with no income. For
families with income, benefits are reduced by 30 cents for each dollar of in-
come after deductions. There is also an additional percentage disregard for
earned income, as of 2015 workers could deduct 20 percent of earnings.
SNAP benefits are adjusted for inflation annually. Over time there have
been a few incremental increases, beyond inflation adjustment, to the
SNAP benefit levels. For the empirical Section of this paper I will not be
able to identify a labor response from adjustments to SNAP due to lack of
policy variation. However I do include SNAP benefits in the analysis due to
important interactions with AFDC and TANF. Unlike EITC benefits, which
do not interact with SNAP, AFDC and TANF benefits count as unearned
income against SNAP benefits. Each additional dollar of AFDC or TANF
an individual receives reduces their SNAP benefit by 30 cents. While this
does create cross-state variation in effective SNAP benefits, the variation
is collinear with state AFDC or TANF policy. AFDC/TANF and SNAP are
10
also linked in terms of receipt, many states have a common application
and benefits are typically disbursed to the same EBT card. Users spend
money from one program or another by entering a program specific PIN at
the point of transaction. I discuss how I control for the direct interaction
of SNAP and AFDC/TANF in Section 4.
3 Theoretical Framework
3.1 General Framework
In this section I develop a simple model of the labor supply decision
for low income single women. This is a simple static model that only con-
siders the extensive margin, the discrete choice whether or not to work.
I make this simplifying assumption because the literature suggests that
single women respond to work incentives more along the extensive mar-
gin than the intensive margin (Heckman, 1993, Meyer and Rosenbaum,
2001a, Eissa and Liebman, 1996). If the individual works, they will receive
their potential earnings net of taxes, and transfers. If the individual does
not work, earnings are zero but they receive income in the form of trans-
fers. The individual does not choose the number of hours worked, or the
levels of income conditional on work, they simply observe their potential
income separately from all sources and choose their employment status.
Individuals in the model also have an unobserved distaste for work. Utility
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for individual i is defined most generally in the following way:
Ui =
8>><>>:
uiw = u(yi1w, yi2w, ...yiPw)  ci if working (w)
uin = u(yi1n, yi2n, ...yiPn) if not working (n)
where l equals 1 if individual i chooses to work and zero if not. ypw is in-
come from source p when the individual works (i.e. net federal tax liability)
and ypn is the income from source p when not working. u(·) is the utility
the individual obtains from income sources. ci is the utility cost of work-
ing for individual i, unobserved by the researcher. However, I assume ci is
a function of observable characteristics plus an unobserved idiosyncratic
component:
ci = f (Xi) + #i
where Xi is the vector of observables and #i is the idiosyncratic component.
Given this framework, an individual will choose to work if their distaste for
work is sufficiently small, specifically when:
#i < u(yi1w, yi2w, ...yiPw)  u(yi1n, yi2n, ...yiPn)  f (Xi)
Changes to the income sources will induce individuals at the margin to
enter or exit the workforce.
3.2 Heterogeneous Effects
I begin with the simplifying assumption that there are no income ef-
fects by assuming linear utility. When I actually estimate the labor supply
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function I explore a parameterization that allows for income effects. The
hypothesis I will test is whether workers react differently across forms of
income. By introducing individual parameters for each income source,
pp, I allow that each can have differential effects on utility, and therefore
behavior. Utility takes the form:
Ui =
8>><>>:
ÂPp=1 ppyipw   a · Xi   #i if working (w)
ÂPp=1 ppyipn if not working (n)
(1)
where pp is the effect that income source p has on utility. Now individuals
choose work when:
#i <
P
Â
p=1
pp
 
yipw   yipn
   a · Xi (2)
where ypw   ypn is the change in income from source p by moving from
non-employment to employment. Again, the individual will choose to work
only if their idiosyncratic realization of #i is sufficiently small. Total labor
supply will depend on where, in the distribution of #, the value of the right
hand side of equation (2) lies. The probability an individual works (and
rate of employment) is:
F
 
P
Â
p=1
pp
 
yipw   yipn
   a · Xi
!
(3)
where F is the CDF of the distribution from which #i is drawn.
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4 Data
The data I use for the estimation come from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) via the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series10. The CPS is
the main source of labor market statistics in the United States and con-
tains contemporaneous work status at the individual level as well as basic
demographic information. Each household in the CPS is surveyed a total
of eight times: two sets of four consecutive months separated by an eight
month gap. Individuals being surveyed for the fourth consecutive month
(surveys four and eight) comprise the outgoing rotation group (ORG). In
March of every year, households are asked an additional set of questions.
Importantly, the March supplement contains data on individual’s earnings
from the previous calendar year. For the purposes of this exercise I focus
on single women age 18 to 55 with less education than a bachelor’s degree,
who are not in the military or enrolled full time in school. I focus on this
subset of the population because they are most affected by income sources
described in Section 2. The data I use for the estimation spans 1984-2011
(ORG data are limited to 1996-2010).
I created a benefit calculator to approximate the AFDC, TANF and SNAP
benefits an individual is eligible for using rules provided by the Urban
Institute. AFDC and SNAP rules come from the TRIM311 program rules
database, and TANF rules are detailed in the Welfare Rules Database12.
AFDC and TANF rules are quite complicated and I have to make some sim-
plifying assumptions. Some of the income disregards in the AFDC/TANF
10Ruggles, Genadek, Goeken, Grover, and Sobek (2015)
11http://trim3.urban.org/
12http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/WRDWelcome.cfm
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benefit formula change over time; for calculation purposes I use the for-
mula that is in effect as a person initially enters the program. I assume
that single mothers are eligible for AFDC/TANF in terms of asset tests,
have not reached their time limit and have no income other than wage
earnings. To calculate federal and state tax liabilities I use the NBER’s
TAXSIM913 module for STATA. TAXSIM9 takes the tax year, household
composition and income as inputs and calculates tax liabilities or credits
separately by federal and state. I assume the woman files her taxes as
head of the household, she claims her children as dependents and has no
income other than wage earnings.
The framework laid out in Section 3 requires the researcher to observe
disaggregated sources of income for each individual if they are working
and if they are not working. Given wage earnings and demographics I can
calculate the composite sources of income as stated above. To calculate
income sources when an individual does not work I assume wage earnings
(and total income) are zero. Calculating the income sources of those for
whom I do not observe wage earnings is more difficult. I only observe
wage earnings for the those that report positive annual earnings in the
March CPS. I do not observe potential wage earnings for those that are not
working or for any individuals in the ORG. To estimate potential earnings
for individuals who report not working and for those not in the March CPS
I impute wages based off of workers in the March CPS.
A second challenge is that I would like to identify work responses from
policy changes alone. If the empirical wage distribution adjusts to policy
13http://users.nber.org/˜taxsim/taxsim9/
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then the income sources themselves are endogenous to the policy. As an
example, suppose there were wage growth for a particular subset of the in-
dividuals relative to the rest, individuals in that subset might move into the
labor force because the payoff from working has increased. The increase
in wages will also lead to higher a EITC benefit (if the potential incomes
lie in the phase-in range), using the OLS imputed wages would introduce
positive correlation between effective EITC benefits and employment, but
not due to a policy change. I want to identify labor supply responses from
policy changes alone, holding wages constant. To do this I construct a
simulated instrument, described later in Section 4.2.
4.1 Earnings Imputation
To impute earnings, I begin with the set of observations that contain
annual earnings data (women in the March CPS who reported working
in the previous year) and estimate the following equation, separately by
educational attainment (high school dropout, high school graduate and
some college, but less than a degree) and year cells:
log(wi) = ds +w · Xi + #i (4)
In addition to state fixed effects ds, control variables within Xi include
a quadratic function of age, dummy variables for race and ethnicity, and
a categorical variable describing the individual’s residence location (i.e.
urban, suburban, rural). I use the coefficient estimates from the state
fixed effects and the vector of demographics to predict log wages for all
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individuals in the sample, whether I observe earnings or not, to keep the
specification consistent across all individuals. EissaLiebman1996
Given an imputed income along with the state of residence, year and
household size provided in the CPS, I am able to approximate net tax lia-
bility using TAXSIM and welfare benefits using the TANF/AFDC and SNAP
calculator I created.
4.2 Simulated Instrument
I want to identify labor supply responses from policy changes alone, not
from the evolution of the wage distribution. To do so, I construct a simu-
lated instrument in the spirit of (Currie and Gruber, 1996). The idea is to
fix the income distribution and calculate the evolution of income sources
due to policy changes alone. The simulated instrument is constructed in
several steps. First I aggregate all individuals in the CPS that report an-
nual income (those who report working in the March CPS) and construct a
distribution of real wages, adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers14. Second I calculate the points in the
distribution of real income that bound each centile. Third, separately by
education group, I calculate the percentage of individuals in each centile.
High school dropouts will have higher mass in the lower centiles relative
to high school graduates and vice versa, but the sum of the percentages
across centiles for each education group is one. These percentages will be
used as weights later. Fourth, separately by year, I calculate a mean nom-
inal income level conditional on being within each of the centile bounds of
14From the Federal Reserve Economic Database, series CPIAUCSL
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the aggregate real distribution from Step 2. Fifth, for the mean nominal
income level associated with each centile I calculate taxes and transfers
separately by state, year and number of children. Finally, for each educa-
tion group, year, state, number of children I construct a weighted average
for each income source using the weights in Step 3. I now have an average
potential income associated with each source that is weighted by a static
income distribution, specific to an education level for each state, year and
number of children. I merge these income sources onto the CPS data and
use them as instruments for the income sources generated from imputed
income above.
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the simulated instrument. EITC
credits are highest for those with the lowest income because more of them
fall into the income eligibility range than those with a higher education
whose earnings are more often in the EITC phase-out portion of the distri-
bution or higher. State taxes are, on average, a liability for each education
group but smaller for those with lower income. Benefits, in the form of
AFDC/TANF and SNAP are highest for low education mothers. The last
two rows combine all of the programs. Women with two children and a
high school diploma or less education average net transfers, while child-
less mothers and college educated mothers of two average net tax liability
when working. Figure 7 shows where the variation in each of the instru-
ments comes from. Each variable is measured as a net increase in income
due to employment, from indicated source. All of the graphs represent the
simulated instrument for high school dropouts and are denominated in
thousands of real dollars. A value of 1 means that becoming employed nets
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the individual $1,000 from the income source. The left panel of each set
separates the variables by number of children. The right panel separates
variables across a selection of states, and displays values for a mother of
two children. Work incentives from all three programs have increased over
time. The change in incentives has been more extreme for mothers than
non-mothers, especially for federal and state taxes. The right panels show
that while there is no cross-state variation in federal taxes, there is con-
siderable cross-state and within-state cross-time variation in state taxes
and AFDC/TANF.
5 Estimation
5.1 Aggregating the Budget Set
Each of the income support programs considered in this paper affects
the budget set individuals face at the low end of the income distribution.
Figure (6) shows how all of the sources of income interact. This specific
collection of budget sets illustrate how I will test the main hypothesis.
All of these budget sets are for single mothers with two children in the
state of Ohio. The top graph is for 1992; the black line is the 45 degree
line. When there are no taxes or transfers pre-tax income equals post-
tax income and the budget set is the 45 degree line. The dot-dashed blue
line is the budget set when we include AFDC or TANF. Notice there is
a transfer of about $6,000 in AFDC or TANF for those with zero pre-tax
income. As income increases the AFDC/TANF line gets closer to the 45
degree line due to the phase out. The dashed red line traces out the budget
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set if we consider both SNAP (conditional on AFDC/TANF income) and
AFDC/TANF. Transfers at zero are even higher but the effective marginal
tax rate is also very high. The green dashed line adds state taxes to AFDC
and SNAP. Finally the solid orange line incorporates all adjustments to
income including federal and payroll taxes. EITC and child tax credits
push the budget set higher and reduce the marginal tax rate. This is the
aggregate budget set.
The middle graph shows the budget set the same mother would face
three years later, after an EITC expansion. The AFDC and SNAP lines are
essentially unchanged, but the budget set pivots up due to the EITC. The
third graph is two additional years later, in 1997. As Ohio transitioned
from AFDC to TANF they changed the phase out rate, effectively pivoting
the budget set up again. The change from the top to the middle graph
increases gains from employment for low income single mothers through
the EITC. The change from the middle to the bottom affects the aggregate
budget set in the same way, but due to a change in AFDC/TANF. My hy-
pothesis is that while these two changes may have had differential impacts
on labor supply even though they had similar effects on the envelope of all
income sources.
5.2 Estimating Equation
I begin with a linear approximation of the labor supply equation (3),
later I will control for income effects. I collapse the data down to a cell
defined by state, year, education group and number of children: the level
of policy variation. The percent of sample women in a given cell that are
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employed is:
Ls,y,e,k =
P
Â
p=1
pp
 
ypw   ypn
 
s,y,e,k + aXs,y,e,k + ds + ty + ei (5)
where (ypw   ypn)s,y,e,k is the average change in income from source p when
a single woman in state s, and year y, with education e, and k number of
children moves from not working to working. Xs,y,e,k is a vector of demo-
graphic and other controls including cell averages for age and age squared,
controls for race ethnicity and state unemployment, fixed effects for num-
ber of children, educational attainment, year, month and CPS division15.
The vector also includes the number of children that would not be eligi-
ble for medicaid if the mother earned her imputed wage16. It is difficult
to place a monetary value on medicaid benefits so I do not interpret the
coefficient in terms of an elasticity, but not including medicare eligibility
changes could lead to omitted variable bias for the estimates of the other
sources of income (if Medicare law changes are coincidental with state
AFDC or TANF rules for instance).
For the estimation, I consider four sources of income (or liability): the
federal tax code, the state tax code, AFDC or TANF benefits and SNAP.
As discussed in Section 2, AFDC/TANF and SNAP interact in important
15CPS divisions are geographic groups of three to eight states. There are nine divisions
in total: New England, Mid Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South
Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. Using CPS
division fixed effects controls for common shocks that affect geographic regions of the
United States, while exploiting some cross-state variation in policy. A concern when not
explicitly controlling for state fixed effects is that state legislation could be a reaction
to the economic conditions within the state. Controlling for state unemployment is an
attempt to ameliorate this concern. I also include state fixed effects as a robustness
check below.
16These rules changes by state and year, I thank Hilary Hoynes for sharing the eligibility
parameters.
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ways. While there is insufficient policy variation to identify labor supply
responses, I account for SNAP in two ways. First, I simply control for
changes in SNAP (mostly induced by state AFDC or TANF changes). Sec-
ond, I combine of AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp benefits and estimate a
single labor supply response from the two programs.
I use two stage least squares, using the simulated income change from
each program calculated at the cell level, described in Section 4.2, as an
instrument for the average change in income calculated using the imputed
earnings.
5.3 Results
Table 2 displays the results from estimating Equation (5). Each variable
listed is the income increase from a given source if an individual were to
change from non-employment to employment. For instance an increase in
the federal taxes variable could arise from an expansion of the EITC. In
this case, federal tax credits for working individuals would increase while
taxes at zero income remain unchanged. The expected sign on each of the
coefficient estimates is positive. All else equal, increasing the income gain
from working should increase labor supply.
Column 1 shows the estimate of the labor supply response to a change
in aggregate income when moving from non-employment to employment.
This is a common method to generate the labor supply elasticity used to
calibrate an optimal taxation model. For the first column I calculate the
implied elasticity as:
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h =
∂Ls,y,e,k
∂(Yw  Yn)s,y,e,k ·
¯Yw  Yn
L¯
where (Yw   Yn)s,y,e,k is the total change in income from employment for a
given cell. ¯(Yw  Yn) is the average total income change across cells, Ls,y,e,k
is the employment ratio at the cell level and and L¯ is the average employ-
ment ratio across cells. The implied elasticity for total income, shown in
the bottom panel, is 0.33 which is in line with much of the existing liter-
ature (see Chetty (2012)). Column 2 displays the results when I allow for
heterogeneous effects across income sources. The implied elasticities for
columns 2-4 are calculated as:
hp =
∂Ls,y,e,k
∂(ypw   ypn)s,y,e,k ·
¯Yw  Yn
L¯
where (ypw   ypn)s,y,e,k is the income change from source p for a given cell.
The interpretation is a one percent change in total income due to a change
in source p induces an hp percent change in the employment ratio. The
results in Column 2 suggest labor responses from changes in the federal
tax code, and across states, within a division, appear greater than the
responses associated with changes to income from AFDC or TANF. In the
bottom panel, the c2 and p-value listed are associated with a test that the
three coefficients are equal. The hypothesis can be rejected, suggesting the
responses are indeed different across programs. The differences between
Columns 1 and 2 are also important for optimal tax theory, using only
the labor supply elasticity of total income to calibrate a model could be
misleading.
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In Column 2, I estimate a labor supply response for AFDC or TANF and
control for SNAP separately. In Column 3, I combine the two programs
and measure net effects of changes to AFDC or TANF and Food Stamps. I
do this because of the interactions of the programs described in Section 2.
Combining the programs does not meaningfully change the results. The
implied elasticities from changes to AFDC or TANF and SNAP remain much
smaller than elasticities coming from the tax code.
Finally, in Column 4, I introduce an indicator variable that equals one
for each year after TANF replaced AFDC (beginning in 1997)17. I interact
the dummy with the ”AFDC/TANF and SNAP” variable to allow for a differ-
ential effect across AFDC and TANF. In this column, the estimate labeled
”AFDC/TANF and SNAP” is the estimate for only the AFDC regime. The
estimate labeled TANF and SNAP is the interaction with the time dummy.
The sum of the last two estimates is the estimated elasticity for the TANF
regime. There are many reasons to believe labor supply responses may
be different across these two welfare regimes. States adjusted eligibility
rules, work requirements, time limits and other parameters. Empirically,
however, the labor supply response across the two programs are indistin-
guishable; the interaction term is essentially zero.
That the labor responses to federal taxes and state taxes are quite sim-
ilar across specifications is an interesting result. The source of variation
from federal taxes is largely due to EITC expansions, a program that even
claimants do not usually display an understanding of the details (Romich
and Weisner, 2000). While much of the variation at the state level is due
17I have also used an indicator variable equal to one for an AFDC waiver and TANF, the
results are unaffected
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to cross-state income tax variation.
Table 3 displays a set of robustness checks using different geographic
fixed effects. Column 1 in Table 3 is the same as Column 4 in Table 2
and is provided for comparison. Table 3 Column 2 replaces division fixed
effects with state fixed effects. Column 3 replaces division fixed effects
with region fixed effects, a coarser geographic grouping of states. Columns
4 - 6 interact geographic fixed effects with the year fixed effects. Estimates
for federal taxes and AFDC/TANF and SNAP are robust to the choice of
geographic fixed effects. However controlling for state fixed effects absorbs
the identifying variation; estimates on state taxes are essentially zero. This
suggests that most of the labor supply response from the state tax code
comes from cross-state level differences in income taxes as opposed to
within-state changes to EITC supplemental programs.
One may be concerned that if federal and state taxes tend to affect
different portions of the income distribution than AFDC/TANF and Food
Stamps, differences in estimated labor supply responses could simply be
due to income effects. The parameterization in equation (3) does not allow
for income effects, implying a vertical shift of the budget set will lead to
the same labor supply. In Table 4, I control for income at zero earnings to
allow for income effects. It might be important to control for each source
of income at zero earnings, except AFDC/TANF and SNAP account for es-
sentially all of the income for non-workers. Each column is analogous to
those in Table 2. The sign on the total income at zero earnings is negative,
as expected, small and marginally significant. A vertical shift in the bud-
get set should lead to a lower labor supply. The inclusion of fixed effects
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slightly reduces the elasticity estimates, but in a uniform way, suggesting
income effects may be important, but are not driving the differences in
labor supply responses across programs.
6 Policy Implications
In Section 5, I provided evidence that labor supply reacts to a greater
degree to adjustments in work incentives derived from the tax code com-
pared to changes in the (dis)incentives provided by welfare-type programs.
In this section I will discuss what the findings mean in terms of policy.
I want to be clear about the limitations of the policy implications one
can glean from the results in presented in Section 5. First I do not estimate
the effect that changes to a program’s parameters have on the recipiency
rate of the program. While effects on recipiency do not affect estimation
of the elasticity of labor supply, it is important from an accounting stand-
point, or for cost-benefit analysis. For example, if the benefit levels are
increased for a particular program, the costs of the program increase for
two reasons: directly from the increase in benefit levels for the current
recipients, and indirectly due to an increase in recipients who now claim
the benefit that did not prior to the increase. Second, the results in Sec-
tion 5 are not sufficient to make claims about general equilibrium effects.
Specifically an increase in benefits for a particular program or a decrease
in taxes must be financed. To the extent that the burden of the financing
derives from tax increases to married women, men, or higher educated in-
dividuals, the results in Section 5 describe an incomplete description of the
effect of increasing transfers to single women. For example, suppose taxes
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were increased on higher educated individuals to finance an increase in
benefits to low income individuals. The results do not describe the change
in labor supply for the higher educated due to higher taxes, which would
be important to consider when designing policy.
Instead of providing a social welfare function, in this section I will high-
light two potential policy goals and discuss what the above results suggest
about attaining those goals.
Policy Goal 1: Increase Employment/Decrease Non-employment
Suppose the goal of the social planner is to induce non-employed to
seek employment among those with low earnings potential. The social
planner has two options: decrease transfers to the non-employed or in-
crease transfers to low income workers.
First consider reducing transfers to the non-employed. Implementing
this policy through the tax code is likely not feasible, the tax code currently
provides no resources to the non-employed so reducing aggregate transfers
would take the form of tax liability on those who have no earnings. Alter-
natively the planner could reduce benefits from welfare-type programs to
the non-employed. Given the estimates from Section 5 one would expect
the labor supply response from this type of measure to be relatively small
and at the expense of the utility of the recipients of the transfers. However
decreasing the benefits would not require any outside financing, and in
fact would save government resources.
Suppose instead the social planner decided to increase benefits for low
wage workers. This policy could be implemented through an EITC expan-
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sion/income tax reduction or through a reduction in the phase out rate
of TANF or SNAP. My estimates suggest that increases to EITC and other
tax parameters would induce more people to seek employment than an
equivalent phase-out rate adjustment to the welfare-type programs.
Policy Goal 2: Transfer Resources to Non-employed
Suppose the goal of the social planner is instead to transfer resources
to the non-employed while minimizing distortion to the labor market. The
social planner again has at least two options: increase the benefits to the
non-employed or shift the entire budget set upwards.
Increasing the benefits to the non-employed could be accomplished
through the tax code. While there are currently no refundable tax credits
to those with no earnings, it seems more feasible to extend tax credits to
the non-employed than to levy taxes. However, my estimates suggest that
increasing benefits in the tax code would lead to a relatively large labor
supply reduction. An increase in the benefits through the welfare-type
programs, on the other hand, would elicit a smaller reduction in labor
supply. However, since the recipiency rates of TANF and SNAP is smaller
than that of the EITC, a welfare-type benefit increase would reach fewer
individuals.
Alternatively the social planner could increase transfers to low income
workers as well as the non-employed. This could be done through either
the tax code or welfare-type programs. The benefit of this policy is that
it would minimize the reduction in labor supply, as suggested by the esti-
mates of the income effect in Table 4. The drawback of this policy option is,
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of course, that it is the most costly of the options facing the social planner.
One takeaway is that US policymakers implemented policy in a man-
ner consistent with the analysis of the two objectives above. AFDC and
SNAP were largely designed to transfer resources to low or no income fam-
ilies. The institutional framework surrounding these programs limited the
distortionary effect on the labor market as evidenced by the estimates in
section 5. On the other hand, the EITC was designed with the goal of in-
creasing labor supply. The larger labor supply elasticity is consistent with
this type of program’s effectiveness.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I consider four major sources of income support: fed-
eral taxes and credits, state taxes and credits, AFDC/TANF and SNAP. I
separately and simultaneously estimate the labor supply effects of multi-
ple overlapping income support programs. Using a simulated instrument
strategy, I identify labor supply responses solely off of policy changes. I
estimate that the labor force response to changes in the benefits adminis-
tered through the tax code is larger than the response to changes in more
traditional welfare programs like AFDC, TANF and SNAP. The differential
responses suggest that the budget set faced by the labor force is more than
just the sum of its parts. Identical budget sets comprised of different un-
derlying programs can lead to different labor supply and welfare outcomes.
Many models of taxation optimize the shape of the aggregate budget with
estimates of the labor supply elasticity without independent consideration
of the underlying programs. The estimates of this paper suggest that ac-
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counting for the differences in elasticities across programs is important.
There are several limitations to the analysis that should be addressed in
future work. Capturing all of the elements of the income support programs
is challenging, especially after the 1996 welfare reform, and few empirical
papers have attempted to do so. Including more of the state level policy
variation may prove important. Analysis of labor response along the in-
tensive margin could provide a more complete description of how the labor
force responses to income programs. Finally, a theoretical model of tax-
ation that considered multiple programs each with different labor supply
responses could help explain how the results of this paper affect optimal
policy.
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Figure 1: EITC Benefits
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Figure 2: Maximum EITC Benefits
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Figure 3: State EITC Implementation
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Figure 4: Example AFDC Schedule
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Figure 5: Example TANF Schedules
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(a) California
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(b) Deleware
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(c) Minnesota
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Notes: These TANF schedules assume the single mother is both eligible and has no income other than wage
earnings. Parameters of the schedule represent the TANF rules faced when initially entering the program. In
some cases income disregards decrease after a period sustained earnings.
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Figure 6: Example Aggregate Budget Sets
(a) Ohio 1992
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Notes: These budget sets assume the single mother has two children and is both eligible
for AFDC/TANF and SNAP and has no income other than wage earnings. Parameters of
the schedule represent the TANF rules faced when initially entering the program. In some
cases income disregards decrease after a period sustained earnings. See Section 5.1 for
more details.
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Figure 7: Identifying Variation in Simulated Instrument
(a) Federal Taxes: Cross Child
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(b) Federal Taxes: Cross State
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(c) State Taxes: Cross Child
-1
-.5
0
.5
Ch
ag
ne
 in
 S
ta
te
 Ta
x W
or
k I
nc
en
tiv
e
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Survey year
California Florida Georgia Illinois
Michigan New Jersey New York North Carolina
Ohio Pennsylvania Texas Virginia
Variation in Simluated Instrument for Change in State Tax Work Incentive
(d) State Taxes:Cross State
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(e) AFDC/TANF: Cross Child
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Notes: Each of these graphs display the evolution of simulated instruments over time.
These graphs show the values for high school dropouts. The left panels separates the
values by number of children. The right panels separate by state and are shown for
single mothers with two children. The value of the instrument is the increase in income
by becoming employed. The vertical axis is denominated in thousands of real 2010 USD.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Simulated Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation High School High School Some
Sample Dropout Graduate College
Panel A: Demographics
Age 34.1 33.6 33.9 34.5
No Children Percent 65.1 59.6 65.8 67.0
1 Child Percent 17.7 16.9 17.8 18.0
2 Children Percent 10.8 12.3 10.6 10.3
3+ Children Percent 6.3 11.2 5.8 4.7
Percent Black 21.0 24.7 21.5 18.7
Percent Hispanic 14.6 30.0 12.2 10.0
Panel B: Income, Taxes and Transfers (Real 2010 Dollars)
Imputed Pre-tax Wage Earnings 22452 14445 21819 26858
Federal Taxes: No Children 2093 874 1931 2772
Federal Taxes: 2 Children -972 -2046 -1120 -206
State Taxes: No Children 571 267 537 734
State Taxes: 2 Children 325 63 309 488
AFDC/TANF: No Children 0 0 0 0
AFDC/TANF: 2 Children 1666 2745 1546 1207
SNAP: No Children 605 982 594 462
SNAP: 2 Children 2213 3103 2199 1736
AFDC/TANF and SNAP: Zero Income, No Children 2052 2038 2051 2059
AFDC/TANF and SNAP: Zero Income, 2 Children 11439 11513 11402 11441
Net Tax and Transfers (Ti): No Children 5495 2351 5185 7127
Net Tax and Transfers (Ti): 2 Children -1156 -5640 -1242 1427
Number of observations 773367 138766 334359 300242
Notes: This table summarizes the simulated instrument. Each of the tax and transfer variables are
an average over a constant earnings distribution. The Imputed Pre-tax Wage Earnings is the weighted
mean of the imputed incomes. A negative tax value is a tax credit. See Section 4.2 for details on the
construction of the simulated instrument.
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Table 2: Marginal Effects: Income Gain from Employment, Multiple Sources
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D y: Total Income 0.021
(0.0024)⇤⇤⇤
D y: Federal Taxes 0.045 0.041 0.038
(0.0052)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0047)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0053)⇤⇤⇤
D y: State Taxes 0.039 0.032 0.031
(0.018)⇤⇤ (0.015)⇤⇤ (0.015)⇤⇤
D y: AFDC/TANF 0.022
(0.0027)⇤⇤⇤
D y: AFDC/TANF and SNAP 0.019 0.020
(0.0024)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0025)⇤⇤⇤
D y: TANF and SNAP -0.0018
(0.0019)
N 16605 16605 16605 16605
r2 0.34 0.26 0.29 0.30
TotInc elast 0.33
fed elast 0.72 0.65 0.62
state elast 0.62 0.52 0.50
AFDC TANF elast 0.36
AFDC TANF SNAP elast 0.31 0.32
TANF SNAP elast 0.29
CraggDonald F 10568.8 304.8 1633.6 1009.2
Chi2 16.6 16.2 18.6
Pvalue 0.00024 0.00030 0.00033
Notes: (* P<.1, ** P<.05, *** P<.01). Standard errors clustered at the state level. The unit
of observation is a state-year-educationGroup-numberKids cell. Regressions control for race,
ethnicity as well as education, state, year and number of children fixed effects. Column 2 includes
controls for SNAP. Column 3 estimates the joint effect of AFDC/TANF and SNAP, in addition to
taxes. Column 4 introduces a dummy equal to one for every year after TANF was implemented in
1997. The fifth row of Column 4 is the estimate for AFDC and SNAP, the sum of the fifth and sixth
rows is the estimate for TANF and SNAP. Implied elasticities are calculated the percent change in
the employment ratio as a percent change in total income due to a change in the labeled source.
See Section for details. The Cragg-Donald F-stat is a test for weak instruments with multiple
endogenous variables. The c2 and p-values are from a test that all of the listed coefficients are
equal.
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Table 3: Marginal Effects: Income Gain from Employment, Multiple Sources: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Division FE State FE Region FE Div x Yr FE St x Yr FE Reg x Yr FE
D y: Federal Taxes 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.037
(0.0053)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0051)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0053)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0056)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0059)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0053)⇤⇤⇤
D y: State Taxes 0.031 -0.010 0.029 0.028 -0.033 0.027
(0.015)⇤⇤ (0.014) (0.015)⇤ (0.015)⇤ (0.016)⇤⇤ (0.016)⇤
D y: AFDC and SNAP 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.017
(0.0025)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0024)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0022)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0026)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0026)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0022)⇤⇤⇤
D y: TANF and SNAP -0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0020
(0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0017)
N 16605 16605 16605 16605 16605 16605
r2 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.37 0.30
fed elast 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.60
state elast 0.50 -0.16 0.46 0.45 -0.53 0.43
AFDC TANF SNAP elast 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.27
Notes: (* P<.1, ** P<.05, *** P<.01). Standard errors clustered at the state level. Column 1 is a reproduction of Table 2,
Column 4, for comparison. Column 2 replaces CPS division fixed effects with state fixed effects. Column 3 replaces CPS
division fixed effects with CPS region fixed effects. Column 4 replaces CPS division fixed effects with division x year fixed
effects. Column 5 replaces CPS division fixed effects with state x year fixed effects. Column 6 replaces CPS division fixed
effects with CPS region x year fixed effects.
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Table 4: Marginal Effects: Income Gain from Employment, Multiple Sources
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D y: Total Income 0.015
(0.0022)⇤⇤⇤
D y: Federal Taxes 0.043 0.038 0.037
(0.0052)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0047)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0054)⇤⇤⇤
D y: State Taxes 0.038 0.031 0.030
(0.018)⇤⇤ (0.014)⇤⇤ (0.014)⇤⇤
D y: AFDC/TANF 0.020
(0.0027)⇤⇤⇤
D y: AFDC/TANF and SNAP 0.016 0.016
(0.0022)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0022)⇤⇤⇤
D y: TANF and SNAP -0.0016
(0.0018)
Income at Zero Earnings -0.0072 -0.0040 -0.0047 -0.0045
(0.0026)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0025) (0.0025)⇤ (0.0025)⇤
N 16605 16605 16605 16605
r2 0.34 0.27 0.30 0.30
TotInc elast 0.25
fed elast 0.70 0.62 0.59
state elast 0.61 0.50 0.49
AFDC TANF elast 0.32
AFDC TANF SNAP elast 0.25 0.26
TANF SNAP elast 0.24
CraggDonald F 8748.2 273.1 1359.0 887.2
Chi2 19.5 20.0 22.0
Pvalue 0.000057 0.000045 0.000066
Notes: (* P<.1, ** P<.05, *** P<.01). Standard errors clustered at the state level. This table is
analogous to Table 2, with the inclusion of a variable for the income an individual would receive
if they had not earnings. The unit of observation is a state-year-educationGroup-numberKids
cell. Regressions control for race, ethnicity as well as education, state, year and number of
children fixed effects. Column 2 includes controls for SNAP. Column 3 estimates the joint effect
of AFDC/TANF and SNAP, in addition to taxes. Column 4 introduces a dummy equal to one for
every year after TANF was implemented in 1997. The fifth row of Column 4 is the estimate for
AFDC and SNAP, the sum of the fifth and sixth rows is the estimate for TANF and SNAP. Implied
elasticities are calculated the percent change in the employment ratio as a percent change in total
income due to a change in the labeled source. See Section for details. The Cragg-Donald F-stat is
a test for weak instruments with multiple endogenous variables. The c2 and p-values are from a
test that all of the listed coefficients are equal.
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Part II
Optimal Income Taxation with Unemployment and Wage Responses:
A Sufficient Statistics Approach (Joint work with Kory Kroft,
Etienne Lehmann and Johannes Schmieder)
8 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed a large shift in the U.S. tax and transfer
system away from welfare towards in-work benefits. In particular, for sin-
gle mothers, work incentives increased dramatically: welfare benefits were
cut and time limits introduced, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was
expanded and changes in Medicaid, job training programs and child care
provision encouraged work. The shift away from programs featuring a Neg-
ative Income Tax (NIT) structure (lump-sum transfers to the non-employed
with positive employment taxes) towards EITC-like programs (negative em-
ployment taxes at the bottom) is prevalent in other countries including
Canada, France, South Korea and the U.K.
The literature evaluating these policy reforms largely views them as suc-
cessful. For single mothers, the reforms sharply reduced welfare caseloads
and increased labor force participation and income (Eissa and Liebman,
1996, Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001b, Eissa and Hoynes, 2006, Gelber and
Mitchell, 2012, Hoynes and Patel, 2015) and consumption levels (Meyer
and Sullivan, 2004, 2008). Within an optimal income taxation frame-
work, the various tax policy changes substantially improved welfare (Eissa,
Kleven, and Kreiner, 2008). This is consistent with Saez (2002) who shows
that the optimal income tax features an EITC-like structure at the bottom
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of the income distribution when labor supply responses are primarily con-
centrated along the extensive margin relative to the intensive margin and
the welfare weight on the working poor is greater than one.
Two important assumptions in Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner (2008) and
Saez (2002) are that all job-seekers find work and wages are fixed with
respect to the tax system. The first assumption may be appropriate during
the 1990s when the U.S. unemployment rate was falling and was very low,
by historical standards, but may be less realistic in more recent periods
where unemployment rates exceeded 10 percent. In fact, recent work by
Bitler, Hoynes, and Kuka (2014) shows that for single women, the EITC
does not provide much protection during economic downturns. Further-
more, even in a full employment economy, the assumption of fixed wages
may be implausible (Rothstein, 2010). It is also worth noting that these
assumptions rule out any labor market spillover effects of government poli-
cies. Since anyone can find a job at all times, there is no mechanism by
which a boost to the labor force could “crowd out” job finding. Thus, these
assumptions are at odds with the growing body of evidence that suggest,
especially during times when unemployment is high, government policies
may induce substantial spillover effects, particularly at the bottom end of
the income distribution. It is desirable to have a theoretical framework
that can account for the presence of these spillovers.
The goal of this paper is to relax the fixed wage and full employment
assumptions and reassess whether the optimal income tax features an
EITC-like structure at the bottom, as in Saez (2002). The paper makes
two key contributions, one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically,
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we derive a sufficient statistics optimal tax formula in a general model
that incorporates unemployment and wage responses to taxation. In the
model, individuals can be out of work by choice (“non-participants”) or by
failing in their search to find a job (“unemployed” ). This contrasts with
Saez (2002) where all active individuals are effectively working. This ad-
dresses Mirrlees (1999) who writes that ”a desire is to have a model in
which unemployment can arise and persist for reasons other than a pref-
erence for leisure”. Rather than specifying the full structure of the labor
market, we pursue a sufficient statistics approach (Chetty, 2009) by al-
lowing wages and the ”conditional employment probability” - the fraction
of participating individuals that are effectively working (i.e. one minus the
unemployment rate) - to depend in a reduced-form way on taxes. Our the-
oretical results show that, for each labor market, the sufficient statistics to
be estimated are: i) the microeconomic participation response with respect
to taxation, ii) the macroeconomic participation response with respect to
taxation and iii) the macroeconomic employment response with respect
to taxation.18 Unlike micro responses, macro responses allow wages and
conditional employment probabilities in each labor market to respond to
a change in taxes. When we consider a restricted version of the model,
whereby tax liabilities in one market do not affect wages, conditional em-
ployment probabilities, and labor supply in other occupations (what we
label the ”no-cross effects” model), we show that an EITC-like policy is op-
timal provided that the welfare weight on the working poor is larger than
the ratio of the micro participation elasticity to the macro participation
18For ease of exposition, we hereafter refer to microeconomic as ”micro” and macroeco-
nomic as ”macro”.
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elasticity.19 When the micro and macro effects are equal, this collapses to
the condition in Saez (2002). Thus, if the macro effect is less than the mi-
cro effect, as our empirical evidence suggests, the optimal policy is pushed
more towards an NIT, relative to the benchmark case.
The intuition for why our optimal tax formula depends on macro em-
ployment responses and macro and micro participation responses is the
following. In the absence of unemployment and wage responses, behav-
ioral responses to taxation only matter through their effects on the gov-
ernment’s budget because they have no first-order effect on an individ-
ual’s objective by the envelope theorem (Saez, 2001, 2002). However, the
latter argument does not apply to wage and unemployment responses be-
cause these responses are not directly chosen by individuals but rather
are mediated at the market level.20 Since the social welfare function is as-
sumed to depend only on expected utilities, market spillovers due to wage
and unemployment responses matter only insofar as macro responses of
expected utility to taxes differ from micro responses. Moreover, since par-
ticipation decisions depend only on expected utilities as well, these market
spillovers are entirely captured by the ratio of macro over micro partici-
pation responses. This is related to results in Kroft (2008) and Landais,
Michaillat, and Saez (2015) who show that to evaluate optimal unemploy-
ment insurance (UI), it is important to estimate the ratio of the micro and
19The no-cross effects model resembles the pure extensive model in Saez (2002), but
additionally allows for unemployment and wage responses to changes in tax liabilities in
the same occupation.
20For example, higher taxes in one occupation may change equilibrium wages, and
therefore labor demand of firms and the conditional employment probabilities that work-
ers face. Such responses may also appear in occupations other than the one where
the tax has changed. Moreover, the tax change may reduce the number of job seekers,
thereby triggering search externalities.
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macro take-up and duration elasticities in the presence of spillover effects,
respectively.
The optimal tax formulas structure our empirical strategy which esti-
mates the sufficient statistics that are inputs to the optimal tax formula
using a standard quasi-experimental research design. Following most of
the literature on labor supply responses to taxation, we focus on single
women. The primary advantage is that this group is most likely to be at the
margin of participating in the labor market and is thereby most affected
by tax and transfer policies at the bottom of the income distribution, in
particular the EITC.21 We adopt a ”cell-based” approach and define labor
markets on the basis of education (high school dropouts, high school grad-
uates, some college but no degree, and college graduates), state and year.
This largely mirrors the definition of labor markets in Rothstein (2010).
To identify the micro participation response, we rely on expansions to the
federal EITC which differentially affected single women with and without
children. For the macro participation and employment responses, we rely
on variation in state EITC levels, as well as variation in welfare benefits
within states over time. To isolate purely exogenous variation in tax liabil-
ities coming from policy reforms, we implement a simulated instruments
approach similar in spirit to Currie and Gruber (1996) and Gruber and
Saez (2002). Our instrumental variables (IV) estimates show that the mi-
cro participation elasticity, for the full sample of single women, is 0.63.
21Our sample omits married women and men. Rothstein (2010) points out that the
wages of similarly skilled single and married women substantially diverged in the 1990s.
For this reason, it seems reasonable to assume they operate in distinct labor markets.
For men on the other hand, to the extent that they are substitutable for single women,
we will be understating the size of each labor market and overstating the changes in
market-level average tax rates. These effects will tend to work in opposite directions.
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This generally lines up with the range of estimates reported in the litera-
ture (Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner, 2008). Our estimate of the macro partic-
ipation and employment elasticity is 0.51. Finally, we estimate how these
behavioral responses vary over the business cycle, proxied by the local
unemployment rate, and we find suggestive evidence that the responses
are lower in magnitude when the unemployment rate is relatively high,
although our estimates are imprecisely estimated. We also find sugges-
tive evidence that the ratio of the micro to macro participation responses
increases during times of high unemployment.
As an illustration, we use our empirical estimates to implement our suf-
ficient statistics formula and calibrate the optimal income tax. We demon-
strate three key results. First, relative to the optimal tax schedule in Saez
(2002), we find that since the macro participation response is less than
the micro response, this moves the optimal schedule more towards an
NIT-like tax schedule with a relatively larger lump sum payment to the
non-employed combined with higher employment tax rates. Second, we
show that calibrating our tax formula with smaller (employment and par-
ticipation) macro responses has a much larger effect on the shape of the
optimal tax profile (leading to a larger lump sum transfer and employment
taxes), relative to calibrating the Saez (2002) formula with a smaller em-
ployment elasticity. This shows that it is misleading to simply calibrate
existing tax formulas with macro employment elasticities, as standard in-
tuition might suggest. Third, we use our empirical estimates of behavioral
responses over the business cycle to show that during recessions, the opti-
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mal income tax at the bottom shifts more towards an NIT-like structure.22
The primary advantage of our sufficient statistics approach is its gener-
ality with respect to the underlying mechanisms. In particular, competitive
models with fixed and flexible wages (Diamond, 1980, Saez, 2002, 2004,
Chone´ and Laroque, 2005, 2011, Rothstein, 2010, Lee and Saez, 2012)
and models with matching frictions (Hungerbu¨hler, Lehmann, Parmentier,
and Van der Linden, 2006, Landais, Michaillat, and Saez, 2015) are special
cases of our sufficient statistics formula. To show the role of only allowing
for flexible wages, we retrieve in the online appendix (provided in Section
V) the competitive model with flexible wages when we assume that the
conditional employment probability is either one (i.e., full employment) or
does not respond to taxes (exogenous unemployment), and permit wages to
respond to tax liabilities. Under the assumption that the production tech-
nology exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) and workers are paid their
marginal products, we show that the optimal tax formula exactly equals
the tax formula in Saez (2002) where wages are fixed. Thus, only allowing
for endogenous wages, but not endogenous unemployment, does not affect
the optimal tax schedule. The other advantage of our tax formula is that
it is exact and does not rely on any approximations. The disadvantage of
our approach however is that analytical results about the precise shape of
the optimal tax schedule are harder to obtain.
22Interestingly, while governments have in general shifted away from NIT programs, in
practice, transfers to the bottom get increased during recessions. For example, the U.S.
significantly increased transfers to the non-employed through the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) during the Great Recession as part of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This suggests that the shape of optimal income transfers
at the bottom might depend on the strength of the labor market. Unfortunately, there is
very little research on this question to help guide policymakers since current models by
design do not allow for this possibility.
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Our paper builds on and contributes to the literature on labor supply
responses to taxation in three ways. First, many studies in the tax litera-
ture do not clarify whether labor supply responses correspond to micro or
macro elasticities. An important exception is Rothstein (2010) and Leigh
(2010) who consider labor demand and wage responses to the EITC in the
U.S. Like Rothstein (2010), our empirical work emphasizes this impor-
tant distinction. Additionally, we estimate micro and macro effects, which
is necessary to implement our optimal tax formula, and we use a single
method and the same sample.23 This avoids the concern that differences
in micro and macro estimates are confounded by differences in methods
and/or different samples. Second, our results clarify the importance of
distinguishing between the effects of taxes on labor force participation and
employment. Some studies use the labor force participation rate as the
dependent variable (Gelber and Mitchell, 2012) while others use the em-
ployment rate (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001b). Our optimal tax formula
indicates that it is important to estimate both participation and employ-
ment elasticities. Third, this study adds to the large literature evaluating
the impact of the EITC expansions in the 1980s and 1990s by expanding
the analysis horizon until the most recent years.24
23A recent study by Ja¨ntti, Pirttila¨, and Selin (2015) estimates micro and macro labor
supply elasticities using cross-country data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
along with a single estimator. We estimate the micro elasticity using micro data and con-
trol for market fixed effects. For the macro elasticity, we pool the data to the market level
and control separately for year and state fixed effects. One can show that this approach
is essentially equivalent to one that estimates both the micro and macro equation in a
single regression.
24One of the earliest papers in this tradition, Eissa and Liebman (1996) evaluate the
expansion of the EITC in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and find positive and significant
participation effects, but no effect on hours of work. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001b)
exploit variation in the EITC up until 1996, controlling for changes to welfare (AFDC and
food stamps), Medicaid, child care subsidies, and job training during this time period.
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A number of recent papers have highlighted the distinction between
micro and macro behavioral responses. The first paper to show that both
are important for optimal policy is Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2015),
who consider a model of unemployment insurance (UI) with labor mar-
ket spillovers and demonstrate that the optimal benefit level is a function
of the gap between micro and macro unemployment duration elasticities.
While our model is related in that it deals with spillover effects, the differ-
ence is that we consider multiple income groups of the labor market and
focus on the optimal non-linear income tax; particularly, optimal transfers
at the bottom of the income distribution. Landais, Michaillat, and Saez
(2015) on the other hand have a single labor market and focus on the op-
timal UI benefit level and how this should vary over the business cycle.
Nevertheless, the distinction that the micro elasticity refers to responses
that hold the job-finding rate (conditional on search intensity) and wages
constant, while the macro elasticity allows the job-finding rate to adjust to
UI benefits, is very similar to the distinction we introduce in our model.
Partly inspired by Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2015), some recent pa-
pers have tried to empirically estimate macro and micro effects of UI bene-
fits (e.g. Lalive, Landais, and Zweimu¨ller, 2015) and job search assistance
programs (e.g. Cre´pon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora, 2013) on
unemployment durations.25
Gelber and Mitchell (2012) exploit the same reform along with a large reform to the EITC
in 1993 to examine the impact of taxes on the labor force participation of single women
and their allocation of time to market work versus home production.
25Cre´pon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora (2013) evaluate an experiment of job
placement assistance and find evidence of negative spillover effects (i.e., crowd-out onto
untreated individuals). They find evidence that these spillover effects are larger when
the labor market is slack and interpret this evidence as consistent with a model of job
rationing (Landais, Michaillat, and Saez, 2015). Lalive, Landais, and Zweimu¨ller (2015)
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The distinction between micro and macro responses also plays an im-
portant role in the recent literature estimating extensive and intensive la-
bor supply responses (See Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber, 2011, and
Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber, 2012, for an overview). The terms mi-
cro and macro responses in these papers correspond to conceptually the
same responses that are identified using different sources of variation in
taxes. For macro, the source of variation is cross-country or business cycle
whereas for micro, the source of variation is quasi-experimental. Differ-
ences between the two have been attributed to adjustment costs (Chetty,
Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri, 2011) and optimization frictions (Chetty,
2012), an issue we abstract from in this paper. Instead, we consider re-
sponses that do (macro) or do not (micro) allow for certain equilibrium
adjustment mechanisms.
This paper also relates to recent research on whether the generosity of
UI benefits should depend on the state of the labor market. Unemploy-
ment benefits create a similar problem as traditional welfare benefits in
that they provide transfers that are conditional on not working (or at least
are at their maximum) and thus provide incentives not to work, while at
the same time providing important insurance against hardship. Just as in
the optimal taxation literature, the efficiency loss from providing UI is in-
versely related to the labor supply elasticities. Baily (1978), Chetty (2006),
Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender (2012), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2014)
show that the unemployment spells of individuals ineligible for UI were affected by a large
expansion of Austria’s UI benefits. Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013)
estimate large macro effects of unemployment insurance policies during the Great Reces-
sion. This is inconsistent with evidence that the micro effects of UI are small (Rothstein,
2011, Farber and Valletta, 2013). The authors stress the role of labor demand, although
Marinescu (2014) does not find robust evidence of UI on vacancy creation.
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and Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2015) derive welfare formulas where
the marginal effect of increasing the generosity of unemployment benefits
depends on the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the
benefit generosity. These papers provide empirical evidence that the labor
supply elasticities determining the optimal benefit durations (Schmieder,
Von Wachter, and Bender, 2012) and levels (Kroft and Notowidigdo 2014
and Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2015) decline during periods of high
unemployment and that the generosity of the UI system should therefore
increase during these times. There are also papers that directly exam-
ine how labor supply responses to taxation vary with local labor market
conditions. Closer to our setting, Herbst (2008) shows that the labor sup-
ply responses to a broad set of social policy reforms in the U.S. during
the 1990s, such as EITC expansions, time limits, work requirements and
Medicaid, are cyclical. Mogstad and Pronzato (2012) shows that labor sup-
ply responses to a “welfare to work” reform in Norway are attenuated when
the local unemployment rate is relatively high.
Finally, our work broadly relates to research which permits labor de-
mand variables to determine employment outcomes and welfare partici-
pation for males and females. Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987) shows
that demand characteristics, such as unemployment rates, are impor-
tant determinants of work for married females. Using the PSID, Ham and
Reilly (2002) also find evidence that unemployment rates are significant
predictors of work for males. While these papers focus on how demand-
side factors affect the level of employment, our research explores whether
such factors influence the change in employment in response to taxes and
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transfers. The role of demand side factors in affecting welfare use has been
noted by others (see Hoynes 2000), yet their normative implications have
not been fully investigated so far.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 20 develops our theo-
retical model. Section 10 contains details on Institutional background and
describes our data and empirical results. Section 11 considers the policy
implications of our theoretical and empirical findings. The last section
concludes.
9 The theoretical model
In this section, we derive an optimal tax formula in a general model
that is consistent with a rich set of labor market responses to taxation.
Following Chetty (2009), we use this benchmark model to identify the suf-
ficient statistics that are necessary to compute the optimal income tax. We
do so first in the no-cross effects case where employment and participa-
tion responses are only on the extensive margin. This allows us to show
the intuition of the main result before we go to the general formula that
holds with arbitrary responses to taxes across labor markets. Our ap-
proach contrasts with papers that have incorporated unemployment into
models of optimal taxation in a more structural way such as competi-
tive models without unemployment (Mirrlees, 1971, Diamond, 1980, Saez,
2002), models with wage rigidity and job rationing (Lee and Saez, 2012)
and matching models and Nash bargaining (Pissarides, 1985).26 Below,
26See Boadway and Tremblay (2013) for an excellent review of optimal income taxation
in models with unemployment.
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we illustrate how these various structural models map into our sufficient
statistic formula.
9.1 Setup
Labor markets
We generalize the model in the appendix of Saez (2002) by introducing
unemployment and wage responses to taxation. The size of the population
is normalized to 1. There are I + 1 “occupations” or income levels, indexed
by i 2 {0, 1, ..., I}. Occupation 0 corresponds to non-employment. All other
occupations correspond to a specific labor market where the gross wage is
wi, the net wage (or consumption) is ci and the tax liability is Ti = wi   ci.
The assumption of a finite number of occupations is made for tractability.
It is not restrictive as the case of a continuous wage distribution can be
approximated by increasing the number I of occupations to infinity. The
timing of our static model is:
1. The government chooses the tax policy.
2. Each individual m chooses the occupation i 2 {0, ..., I} to participate
in. Individual heterogeneity only enters the model through the cost of
search, as we indicate below.
3. For each labor market i 2 {1, ..., I}, only a fraction pi 2 (0, 1] of partic-
ipants are employed, receive gross wage wi, pay tax Ti and consume
the after-tax wage ci = wi   Ti. The remaining fraction 1  pi of partic-
ipants are unemployed.
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Unlike Saez (2002), we make a distinction among the non-employed
individuals between the unemployed who search for a job in a specific
labor market and fail to find one and the non-participants who choose not
to search for a job.27 For each labor market i 2 {1, ..., I}, ki denotes the
number of participants, pi 2 (0, 1] denotes the fraction of them who find
a job and are working, hereafter the conditional employment probability,
and hi = ki pi denotes the number of employed workers. The number of
unemployed individuals in labor market i is ki   hi = ki(1   pi) and the
unemployment rate is 1  pi. The number of non-participants is k0. The
number of non-employed is h0 = k0 +ÂIi=1 ki(1  pi).
All the non-employed, whether non-participants or unemployed, receive
the same welfare benefit denoted b.28 Therefore, the policy choice of the
government is represented by the vector t = (T1, ..., TI , b)0. The government
faces the following budget constraint:
I
Â
i=1
Ti hi = b h0 + E ,
I
Â
i=1
(Ti + b) hi = b+ E (6)
where E   0 is an exogenous amount of public expenditures. One more
employed worker in occupation i increases the government’s revenues by
the amount Ti of tax liability she pays, plus the amount of welfare benefit b
27We simply assume job search intensity is either zero for non-participants or one
for participants. Introducing a continuous job search intensity decisions as Landais,
Michaillat, and Saez (2015) would add notational complexity while not substantially mod-
ifying the results.
28This is because the informational structure of our static model prevents benefits from
being history-dependent. Moreover, as the government only observes income, it cannot
distinguish non-participants from unemployed individuals. This latter assumption seems
more realistic than the polar opposite one where the government can perfectly monitor
job search. In this case, and if there is only one occupation, the government can provide
full insurance to the unemployed.
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she no longer receives, the sum of two defining the employment tax.29 The
budget constraint states that the sum of employment tax liabilities Ti + b
collected on all employed workers in all occupations finances the public
good plus a lump-sum rebate b over all individuals.
Rather than specify the micro-foundations of the labor market, we use
reduced-forms to describe the general equilibrium or macro responses of
wages and conditional employment probabilities to tax policy t.30 In labor
market i, the gross wage is given by wi = Wi(t), the net wage is given by
ci = Ci(t)
def⌘ Wi(t)  Ti and the conditional employment probability is given
by pi = Pi(t). At this general stage, we are agnostic about the micro-
foundations that lie behind these macro response functions and we only
assume that these functions are differentiable, that P(·) takes values in
(0, 1] and that 0 < b < W1(t) < ... < WI(t) for all tax policies t. The latter
assumption ensures that occupations indexed with a higher i correspond
to labor markets with higher skills. The functions Wi(·), Ci(·) andPi(·) en-
capsulate all the effects of taxes, including those occurring through labor
demand and wage setting responses.
Profits do not appear explicitly in our model. This is consistent with
two possible scenarios. First, many natural models of the labor market,
such as competitive models with constant returns to scale (Lee and Saez,
2012) or models with matching frictions on the labor market and free entry
29The literature uses instead the terminology participation tax, which we find confusing
whenever unemployment is introduced. The employment tax Ti + b captures the change
in tax revenue for each additional employed worker. An additional participant being only
employed with probability pi, the change in tax revenue for each additional participant is
only (Ti + b)pi, which should correspond to the participation tax.
30We implicitly assume that an equilibrium exists and is unique. This equilibrium
varies smoothly with the policy t in a way described by the W (·), the C (·) and the P(·)
functions.
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(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) have profits equal to zero in equilibrium.
Second, our results are consistent with the presence of profits if we assume
that profits are not taxed and if the welfare of capital owners who receive
profits does not enter the social welfare function. These assumptions are
clearly simplifying. We consider in subsection 9.4 an extension of our
model with partially taxed profits.
Labor supply decisions
The structure of labor supply is as follows. We let u(·) be the cardinal
representation of the utility individuals derive from consumption. This
function is assumed to be increasing and weakly concave. Individual m
faces an additional utility cost di for working in occupation i and a utility
cost ci(m) for searching a job in labor market i.31 Individual m thus enjoys
a utility level equal to u(ci)  di   ci(m) if she finds a job in labor market
i, equal to u(b)   ci(m) if she is unemployed in labor market i, and u(b)
if she chooses not to search for a job. Let Ui(t)
def⌘ Pi(t) (u (Ci(t))  di) +
(1 Pi(t)) u(b) denote the gross expected utility of searching for a job in
occupation i, absent any participation cost, as a function of the tax policy
t, and let Ui denote its realization at a particular point of the tax system.32
Let U0 = u(b) be the utility expected out of the labor force.
Individual m expects utility Ui   ci(m) by searching for a job in labor
market i. She chooses to search in labor market i if and only if Ui  
31We denote c0(m) = 0. We furthermore assume that ci(m) = +• if individual m does
not have the required skill to work in occupation i.
32Ui is identical across all participants because the conditional employment probability
pi and the wage wi are identical across participants in labor market i and in particular do
not vary with (c1(m), ...,cI(m)).
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ci(m) > Uj   cj(m) for all j 2 {0, ..., I} \ {i}. The set of individuals choosing
to participate in labor market i is therefore Mi(U1, ...,UI , u(b))
def⌘ {m|i =
argmaxj2{0,...,I} Uj   cj(m)}. Assuming that participation costs (c1, ...,cI)
are distributed in the population in a sufficiently smooth way and denoting
µ(.) the distribution of individuals, the number ki of participants in labor
market i is a continuously differentiable function of expected utility in
each occupation through: ki = Kˆi(U1, ...,UI , u(b)) def⌘ µ(Mi(U1, ...,UI , u(b))).
Participation decisions are determined through:
ki ⌘ Ki(t) def⌘ Kˆ (U1(t), ...,UI(t), u(b)) (7)
Finally, employment is given by:
hi = Hi(t) def⌘ Ki(t)Pi(t) (8)
Micro vs. Macro Responses
A crucial distinction is the difference between macro and micro partici-
pation responses to taxes. We define the micro participation response to a
tax change in the hypothetical case where tax changes do not affect gross
wages w1, ...,wI or conditional employment probabilities p1, ..., pI. This is,
for instance, the case for tax reforms frequently considered in the micro-
econometric literature that affect only a small subset of the population, so
that the equilibrium effects of the reform on wages and conditional employ-
ment probabilities can be safely ignored. The micro response of expected
utility is thus  piu0(ci). Moreover, from Equation (7), as taxes affect partic-
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ipation decisions only through expected utility levels in each occupation,
the micro participation response is given by:
∂Ki
∂Tj
     
Micro
def⌘  pju0(cj) ∂Kˆi∂Uj (9)
Conversely macro responses encapsulates wage and conditional em-
ployment probability responses. The macro response of expected utility is
therefore:
∂Ui
∂Tj
=
"
∂Ci
∂Tj
+
∂Pi
∂Tj
u(ci)  di   u(b)
pi u0(ci)
#
pi u0(ci) (10)
The term within brackets on the right-hand side of (10) in particular de-
scribes how the wage and conditional employment probability responses
induce a gap between macro and micro expected utility responses. Using
(7) and (10), the macro participation response is given by:
∂Ki
∂Tj
=
I
Â`
=1
∂U`
∂Tj
∂Kˆi
∂U`
=
I
Â`
=1
"
∂C`
∂Tj
+
∂P`
∂Tj
u(c`)  d`   u(b)
p` u0(c`)
#
p` u0(c`)
∂Kˆi
∂U`
(11)
The micro and macro participation responses differ for two main rea-
sons. First, utility levels in the occupation that experiences the tax change
can be affected by change in the wage and in the conditional employment
probability in that occupation, as we will discuss below. For micro re-
sponses, gross wages are held constant, thus ∂Cj∂Tj =  1 and taxes are
passed through one for one to the worker, while employment probabilities
are also fixed and thus ∂Pj∂Tj = 0. For macro responses on the other hand,
tax adjustments may affect gross wages in a variety of ways ∂Cj∂Tj 6=  1 while
employment probabilities may also change ∂Pj∂Tj 6= 0, e.g. due to changes
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in labor supply in that occupation or due to changes in vacancy creation
by employers, as we will discuss below. Second, utility levels can also be
affected by change in the tax liability in other occupations, explaining the
summation over all occupations in (11). This could be for example because
increasing taxes in occupation j may lead firms to adjust their composi-
tion of labor inputs and may change labor demand for other occupations.
Moreover, it may be because the workers who are less likely to search for
jobs in occupation j may look for jobs in other occupations which will thus
change equilibrium outcomes in those occupations.
Social objective
We assume that the government maximizes a weighted utilitarian wel-
fare objective that depends only on individuals’ expected utilities:
W(U1, ...,UI , u(b)) =
Z
g(m)
✓
max
i
Ui   ci(m)
◆
dµ(m) (12)
where the weights g(m) may vary across individuals. In the particular
case where the utility function u(·) is linear, it is the variation of weights
with the characteristics of individuals through the heterogeneity in g(·)
that generates the social desire for redistribution, while if individual utility
is concave the desire for redistribution comes (also) from individual risk
aversion.33
33It is straightforward - and does not change our results below - to generalize this social
welfare function to the case where the social planners maximizes an arbitrary concave
function of individual expected utilities integrated over the population.
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The optimal policy
The government chooses the tax policy t = (T1, ..., TI , b)0 to maximize
(12) subject to the budget constraint (6). Let l > 0 denote the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the latter constraint. Following Saez (2001,
2002), we define the marginal social welfare weight of workers in occu-
pation i 2 {1, ..., I} as:
gi
def⌘ 1
ki
∂W
∂Ui
u0(ci)
l
=
pi u0(ci)
R
m2Mi g(m) dµ(m)
l hi
(13)
The social weight gi represents the social value in monetary terms of trans-
ferring an additional dollar to an individual working in occupation i. It
captures the micro effect on the social objective of a unit decrease in tax
liability, expressed in monetary terms. Absent wages and conditional em-
ployment probabilities responses, the government is indifferent between
giving one more dollar to an individual employed in labor market i and gi
more dollars of public funds. Using Equations (10) and (13), we get the
following lemma (See Appendix 18).
Lemma 1. The first-order condition with respect to the tax liability Tj in labor
market j is:
0 = hj|{z}
Mechanical effect
+
I
Â
i=1
∂Hi
∂Tj
(Ti + b)| {z }
Behavioral effects
+
I
Â
i=1
"
∂Ci
∂Tj
+
∂Pi
∂Tj
u(ci)  di   u(b)
pi u0(ci)
#
gi hi| {z }
Social Welfare effects
(14)
A unit increase in tax liability triggers the following effects:
1. Mechanical effect: Absent any behavioral response, a unit increase
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in Tj increases the government’s resources by the number hj of em-
ployed individuals in occupation j.
2. Behavioral effects: A unit increase in Tj induces a change ∂Hi/∂Tj in
the level of employment in occupation i. For each additional worker
in occupation i, the government increases its resources by the em-
ployment tax Ti + b that is equal to the additional tax received Ti plus
the benefit b that is no longer paid.
3. Social welfare effects: A unit increase in Tj affects the expected util-
ity in occupation i by ∂Ui/∂Tj. Multiplying by the rate ∂W∂Ui/l at which
each unit change in expected utility affects the social objective in
monetary terms and using Equations (10) and (13), we get that the so-
cial welfare effect of tax Tj in occupation i is: gihi
h
∂Ci
∂Tj
+ ∂Pi∂Tj
u(ci) di u(b)
pi u0(ci)
i
.
Note that because the social welfare function depends on expected
utility Ui, the labor supply response only modifies the decisions of in-
dividuals that are initially indifferent between two occupations, and
thus only have second-order effects on the social welfare objective,
by the envelope theorem (Saez, 2001, 2002). Conversely, wage and
unemployment responses are general equilibrium (macro) responses
induced by the market instead of being directly triggered by individ-
ual choices. This is the reason why these “market spillovers” show up
in the social welfare effect through the term within brackets, unlike
the participation responses. Because the social objective as well as
participation decision depend on the tax policy only through expected
utility levels in each occupation, the same terms ∂Ci∂Tj +
∂Pi
∂Tj
u(ci) di u(b)
pi u0(ci)
65
describe how macro social welfare effects differ from micro ones and
how macro participation responses differ from micro ones.
Optimal benefit level
Finally, for the sake of completeness, the first-order condition with re-
spect to the welfare benefit b is (see Appendix 18):
0 =  h0 +
I
Â
i=1
(Ti + b)
∂Hi
∂b
+ g0h0 +
I
Â
i=1
gihi

∂Ci
∂b
+
1
pi
∂Pi
∂b
u(ci)  di   u(b)
u0(ci)
 
(15)
where the social marginal welfare weight on the non-employed is:
g0
def⌘ u
0(b)
h0
"Z
m2M0
g (m)
l
dµ(m) +
I
Â
i=1
gi
u0(ci)
ki(1  pi)
#
(16)
In particular, if we furthermore assume there is no income effects so that
ÂIi=1
∂Wi
∂Ti
= ∂Wi∂b , Â
I
i=1
∂Pi
∂Ti
= ∂Pi∂b and Â
I
i=1
∂Hi
∂Ti
= ∂Hi∂b , we get that the weighted
sum of social welfare weights is 1 (See Appendix 18):
g0 h0 +
I
Â
i=1
gi hi = 1
9.2 The sufficient statistics optimal tax formula
To numerically implement the optimal tax formula in equation (14), one
must know the gap in utilities between employment and non-employment,
the responses of net wages to taxation ∂Ci∂Tj and the responses of the con-
ditional employment probabilities to taxation ∂Pi∂Tj that appear in the social
welfare effects. We now show that there is a simpler representation for the
optimal tax formula (14) in terms of the macro ∂Ki∂Tj and micro participation
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responses ∂Ki∂Tj
   Micro. The advantage of this representation is that we may
apply conventional econometric techniques to estimate these terms.
The no-cross effect case
To simplify the exposition and develop intuition, we begin with the “no-
cross effect” case where we assume for simplicity that ∂Wi/∂Tj = ∂Ci/∂Tj =
∂Pi/∂Tj = ∂Kˆi/∂Uj = 0 for i 6= j and i 6= 0. This means that labor demand
only responds to tax liabilities in the same market, but not other mar-
kets. It also implies that labor supply responses are concentrated along
the extensive margin; in other words, individuals can move from non-
employment to work (or vice-versa) in a single occupation, but cannot move
between occupations in response to a tax change. Thus, this rules out in-
tensive margin responses.34 Moreover, we get from (10) that ∂Ui/∂Tj = 0,
which together with (7) and (8) imply that: ∂Ki/∂Tj = ∂Hi/∂Tj = 0 for i 6= j,
i.e. that the wage, the conditional employment probability, the employ-
ment level and the participation level in one occupation only depend on
the welfare benefit b and on the tax liability in the same occupation, and
not on tax liabilities in the other occupations. The no-cross effect environ-
ment includes the model of Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2015) where the
wage depends on the level of tax liability but not on the marginal tax rate.
In the no-cross effect case, Equations (9) and (11) imply that we may ex-
press the macro participation response in terms of the micro participation
response in the following way:
34This convention is similar to Saez (2002) who defines the extensive margin as the
participation margin and the intensive margin as movements between occupations.
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∂Kj
∂Tj
=  
"
∂Cj
∂Tj
+
∂Pj
∂Tj
u(cj)  dj   u(b)
pj u0(cj)
#
∂Kj
∂Tj
     
Micro
The formula (14) for the optimal tax liability in occupation j then simplifies
to:
0 = hj +
∂Hj
∂Tj
(Tj + b) 
∂Kj
∂Tj
∂Kj
∂Tj
     
Micro gjhj (17)
To better relate this expression to the optimal tax literature, we define the
micro participation elasticity as pmj
def⌘   cj bkj
∂Kj
∂Tj
   Micro. This elasticity mea-
sures the percentage of employed workers in i who leave the labor force
when the tax liability is increased by 1 percent, holding wages and the
conditional employment probabilities fixed. Next, we define the macro em-
ployment elasticity as hj
def⌘   cj bhj
∂Hj
∂Tj
. From (8), the macro employment
response hj verifies hj =
cj b
pj
∂Pj
∂Tj
+ pj. In particular, it encapsulates condi-
tional employment responses cj bpj
∂Pj
∂Tj
in addition to the macro participation
responses pj. Moreover, wage and unemployment responses modify the
macro participation responses pj from the micro ones pmj , as discussed
above.
Proposition 1. The optimal tax formula in the no-cross effects case is:
Tj + b
cj   b =
1  pj
pmj
gj
hj
(18)
The no-cross effect environment is the simplest one to understand how
the introduction of unemployment and wage responses modifies the opti-
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mal tax formula compared to the pure extensive case without unemploy-
ment case considered by Diamond (1980), Saez (2002) and Chone´ and
Laroque (2005, 2011) where it is: Tj+bcj b =
1 gj
hj
.
There are two key differences between Equation (18) and Equation (4)
in Saez (2002). First, the denominator in (18) corresponds to the macro
employment elasticity, whereas Saez (2002) does not distinguish between
a micro employment elasticity and macro employment elasticity that in-
cludes all the general equilibrium effects of taxation. Second, equation
(18) modifies the social marginal welfare weight by the ratio of the macro to
micro participation elasticity. The response of expected utility may be dif-
ferent at the macro and micro levels. This is because the macro responses
encapsulate not only the direct effect of a tax change on consumption, but
also the indirect effects of a tax change on the wage ∂Wi∂Ti 6= 0 and on the
conditional employment probability ∂Pi∂Ti 6= 0. The ratio between the micro
and macro expected utility responses corresponds exactly to the ratio of
the macro to the micro participation elasticities. So the welfare effect may
be larger or lower than the social welfare weight gi. To understand why,
consider a decrease in tax liability Tj. This triggers a positive direct impact
on social welfare  gjhj, which is the only one at the micro level. Moreover,
this decrease in tax liability typically induces a decreases in the gross wage
when ∂Wj∂Tj > 0, so the responses of wage attenuates the direct impact on so-
cial welfare. Finally, the decrease in tax liability also typically triggers a
rise in job creation, i.e. ∂Pj∂Tj < 0, so the response of the conditional employ-
ment probability reinforces the direct impact on social welfare. The macro
response of participation to taxation is therefore larger (smaller) than the
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micro one if the impact of the conditional employment responses domi-
nates (is dominated by) the impact of the wage responses. In particular,
if the effect of the tax on the conditional employment probability happens
only though a labor demand response, the macro participation response
is higher than micro one if the labor demand elasticity is high enough. We
therefore get:
Corollary 1. In the no-cross effect case, the optimal employment tax is neg-
ative whenever g1 >
pm1
p1
.
According to (18), a negative employment tax (EITC) becomes optimal
whenever the social welfare weight is higher than the ratio of micro over
macro participation elasticity, instead of one without unemployment and
wage responses.
The case with cross effects
We now turn back to the general formula with cross effects, where ma-
trix notation turns out to be convenient. For f = K, Kˆ, H, U , P, W and
x = T,U, we denote dfdx the square matrix of rank I whose term in row j
and column i is ∂ fi∂xj for i, j 2 {1, ..., I}.35 Symmetrically, the matrix of mi-
cro responses are denoted dfdx
   Micro. Moreover, h = (h1, ..., hI)0 denotes the
vector of employment levels, g h = (g1h1, ..., gIhI)0 denotes the vector of wel-
fare weights times employment levels and · denotes the matrix product.
Appendix 18.1 then shows that market spillover terms ∂Ci∂Tj +
∂Pi
∂Tj
u(ci) di u(b)
pi u0(ci)
that appear in the social welfare effects in the optimal tax formula (14) still
35In particular, these matrices do not include partial derivatives with respect to b, nor
do they include partial derivatives for occupation 0.
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correspond to the ratio of macro over micro participation responses. The
only difference is that in the presence of cross effects, this ratio should be
understood in matrix terms. We thus get the following generalization of
the optimal tax (17) in the presence of cross effects:
Proposition 2. If dKdT
   Micro is invertible, the optimal tax system for occupa-
tions i = {1, ..., I} solves the following system of equations in matrix form:
0 = h+
dH
dT
· (T+ b)  dK
dT
·
 
dK
dT
    Micro
! 1
· (g h) (19)
Equation (19) is expressed in terms of sufficient statistics. It implies
that the ratio (in matrix terms) of macro to micro participation responses
are the sufficient statistics to estimate, instead of the market spillover
terms that depend on net wage ∂Ci∂Tj and conditional employment probability
responses ∂Pi∂Tj . Intuitively, because the social welfare function is assumed
to depend only on expected utilities, the market spillovers that appear in
the social welfare effects in (14) coincide with the terms ∂Ci∂Tj +
∂Pi
∂Tj
u(ci) di u(b)
piu0(ci)
that describe how the macro responses of expected utility differ from the
micro ones (see (10)). Moreover, because participation decisions depend
only on expected utility as well, these market spillovers are entirely cap-
tured by the matrix ratio of macro over micro participation responses. Im-
portantly, the gap between micro and macro responses does not matter
for the behavioral effects, but only for the social welfare effects. This is
because the matrix dHdT of macro employment responses already encap-
sulates the unemployment and wage responses in addition to the micro
participation responses.
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9.3 The links between the optimal tax formula and micro-foundations
of the labor market
In this section, we discuss how different micro-foundations yield differ-
ent predictions for the relative magnitude of micro and macro participation
(and to a lesser degree employment) responses. This serves to build intu-
ition for the macro-micro gap and thereby what economic forces push the
optimal tax at the bottom towards an EITC or NIT, while at the same time
highlighting how our framework encompasses standard models of the la-
bor market. We start with the search-matching paradigm before presenting
the job-rationing paradigm. We then briefly discuss the competitive model
and finally models with a wage moderating effect of tax progressivity.
Search and matching models with constant returns to scale (CRS)
In its simplest version, the search-matching framework (Diamond, 1982,
Pissarides, 1985, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Pissarides, 2000) as-
sumes a linear production function and a constant returns to scale match-
ing function which gives the number of jobs created as a function of the
number of vacancies and the number of job seekers. Firms employ more
workers the lower the gross wage (which makes it more rewarding for firms
to hire a worker) and the more numerous job-seekers there are (which de-
crease the search congestions from firms’ viewpoint thereby easing their
recruitment). In the model, the conditional employment probability pi is
a decreasing function Li(·) of the gross wage and is independent of the
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number of job-seekers.36 Therefore, a policy reform that increases labor
supply, without affecting the gross wage, leads to a rise in employment in
the same proportion as the rise in labor supply, but does not affect the
employment probability.
If we consider a version of the matching model where wages are fixed,
then the conditional employment probabilities are fixed, so the macro par-
ticipation responses are equal to the micro ones. If we instead consider a
version of the matching model where wage setting is based on wage bar-
gaining, taxes may affect the outside option for workers as well as the
match surplus and thus equilibrium wages and in turn conditional em-
ployment probabilities. To build intuition, consider the case with risk
neutral workers (hence u(c) ⌘ c) and proportional bargaining. In such
a setting, workers receive an exogenous share bi 2 (0, 1) of the total match
surplus yi   Ti   di   b, so the wage is given by:37
wi = Wi(Ti, b) ⌘ bi yi + (1  bi)(Ti + di + b) (20)
Combining the labor demand relation pi = Li(wi) with the wage equa-
tion (20) and the assumption that labor supply responses are concen-
trated along the extensive margin provides a complete search-matching
micro-foundation for the no-cross effect economy. The following proposi-
tion shows that the macro-micro participation gap is directly linked to the
bargaining weights and the elasticity of the matching function with respect
36We derive in Appendix19 this standard result, as well as the proof of Proposition 3
below.
37A similar expression for wage bargaining appears in Jacquet, Lehmann, and Van der
Linden (2014) and in Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2015).
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to the number of job-seekers µi 2 (0, 1):
Proposition 3. In the search-matching economy with proportional bargain-
ing (20), the micro and macro participation responses are equal either when
the workers have full bargaining power so there is no wage responses, or
when the Hosios (1990) condition bi = µi is verified. If bi < µi the macro
response is lower then micro one. If µi < bi < 1 the macro response is larger
then micro one.
An increase in tax liability has three effects on expected utility, thereby
on participation decisions. First, absent wage and conditional employ-
ment response, a rise in Ti has a direct negative impact at the micro level
(holding wi and pi constant) as it reduces the net wage and thus incen-
tives to work and to participate. Second, at the macro level, gross wages
increases (through bargaining) attenuating the direct labor supply effect.
Finally, the gross wage increase triggers a reduction in labor demand that
amplifies the direct effect at the macro level. If the workers get all of the
surplus (i.e. if bi = 1), wages do not respond to taxation (
∂Wi
∂Ti
= 0), the con-
ditional employment probabilities are not affected so the micro and macro
responses to participation are identical. On the other hand, if bi < 1, the
conditional employment probability effect dominates (is dominated by) the
wage effect whenever the labor demand elasticity is (not) sufficiently elas-
tic, which happens when the matching elasticity µi is higher (lower) than
the bargaining share bi. Propositions 1 and 3 imply that the optimal em-
ployment tax rate on the working poor is more likely to be negative in the
no-cross effect DMP case than in the pure extensive case if the workers’
bargaining power is inefficiently high, i.e, is higher than the bargaining
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power prescribed by the Hosios (1990) condition.38 Therefore, in the DMP
model the macro micro participation gap can be higher or lower than one,
attenuating or reinforcing the arguments in favor of a negative participa-
tion tax at the bottom.39
Finally, it is worth noting that under the Hosios (1990) condition bi = µi,
while the macro and the micro participation elasticities are equal, this does
not imply that the macro employment elasticities is equal to the micro em-
ployment elasticity. At the micro level, for fixed wages and tightness, a 1%
increase in tax reduces employment only through the reduction in partic-
ipation. The micro employment elasticity is therefore equal to the micro
participation elasticity. Under the Hosios (1990) condition, the latter is
equal to the macro participation elasticity. However, as a 1% increase in
tax also decreases tightness because of the wage response to taxes, the
conditional employment probability is also reduced, so the macro employ-
ment response is larger than the macro participation response.
Job-rationing models
An older tradition in economics has proposed job rationing to explain
unemployment. In contrast to the matching framework, the job-rationing
framework assumes search frictions away and considers that each type
of labor exhibits decreasing marginal productivity. In each labor market,
38As
pj
pmj
=
b j
µj
from (29), Equation (18) becomes
Tj+b
cj b =
1  bjµj gj
hj
which corresponds to (19b)
in Jacquet, Lehmann, and Van der Linden (2014).
39By extending this model with intensive labor supply decision, the present model can
include the central mechanism of Golosov, Maziero, and Menzio (2013) where firms have
different productivity and individuals direct their search.
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employment is determined by the equality between the marginal product
and the wage. Unemployment occurs whenever the wage is set above its
market-clearing level. This theory of unemployment that Keynes (1936)
attributed to Pigou was formalized in the disequilibrium theory (Barro and
Grossman, 1971) and further developed in models that allowed for wages
being set endogenously above the market clearing level (McDonald and
Solow, 1981, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).40
To develop some intuition about the macro-micro participation gap in
job-rationing models, we now consider a model with a single type of labor
that exhibits a decreasing marginal productivity and a fixed gross wage
w. This can occur for instance as a result of a minimum wage regulation.
The fixed wage determines the level of employment h, independently of the
number of participants.41 We assume that individuals who participate face
a heterogeneous participation cost c that is sunk upon participation. The
k participants face the same probability p = h/k to be employed, whatever
the participation cost c they incur if they participate. In such a frame-
work, a tax cut in T triggers a rise in participation at the micro level.
However, provided that this tax cut occurs for a fixed wage, employment
does not change, so the macro employment response is nil. Therefore, as
40The Keynesian and New Keynesian theories of unemployment in addition assume
nominal rigidities to give a transitional role to aggregate demand management policies.
See also Michaillat and Saez (2015) for an extension of the new Keynesian model in which
disequilibrium due to price rigidity are smoothed by matching functions on both the labor
and the product market.
41Note that with a fixed wage, it is no longer equivalent whether the firm or the worker
pays the tax. If the firm pays the tax, then a tax cut reduces the cost of labor and
increases labor demand. In this case, the government controls not only the total tax
liability in an occupation, but also the cost of labor and thereby the employment level.
Lee and Saez (2012) provides conditions where the government finds it optimal to set
the cost of labor above the market-clearing level, thereby generating unemployment in a
job-rationing model.
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the number of participants increases, the probability to be employed is
reduced, which attenuates the participation responses at the macro level,
as compared to the micro one. As a result, the optimal employment tax on
the working poor is more likely to be positive in this job-rationing model
without cross effect than in the pure extensive case.
There are different job-rationing models in the literature. For instance,
in Lee and Saez (2012), there are different types of labor that are per-
fect substitutes, the minimum wage policy is explicitly an additional policy
instrument and efficient rationing is assumed, so that the probability to
be employed varies across participants as a function of their private cost
upon working. Wages can also be made endogenous through union bar-
gaining (McDonald and Solow, 1981) or through efficiency wages (Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Job rationing can also be an-
alyzed within a search-matching framework if decreasing returns to scale
is assumed for the production function, as in Michaillat (2012). As in a job-
rationing model without matching, the macro employment effect would be
dampened compared to the micro one and conditional employment prob-
abilities would fall in response to a tax decrease. This in turn generates
a gap in the micro and macro participation response that captures the
spillover effect on the labor market. While decreasing returns to scale may
not be realistic in the long run, it may be plausible at least in the short-run
during recessions with aggregate demand shortfalls. Landais, Michaillat,
and Saez (2015) discuss this possibility as a possible reason that the effect
of unemployment insurance benefits on employment may be larger when
the labor market is tight than when it is slack and thus the moral haz-
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ard associated with UI may be less severe during a crisis. For the same
reason it may be that reductions in tax levels may have a larger effect on
employment in recessions than in booms and the optimal policy during
recessions may look more like an NIT.42
Competitive models
Like job-rationing models, competitive models assume search frictions
away. However, these models assume that in each labor market, the gross
wage adjusts to clear the labor market so there is no unemployment. If, in
addition, the technology exhibit constant returns to scale and perfect sub-
stitution across the different types of labor, labor demand is perfectly elas-
tic and our model reduces immediately to Saez (2002).43 In such a model,
there is no difference between macro and micro responses, so the optimal
tax formula depends only on the macro (or micro) employment effect of
taxes. On the other hand, consider a competitive model with a constant
returns to scale technology and flexible wages: there would be no unem-
ployment, but wages may adjust to taxes due to imperfect substitution
across the different types of labor. In this case the micro and macro em-
ployment responses may be different due to the wage adjustments in each
labor market, but the participation gap would still capture these spillover
effects. Saez (2004) showed that in such a model, the optimal tax formula
42Though note that we have a static framework which may not be well suited to deter-
mine time-varying optimal taxes over the business cycle.
43Assuming fixed wi and pi, equation (14) collapses to the optimal tax formula (11) in the
Appendix of Saez (2002). This formula can be further specialized by assuming that labor
supply responses are concentrated along the intensive margin (Mirrlees (1971) and Saez
(2002, Equation (6))), along the extensive margin (Diamond (1980), Saez (2002, Equation
(4)) and Chone´ and Laroque (2005, 2011)) or both (Saez (2002, Equation (8)))
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can be expressed using only the micro employment response and takes the
same form as Saez (2002). In the on-line Appendix, we show that this re-
sult remains valid if unemployment rates are positive but exogenous. So,
the optimal employment tax is negative when the social marginal welfare
weight exceeds one. However, even in this case, our optimal tax formula
(19) remains valid.
Wage moderating effects of tax progressivity
Another strand in the literature has stressed the possibility that in-
creases in tax progressivity may actually increase employment. For exam-
ple in the monopoly union model, unions set the wage to maximize the
expected utility of its members, which is increasing in the net wage and in
the level of employment. Since the level of employment is decreasing in the
gross wage, unions do not want to push the wage too high. If tax rates in-
crease (become more progressive) the wedge between net and gross wages
increases and therefore a one unit increase in the net wage will have to be
traded off against a larger loss in employment. Thus unions may actually
accept a lower gross wage in response to an increase in tax progressivity
and tax increases may increase employment.44 The main consequence of
44This result has been obtained in a Monopoly unions model with job rationing by Her-
soug (1984), in a union bargaining model by Lockwood and Manning (1993) or in the
competitive directed search model (or wage posting) of Moen (1997) by Lehmann, Par-
mentier, and Van der Linden (2011). A very similar result can also hold in the efficiency
wage model of Pisauro (1991) or within the matching framework with Nash bargaining
(Pissarides, 1985, 1998), or with the bargaining model of top income earners of Piketty,
Saez, and Stantcheva (2014). Evidence for this wage moderating effect of tax progressiv-
ity can be found in Malcomson and Sartor (1987), Holmlund and Kolm (1995), Hansen,
Pedersen, and Sløk (2000) and Brunello and Sonedda (2007), while Manning (1993) and
Lehmann, Lucifora, Moriconi, and Van der Linden (2015) provide some empirical support
for the unemployment reducing effect of tax progressivity.
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introducing the wage moderating effect of tax progressivity into the model
is to make the matrix dWdT and therefore the matrices
dP
dT ,
dU
dT ,
dK
dT and
dH
dT
non-diagonal. The wage moderating effect of tax progressivity is therefore
an argument against the no-cross effect restriction, which is different than
the presence of labor supply responses along the intensive margin.45
9.4 The introduction of profits
Up to now, profits did not appear in our model. We assumed that if
firms make profits, these profits are untaxed and these profits are received
by some ”capital owners” whose welfare are not included in the social wel-
fare function. Alternatively, the public finance literature considered a po-
lar assumption where profits are assumed to be fully taxed, or, equiva-
lently, where all production is controlled by the government (Diamond and
Mirrlees, 1971). It is therefore important to consider an extension of our
model where profits are taxed at an exogenous rate denoted t.
For that purpose, we consider a model where a representative firm pro-
duces a numeraire good using a decreasing returns to scale technology
F(h1, ..., hI). For simplicity, we consider a pure job rationing model with-
45In the context of our framework reduced to the case with two occupations I = 2, these
models imply that the wage functions Wi not only verify
∂W2
∂T2
> 0 and ∂W1∂T1 > 0, as in the
proportional bargaining case, but also that the marginal tax rate, as approximated by
T2   T1, has a wage moderating and unemployment reducing effect. This implies that
∂W2
∂T1
> 0 > ∂W1∂T2 . Within a matching model, using pi = Li(wi), we obtain
∂P2
∂T2
< 0 and ∂P1∂T1 <
0, but also ∂P2∂T1 < 0 <
∂P1
∂T2
. Hence, making the tax schedule more progressive by increasing
T2 and decreasing T1 increases employment in both occupations, which the government
finds beneficial whenever employment taxes remain positive. Hence, compared to the
proportional bargaining case, the case with a wage moderating/unemployment reducing
effect of tax progressivity leads to a more progressive optimal tax schedule as formally
shown by Hungerbu¨hler, Lehmann, Parmentier, and Van der Linden (2006), Lehmann,
Parmentier, and Van der Linden (2011).
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out search frictions on the labor market. Firms adjust their labor de-
mand to maximize their profits and we get the labor demand conditions
Fi(h1, ..., hI) = wi for all types of labor. With the additional tax revenues
from corporates, the budget constraint (6) becomes:
I
Â
i=1
(Ti + b) hi + t
 
F(h1, ..., hI) 
I
Â
i=1
wihi
!
= b+ E
Using Hotelling’s lemma , the optimality condition is:
0 = hj +
I
Â
i=1
∂Hi
∂Tj
(Ti + b) +
I
Â
i=1
"
∂Ci
∂Tj
+
∂Pi
∂Tj
u(ci)  di   u(b)
piu0(ci)
#
gihi   t
I
Â
i=1
∂Wi
∂Tj
hi
Compared to (14), a new term appear when profits can be taxed: a change
in tax on labor of type j may affects the wages on labor of type j which
triggers a change in the profit tax base. Assuming cross-effects away, the
optimal tax formula (18) becomes:
Tj + b
cj   b =
1  pj
pmj
gj   t
∂Wj
∂Tj
hj
Under rigid wage, the formula with profits is therefore unchanged. If a
part of the tax incidence is conversely on the firm side so that ∂Wj∂Tj > 0,
then EITC becomes more desirable because it triggers a wage reduction
that increases profits, thereby providing additional tax revenue whenever
t > 0.
This extension with profits in a model with diminishing returns to scale
is however partial equilibrium. Typically, one may consider that the actual
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technology exhibits constant returns to scale once a fixed input is made
explicit. The above analysis therefore assumes an exogenous supply of this
fixed factor. While this may be reasonable for land, it is more disputable if
one may think of physical or technological capital for which the supply is
probably very elastic in the long run. Therefore, to include profit taxation,
one needs to make explicit the supply of this input, which is clearly beyond
the scope of the present paper.
10 Estimating Sufficient Statistics
To illustrate the practical relevance of our optimal tax formula, we esti-
mate the sufficient statistics necessary to implement our optimal tax for-
mula, namely the macro employment response to taxes, and the micro and
macro participation responses. We follow the large empirical literature on
the effects of the EITC and welfare reform in the U.S. and focus on sin-
gle women throughout the last three decades. As a consequence of the
gradual expansion of the EITC and the 1990’s welfare reform, this group
experienced substantial changes in participation and marginal tax rates
differentially by number of children, within and across states. These pol-
icy reforms provide sufficient variation to identify both micro and macro
participation responses and macro employment responses.
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10.1 Data
Current Population Survey (CPS)
Our analysis is based on data from the monthly outgoing rotation group
(ORG) and the March annual data of the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The March annual data spans the time period 1984-2011, while the ORG
data (from IPUMS) spans 1994-2010. As our analysis sample, we select all
single women age 18 to 55 who are not in the military or enrolled full time
in school or college. Since there was insufficient tax variation for higher
income individuals we furthermore restrict our sample to women with ed-
ucation less than a bachelors degree. Our theory distinguishes between
individuals who choose to participate in the labor force (and are employed
or unemployed) and those individuals who are actually employed. We mea-
sure these labor market states using the standard International Labor Of-
fice (ILO) criteria. A person is classified as being in the labor force if she is
either employed or unemployed (i.e., actively looking for a job during the
reference week and was available for work) and employed if she has been
working during the reference week (or been temporarily absent from a job).
46
Panel A of Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the demographic
characteristics of single women in the March CPS for the full sample (Col-
umn 1) and broken down by educational attainment groups (Columns 2-
4), pooling all years from 1984 to 2011.47 The age range is pretty similar
46For complete details on sample construction and variable definitions, please see the
online appendix (Section V).
47We do not include the CPS ORG in this table since it spans different years, but when
we compare sample means for the March CPS and ORG for the same period they are
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across the three education groups - less than high school, high school,
and some college - but there are large differences in the distribution of
number of children, with lower educated single women being much more
likely to be mothers. This is likely due to our sample restriction to sin-
gle women since higher educated mothers are more likely to be married.
Additionally, low educated women are more likely to be black or Hispanic
than high educated ones. Panel B displays labor market variables by ed-
ucational attainment. Lower educated women are much less likely to be
in the labor force than higher educated ones and also experience higher
unemployment rates.
Tax and Transfer Calculator
In order to estimate the employment and participation effects of taxes
and transfers it is necessary to compute the budget sets that individuals
face. For this purpose, we build a calculator that computes taxes and
transfers at (nominal) income levels for single women, depending on the
number of children, state and year.48 We assume that a woman is fil-
ing as the head of the household and claims her children as dependents.
To compute taxes (covering federal and state income taxes, including tax
credits, as well as FICA liability), we rely on the NBER TAXSIM software.
We assign taxes based on state of residence, as reported in the CPS, as
well as number of children, year, and income.49 To compute transfers,
extremely close.
48We describe in details below how we impute income that serves as an input to the
calculator.
49For an individual who resides and works in different states, the following rules apply.
Generally an individual is required to pay income tax to his or her state of residence first.
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in particular Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP), we construct a benefit calculator based on rules
published in the Welfare Rules Database, managed by the Urban Insti-
tute. This allows us to compute the benefits an individual is eligible for,
as a function of number of children, state of residence, year and income.
The shift from AFDC to TANF introduced a number of additional work and
eligibility requirements for welfare recipients. For example, federal rules
require a minimum number of TANF recipients to be employed and the life-
time duration of receiving TANF benefits is limited to a total of 5 years.50
Rather than incorporate all of these policies explicitly into our empirical
framework, we multiply benefits by recipiency rates constructed from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The new eligibility re-
quirements are reflected in lower observed recipiency rates in our sample
post-welfare reform.
We use our tax and transfer calculator to compute the incentive to work.
Since we focus solely on the extensive margin in our analysis, we capture
work incentives using just two measures, the transfer an individual re-
ceives when she has zero income and the tax and transfer level at the
Then they must file as a non-resident in the state where they work, but get to take the
amount of tax paid to the state of residence as a tax credit, and only pay the difference.
If the amount of tax paid to the state of residence is greater than the tax bill for the work
state, the individual doesn’t pay anything to the work state, but still has to file. We don’t
take this into account in computing tax liabilities.
50In general, a state must have 50 percent of its single parent households and 90
percent of its dual parent households engaged in work-related activities (these include
not only work but searching for work or training courses) for a minimum number of
hours per week (30 hours per week or 20 hours if there is a young child). The 50 percent
and 90 percent are calculated from a pool of ”work-eligible individuals” which does not
include single parents of children under the age of 1. States can obtain credits against
the 50 and 90 percent rates for overall caseload reduction.
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earnings level an individual obtains when working. A key difficulty is that
earnings, and hence tax liabilities, are unobserved for non-employed indi-
viduals. Moreover, earnings for employed workers may be endogenous to
the tax system. We proceed using two approaches. First, we impute an
individual’s tax liability following the approach taken in Eissa and Hoynes
(2004) and Gelber and Mitchell (2012). We begin by running separate re-
gressions for each education group (e) and year (t) of log annual earnings
for individual m on state fixed effects (de,s,t) and control variables (Xm,e,s,t):
51
log(wm,e,s,t) = de,s,t + Xm,e,s,tpe,t + em,e,s,t (21)
The control variables include state fixed effects, a quadratic function of
age, dummy variables for black and hispanic, and a categorical variable
describing geographic location (i.e., urban versus rural). For each individ-
ual in our sample (both the non-employed and employed), we construct
predicted earnings using the regression coefficients estimated from our
model. This is for the purpose of obtaining a consistent specification.52
We then use predicted earnings to impute an individual’s tax liability us-
ing TAXSIM and the benefit calculator described above.
51For this exercise, we use earnings from the March CPS. To deal with misreporting we
also drop observations where the implied hourly wage is less than one dollar or greater
than one hundred dollars.
52As an alternative, we tried performing a Heckman selection correction to control for
self-selection using the number of children and the presence of young children in the
selection equation. However, we found that the pattern of results were not very well
behaved. In particular, predicted earnings for high school dropouts seemed too high
and earnings for higher education levels seemed unrealistically low relative to the raw
differences earnings across education groups. This is likely due to the lack of a convincing
instrument for working.
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In the online appendix (Section V) , we present OLS regressions of par-
ticipation and employment using this imputed tax liability. One problem
with this approach is that the demographic distribution itself, and there-
fore the imputed tax liabilities, might be endogenous to tax policy. For
instance, more generous transfers to single mothers with kids, but not to
women without children, may boost fertility and impact earnings. To ad-
dress this concern, we also rely on a simulated instrument approach based
on Currie and Gruber (1996).53 This approach isolates policy variation in
tax liabilities since it uses a fixed income and demographic distribution
during the sample period.
There are several steps that we take to implement this procedure. To
construct the simulatedmicro tax liabilities, we first compute real earnings
in 2010 dollars for each employed individual in the sample. Second, using
earnings for the full sample of employed individuals across all years 1984-
2011, we construct the percentiles of the empirical earnings distribution.
Third, we compute for each education group, the percentage of workers
that fall into each centile across all states and years. Fourth, for each
year, we compute the nominal earnings level in each centile, conditional
on real earnings in that year being within the bounds of the centile from
step 2. Fifth, for each year, we take the nominal earnings level in each
centile and we compute tax liabilities separately by number of children
for each state, using the tax and transfer calculator. In the last step, for
each education group, year, state and number of children, we compute
53Gruber and Saez (2002) use this approach to estimate taxable income elasticities;
however, we are not aware of any papers that use this approach to estimate extensive
margin labor supply responses.
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the weighted-mean of the tax liabilities across centiles using the (time-
and state-invariant) education distribution from step 3 as weights. This
leaves us with instruments that are cell means, where the cells are defined
by education group, year, state, and number of children, with variation
driven solely by exogenous changes in the tax code, and not by endogenous
changes in the earnings and/or demographics distribution. Finally, for
the simulated macro tax liability, we aggregate micro tax liabilities across
family types using weights for number of children that vary by education
group, but are time- and state-invariant. All tax liabilities are adjusted
for inflation using the consumer price index for all urban consumers with
2010 as the base year. The simulated cell average (micro and macro) tax
liabilities are then matched back to the CPS data and used as instruments
for imputed tax liabilities, among individuals in a given cell, in a two-stage
least squares regression.
Panel C of Table 5 shows the mean imputed real earnings for each
education group averaged over the years and the corresponding tax and
transfer levels depending on the number of children in the household.
All numbers are reported in real 2010 U.S. dollars (USD). For high school
dropouts, taxes (transfers) are strongly decreasing (increasing) in the num-
ber of children. The welfare benefit for households with no children is
driven entirely by SNAP since these households are ineligible for AFDC or
TANF. For bachelor degree holders, the range is very small and close to
0 since most are ineligible for these mean-tested benefits. Importantly,
the reported welfare benefits do not incorporate recipiency rates which are
much less than 100 percent during our sample period. The last four rows
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report recipiency rates, as estimated in the SIPP. Each individual in the
CPS is assigned a recipiency rate that we calculate from the SIPP based on
education, income and year. The table reports the average of the assigned
recipiency rates separately for AFDC/TANF and food stamps, and also pre-
and post-1996. We see that for high school dropouts, recipiency rates are
roughly 50 percent for AFDC/TANF but fall to 20 percent post-1996. For
food stamps, recipiency rates are much more comparable pre- and post-
1996 and equal to roughly 40 percent.54 These recipiency rates decrease
with education which reflects diminishing eligibility as earnings increase.
10.2 Empirical Method
Specification of Labor Markets
In the theoretical model, individuals sort themselves into I + 1 distinct
occupations. For our empirical analysis, a key difficulty is ranking indi-
viduals, including the non-employed, according to their potential income if
they work. For this purpose, we approximate the labor market an individ-
ual may participate in by her educational attainment (high school dropout,
high school graduate, some college), state and time (year-month). We as-
sume that individuals are perfect substitutes within labor markets and
use (e, s, t) to denote these cells. This labor market definition is consistent
with Rothstein (2010).
54For AFDC/TANF, we calculate recipiency rates based on sample of mothers since
single women with no children are not eligible for these programs.
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Estimating Micro and Macro Participation Responses and Macro Em-
ployment Responses
Equation (19) shows that the optimal tax schedule can be expressed
in terms of macro employment responses and the ratio of macro to mi-
cro participation responses in matrix terms. Ideally one would attempt
to estimate the matrix of macro participation responses ∂Ki∂Tj , the matrix of
micro participation responses ∂Ki∂Tj
   Micro and the matrix of macro employ-
ment responses ∂Hi∂Tj for all labor markets i, j. However, this would lead to
a very large number of cross effects to estimate that would be difficult to
identify, especially the macro responses. Thus, for the purpose of esti-
mation, we focus on the no-cross effects case where the above mentioned
matrices are diagonal. We also assume away income effects by estimat-
ing the responses to employment tax liabilities Ti + b, instead of estimating
separately the responses to tax liability Ti and to benefit b.
In our model Hi and Ki correspond to the number of individuals in in-
come group i, but for an empirical specification that uses variation across
individuals and labor markets, it makes little sense to assume ∂Ki∂Ti or
∂Hi
∂Ti
are constant across labor markets. Instead we will estimate the effect
of taxes Ti on employment and participation rates. We denote the employ-
ment rate in income group i, which in our empirical setting will correspond
to an education group i, as Hˆi and the participation rate as Kˆi. These are
the fraction of individuals with education level i who are employed or par-
ticipating in the labor force, respectively. Estimating the marginal effects of
taxes on employment and participation rates furthermore has the impor-
tant advantage that the estimates are easier to interpret and to compare
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to the prior literature. For example, these estimates are straightforward to
convert to employment and participation elasticities.
To obtain an econometric specification for the responses to taxation
that is motivated by the theoretical model (without cross effects), we make
two assumptions. First, we assume that the conditional employment prob-
ability and wage in a market can be written as functions of the average tax
liability in that market only.55 Second, we assume that tax liabilities vary
across individuals within a labor market according to the number n of chil-
dren in the household.56 The function describing participation decisions
for individual m in labor market (e, s, t) can thus be written as:
Kˆm,e,s,t,n(t) = K˜m,e,s,t,n(pe,s,t(Te,s,t),we,s,t(Te,s,t), Te,s,t,n) (22)
To estimate the micro participation response, we take a linear approx-
imation to Equation (22), add labor market fixed effects (one FE for each
state-by-year-by-month-by-education cell) and flexible controls (education
by number of children FE, and demographic control variables like age,
age-squared, race, ethnicity all interacted with education groups), to get
the following econometric specification:
kˆm,e,s,t,n = Te,s,t,nb+ de,s,t + de,n + Xm,e,s,t,nl+ nm,e,s,t,n (23)
This equation implies that b = ∂Kˆm,e,s,t,n∂Te,s,t,n
   Micro captures the micro participa-
55The restrictions on the econometric specification correspond to the no-cross effect
theoretical assumption that is assumed in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.
56Moffit (1998) argues that the literature features very heterogeneous marriage and
fertility responses to taxes and transfers across studies, with a large number of studies
finding no effect. As a result, he concludes that much more research remains to be done.
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tion effect. Implicit in this specification is a pooling assumption, whereby
the partial derivative of taxes on participation does not vary across labor
markets. We adopt this assumption for simplicity and because it is dif-
ficult to generate exogenous variation in tax liabilities that differentially
affects income groups.
Next, to estimate macro participation responses, we aggregate the data
to state-year-education averages, add education-by-year and education-
by state fixed effects, region specific linear time trends, and demographic
controls (cell averages of the micro controls) interacted with education to
get:
kˆe,s,t = Te,s,tg+ de,s + de,t + Xe,s,tl+ ne,s,t (24)
The macro effect is defined as the change in individual participation prob-
abilities if the tax liabilities for all individuals in a labor market increase
by one dollar. Therefore the macro effect can be obtained as: dKˆe,s,tdTe,s,t = g.
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The market-level employment rate in market (e, s, t) is given by
Hˆe,s,t(Te,s,t) = pe,s,t(Te,s,t) ⇥ Kˆe,s,t(Te,s,t). Thus, the macro employment re-
sponse is given by ∂Hˆe,s,t∂Te,s,t = pe,s,t⇥
∂Kˆe,s,t
∂Te,s,t + Kˆe,s,t⇥
∂pe,s,t
∂Te,s,t . We will rely on a linear
approximation for the market-level employment rate similar to Equation
(24) and we will estimate the macro employment response in a way that is
analogous to how we estimate the macro participation response.
57Note that without income effects, ∂Kˆi∂Ti =
∂Kˆi
∂b .In this case, only the difference in taxes
and transfers between working and not working matters Ti   Ti(0) = Ti + b, and therefore
∂Kˆi
∂Ti
= ∂Kˆi∂b =
∂Kˆi
∂(Ti+b)
. For our main specification, we will assume no income effects and
therefore estimate directly ∂Kˆi∂(Ti+b) thereby using both variation in Ti and b to estimate the
parameter of interest with maximum power. We tested whether the condition ∂Kˆi∂Ti =
∂Kˆi
∂b
holds and found that the difference was very small and statistically insignificant. We
therefore only report results under the no income effect assumption.
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Identification
To identify the parameter b, we require that the micro tax liability Te,s,t,n
is exogenous, conditional on labor market and education-by-number of
children fixed effects and observables. Similarly, our identifying assump-
tion for g is that the macro tax liability Te,s,t is exogenous, conditional on
education-by-state and education-by-year fixed effects and observables.
Thus, two independent sources of exogenous variation in tax liabilities are
needed. For the micro response b, we require variation in tax liabilities
across individuals within the same labor market. For the macro response
g, we require variation in average tax liabilities between labor markets.
As described above, our strategy is to generate such variation using
a simulated instrument approach. The policy variation in the micro tax
liability is illustrated in Figure 8a). This figure plots the average value of
the micro simulated tax liability, by year and number of children, relative
to the value in 1984, for high school dropouts. One can see that there is
substantial variation in taxes over time and this variation is very different
across the number of children. Much of this is driven in large part by
the EITC. In particular, the TRA86 reform can be clearly seen in 1986-
1987, but is quite small relative to the expansions in the 1990s, which also
introduced differential EITC levels for parents with one or two children.
Finally in 2009, the EITC was expanded for parents with 3 children, as
can be seen in the figure, and income taxes were cut for all family types.
The identification strategy is similar to the one used by Eissa and Liebman
(1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001b) and Gelber and Mitchell (2012).
The policy variation in macro tax liability comes mainly from changes
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in state income taxes; in particular, the state-level EITCs and welfare ben-
efits, which vary across states and over time. The large expansions of
the federal EITC, that much of the literature has relied on, are not use-
ful, since the change affected all states simultaneously and thus would
be collinear with time trends. We illustrate this variation by plotting the
macro simulated tax liability for high school dropouts for the largest 12
states in Figure 8b).
A potential concern with our identification strategy is that single women
might move to avoid taxes or receive higher benefits. However, several pa-
pers (e.g. Meyer, 2000, Kennan and Walker, 2010) suggest that this re-
sponse is at best modest, particularly for the sample of low income women
that are the focus of this study. Thus, while migration responses might be
important in other contexts, we do not believe that our estimates will be
confounded by them.
10.3 Empirical Results
For all of our empirical results, we report Instrumental Variables (IV)
estimates from a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression. Reported
standard errors in all regressions are clustered on the state level. The
notes of the tables contain exact details about the regression specification.
All of the OLS results can be found in the online appendix (Section V).
Note that in interpreting these results that the tax liabilities are in units of
$1000.
The top panel of Table 6 shows the IV estimates for the micro partic-
ipation (Column 1) and employment (Column 2) responses to taxes and
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transfers based on equation (23) above. The results indicate a clear neg-
ative and statistically significant participation effect of taxes, consistent
with the prior literature. We find that a $1000 increase in taxes leads
to a 3.4 percentage point reduction in the participation probability which
translates to an elasticity of -0.63.58 We also see fairly similar micro re-
sponses for employment.59
Our elasticity estimates are somewhat large but they are within the
range of elasticities that is reported in the literature.60 This is not that
surprising since we use similar variation in taxes as the previous litera-
ture; in particular, variation driven by the EITC. One notable difference is
that past studies typically control for state and year fixed effects, but not
their interaction. This yields estimates that confound micro and macro re-
sponses (See Rothstein (2010) for a discussion of this). Nevertheless, most
of the tax variation in these papers would also have come from across
group variation within labor markets.
The macro participation and employment IV estimates are displayed
in the second panel of Table 6. These correspond to empirical estimates
58Following the theory, we take the marginal effect and multiply it by the ratio of the
income gain from employment over the participation rate. For example, if we take the
marginal effect of -0.034 and multiply it by the ratio $14.26/0.77, we get an elasticity of
-0.63.
59The online appendix (Section V) reports the OLS regression results. We see that the
OLS participation responses are attenuated relative to our IV estimates. For the full
sample, the micro participation elasticity is 0.09 and the macro participation elasticity
is -0.8. The micro and macro employment responses are of a similar magnitude. This
highlights the importance of instrumenting for the micro and macro tax liabilities. In
general the OLS results are not very informative, for example there is a strong reverse
causality issue where high participation rates will be associated with lower earnings (due
to selection) and higher employment taxes. Isolating variation coming from tax policy
changes is crucial in order to obtain meaningful results.
60Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner (2008) report a range of (-0.35,-1.7) with a central elasticity
of -0.7.
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from a macro-level (education-state-year cells) 2SLS regression of partici-
pation and employment rates on market-level tax liabilities, controlling for
education-by-state and education-by-year fixed effects and percent black,
percent Hispanic, average age, average age-squared, average number of
children and their interactions with education and region-specific time
trends. Since the number of observations is much smaller and since there
is less variation in tax liabilities across labor markets, the coefficients are
estimated less precisely. Nevertheless, there is some suggestive evidence
that the macro participation and employment responses are smaller than
the micro ones. According to Proposition 3, such a finding is consistent
with a matching model where the bargaining power is lower than the one
prescribed by the Hosios condition.
Our results on micro and macro responses to taxation are generally
consistent with the meta analysis conducted in Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and
Weber (2012) who report slightly larger estimates of the extensive steady-
state elasticities based on micro evidence than macro evidence. It is worth
noting that the macro-based studies cited in Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and
Weber (2012) are based on cross-country evidence that typically comes
from a limited number of OECD countries. Nevertheless, it is reassuring
to note that our results are similar, based on a panel data approach across
all states, over time, in the U.S.
A concern with our macro estimates, which are identified by state-year
variation in tax liabilities, is that they may be confounded by policy en-
dogeneity. In particular, states may endogenously set taxes and welfare
benefits based on prevailing local economic conditions. Our baseline es-
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timates control for region-specific time trends which should partially ad-
dress this issue. To further explore the robustness of our estimates, we
consider several alternative specifications and report the results in Table
3. Table 7 provides a series of robustness tests. The first column re-
ports our baseline estimates for comparison. In columns 2-4 we drop the
region-specific time trends from the regressions and include alternative
controls for pre-trends. Since the micro participation regressions control
for year by state fixed effects, these are not affected (Panel A), but Panel
B and C show that the macro responses are very robust to controlling
for division-by-year fixed effects, region-by-year fixed effects and no con-
trols for pre-trends. In column 5 we present our results dropping state
taxes (state EITC and state income taxes) from our imputed tax liability
and instrument, as those may be endogenous, as Hoynes and Patel (2015)
have argued. While this slightly reduces the precision of our macro es-
timates, the results are qualitatively similar. Finally, Column 6 controls
for the state unemployment rate interacted with education as a proxy for
the state specific economic environment and shows a very similar pattern.
Overall, the robustness of our estimates suggest that policy endogeneity is
not of first-order importance in our setting.61
Finally, Table 8 considers behavioral responses over the business cy-
cle. In particular, this allows us to test whether spillovers are larger in
recessions, as some recent research has found. We rely on several proxies
61In column 7 we show our results when we calculate tax liabilities assuming that all
individuals who would be eligible to receive AFDC, TANF or food stamps based on their
income actually take-up benefits. Since this leads to larger calculated tax liabilities (and
values for the instruments), the estimated marginal effects and elasticities are reduced,
but the result that macro participation responses are larger than micro participation
responses is actually more pronounced.
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for the business cycle: the 6-month change in the unemployment rate, the
state unemployment rate and an indicator for whether the unemployment
rate exceeds 9 percent. Across all specifications, we see that micro and
macro participation and employment responses tend to be lower when the
unemployment rate is relatively high. This is consistent with results in
Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender (2012) and Kroft and Notowidigdo
(2014). There is also some suggestive evidence that the micro-macro par-
ticipation gap increases in weak labor markets; for instance, for the 6-
month change in unemployment specification, the gap is roughly 0.1 in
weak labor markets but only 0.01 in strong labor markets. We emphasize
however, that lack of precision limits any strong conclusion about how the
gap varies over the cycle.
Overall, these results suggest that while micro labor supply responses
are sizeable and in line with what the literature has found before, they may
not always be good approximations for the macro employment responses.
In particular our evidence broadly suggests that macro responses tend to
be lower than micro responses. Although this is some of the first evidence
on the gap between micro and macro elasticities, it is however worth noting
that our macro estimates are less precisely estimated than our micro ones.
Such discrepancy can easily been explained by the limited policy variations
at the state level over time, compared to policy variations across women
with different number of kids over time. Future research should use other
source of policy variations as robustness checks for our macro estimates.
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11 Simulating the Optimal Tax Schedule
In this section we show how unemployment and wage responses af-
fect the shape of the optimal tax and transfer schedule. For this purpose
we simulate the optimal tax schedule using the sufficient statistics for-
mula for the optimal tax and transfer schedule. In line with the empirical
section, we focus on the no-cross effects model with its restricted set of
sufficient statistics. These simulations are very stylized and should be
viewed as an illustration of the comparative statics of our optimal tax for-
mula, that highlight the importance of taking spillovers into account. The
resulting tax schedule should not be viewed as a precise attempt to derive
the optimal tax schedule for any particular population.62
To simulate the optimal tax schedule, we solve the system of first-order
conditions derived in the theoretical section for the tax levels at different
income levels. The system contains N + 2 unknowns, the i = 0 . . .N tax
levels Ti as well as the lagrange multiplier l, and N + 2 equations, the
first-order conditions (17) and (15) and the government budget constraint
(6). Since we focus on the no-cross effects model, the first-order conditions
for the tax levels simplify to Equation (17).63 We partition the income dis-
tribution into discrete bins, corresponding to the zero income level, the 3
62Such an exercise for the U.S. would, for example, have to take into account that
policy makers seem to have placed different welfare weights on different groups of single
women, depending on the number of children. Backing out the implicit welfare weights
in the current tax schedule given an optimal tax framework and calibrating how the tax
schedule given these welfare weights would change under alternative models would be
very interesting, but beyond the scope of this paper.
63In order to express the FOC for the benefit level in terms of sufficient statistics, we
make two assumptions: a) benefits do not affect wages or job finding probabilities in any
labor market and b) the social welfare function is linear in expected utilities (Benthamite
Utilitarian). This can be viewed as an approximation that in practice likely does not make
a big difference for the results.
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education groups in our empirical analysis, as well as a 4th group: single
women with Bachelor degrees, which we did not use in our empirical anal-
ysis due to the lack of identifying policy variation for this group. We take
the average number of individuals over all years as the population shares
of the education groups and assign to each group the average income over
our sample period. In order to solve the system of equations we also have
to parameterize gi(Ti) and hi(Ti). Following Saez (2002) we parameterize gi
using the functional form: gi = 1l(w0i T0i )n
, where n is the parameter describ-
ing society’s parameter for redistribution. We set n = 0.5, which leads to
optimal tax schedule similar to the observed schedules, but in the online
appendix (Section V) we also report results for n = 1. We use a first order
Taylor approximation to describe hi, which should provide a reasonable
approximation as long as the optimum is close to the current policy:
hi = h0i +
∂Hi
∂(Ti + b)
⇣
(Ti + b) 
⇣
T0i + b
0
⌘⌘
. (25)
We present simulations of the optimal tax schedule based on the for-
mula derived in this paper, which we refer to as the KKLS formula, and
contrast this tax schedule with simulations based on the optimal tax for-
mula in Saez (2002).
Figure 14a) shows the optimal tax and transfer schedule for the low-
est 3 education groups using the employment and participation response
estimates from our empirical section. The dashed line with circles shows
the optimal tax schedule implied by our no-cross effects welfare formula,
which relies on the micro-macro participation gap to correct for spillovers.
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The figure also shows the corresponding optimal tax schedule implied by
the pure extensive margin optimal tax formula in Saez (2002). The Saez
(2002) formula relies only on employment responses but does not spec-
ify whether these are micro or macro responses. For the solid line with
stars we implement the Saez (2002) formula using our micro employment
response estimates, while for the red line we use the macro estimates.
Compared to using the Saez (2002) formula with macro employment re-
sponses, our formula implies a lump sum transfer to the non-employed
about twice as big and higher marginal tax rates (a flatter slope). This
is because our estimates imply lower macro than micro participation re-
sponses, so that the spillover effects attenuate the welfare gain of a trans-
fer to the working poor. The Saez (2002) formula calibrated with macro
employment responses implies larger transfers at the bottom than when
micro employment responses are used for calibration and a somewhat flat-
ter slope. This is because we estimate larger micro employment responses
than macro ones. To highlight the differences in the slopes, Figure 14b)
shows the implied employment tax rates, i.e. Ti+bwi , at each income level.
Clearly the Saez (2002) formula with micro employment effects generates
the lowest employment tax rate, which is infact negative like the EITC.
Saez (2002) with macro employment effects, generates larger employment
tax rates that is only slightly negative and finally the KKLS optimal tax
formula yields an employment tax rate that for the lowest income group is
positive, thus resembling more an NIT.
In Figure 15a) we show how, holding the macro employment response
constant, the macro-micro participation ratio affects the optimal tax sched-
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ule. The line with circles shows the benchmark tax schedule from Fig-
ure 14 using our optimal tax formula with our main empirical estimates.
The line with stars shows the optimal tax schedule using our formula
when we double the macro-micro participation ratio but everything else
constant. This captures a situation where the spillovers from an increase
in employment taxes are positive (more labor market participants make
it easier for people to find jobs). This makes the tax profile steeper and
the optimal tax is a clearly EITC-like schedule, as Figure 15b) shows the
employment tax rate is indeed negative at the bottom. The line with plus
signs on the other hand shows the optimal tax schedule when we cut
the macro-micro participation ratio to 0.5, thus leading to large negative
spillovers where the macro response is smaller than the micro response.
This makes the overall tax profile much flatter and the benefits to the non-
employed larger, mirroring an NIT situation.
Other papers have stressed the possibility that macro employment re-
sponses could be significantly lower than micro employment responses,
particularly in the context of UI and job search assistance and this has
typically been explained by the possibility of job rationing at least in the
short run, especially during recessions. Our estimates in Table 8, while
noisy, are consistent with this view: while both macro and micro responses
decline in recessions, the decline is much larger for macro responses, both
with respect to employment and participation. The business cycle macro
estimates suggest that spillover effects could be larger during economic
downturns. Figure 16 simulates how the optimal tax schedule would vary
over the business cycle given our estimates from Table 8. We present
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results from the estimates based on the 6 month change in the unem-
ployment rate here, but using the other measures yields qualitatively very
similar results. In Figure 16a) and 16b) we show the optimal tax schedule
for different business cycle states implied by our (KKLS) optimal tax for-
mula. The transfer at zero income is around 4000 USD during a strong
labor market with a negative employment tax of about -10 percent for mov-
ing from zero income to the first income group. During weak labor markets
the simulation suggests that the transfer at zero should increase to 7000
USD per year with a much higher employment tax of about 23 percent.
In contrast, panels (c) and (d) of Figure 16 show the tax schedule implied
by the Saez (2002) formula using the macro employment effects estimated
over the business cycle.64 While the decline in macro employment re-
sponses during weak labor markets also leads to an increase in transfers
at the bottom and a slight increase in employment tax rates, the change is
comparatively modest due to the absence of the spillover channel.
12 Conclusion
This paper revisits the debate about the desirability of the EITC ver-
sus the NIT. We have shown that whether the optimal employment tax
on the working poor is positive or negative depends on the presence of
unemployment and wage responses to taxation. Our sufficient statistics
optimal tax formula, combined with our reduced-form empirical estimates,
indicate that the optimal policy is pushed more towards an NIT than the
64Using the micro employment effects yields even less variation in the optimal tax
schedule over the cycle.
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standard optimal tax model would suggest, although statistical precision
limits strong conclusions about the magnitude of the macro responses.
There are several limitations to our analysis that should be addressed
in future work. First, there is clearly a need for better empirical estimates
of the macro effects of taxation. Most studies of macro labor supply re-
sponses rely on cross-country variation in taxes, which can be substantial.
While this variation is clearly desirable for efficiency reasons, across coun-
tries, tastes for redistribution and other forms of government spending are
probably correlated with taxes and employment and are difficult to fully
control for. What is needed is reliable policy variation in taxes across labor
markets, similar to variation in UI benefit payments that is exploited in
Lalive, Landais, and Zweimu¨ller (2015). Second, it would be very interest-
ing to study business cycle effects of taxation more directly by introducing
dynamics into the model. The approach we adopted in this paper is en-
tirely steady-state. Finally, it would be useful to develop a model that
more fully integrates UI benefits and income taxes, where benefits depend
on prior wages, as is currently the policy in most developed economies.
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Table 5: Variable Means for Single Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full High School High School Some
Sample Dropout Graduate College
Panel A: Demographics
Age 34.1 33.6 33.9 34.5
No Children Percent 65.1 59.6 65.8 67.0
1 Child Percent 17.7 16.9 17.8 18.0
2 Children Percent 10.8 12.3 10.6 10.3
3+ Children Percent 6.3 11.2 5.8 4.7
Mean Years of Education 12.0 9.3 12 13.3
Percent Black 21.0 24.7 21.5 18.7
Percent Hispanic 14.6 30.0 12.2 10.0
Panel B: Labor Force Status
Labor Force Participation Rate (ki) 76.9 55.2 78.3 85.3
Employment Rate (hi) 70.2 45.9 71.4 80.2
Unemployment Rate (1  pi) 9.3 17.1 8.9 6.1
Panel C: Income, Taxes and Transfers (Real 2010 Dollars)
Imputed Pre-tax Wage Earnings 17463 10021 16925 21503
Net Taxes: No Children 3929 1667 3717 5092
Net Taxes: 2 Children -816 -1991 -1286 375
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps: No Children 644 1355 638 359
AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps: 2 Children 3748 7177 3666 1944
Net Tax and Transfers (Ti): No Children 3285 312 3079 4733
Net Tax and Transfers (Ti): 2 Children -4564 -9168 -4951 -1569
Net Tax and Transfers (b): Zero Income, No Children -2070 -2055 -2069 -2077
Net Tax and Transfers (b): Zero Income, 2 Children -11477 -11546 -11442 -11480
AFDC/TANF Recipiency Rate for Mothers: Pre-1996 29 49 25 17
AFDC/TANF Recipiency Rate for Mothers: Post-1996 11 21 10 6
Food Stamp Recipiency Rate: Pre-1996 21 41 19 10
Food Stamp Recipiency Rate: Post-1996 22 41 23 15
Number of observations 773367 138766 334359 300242
Notes: The sample is restricted to single women aged 18-55. All dollar figures are in real 2010 dollars.
Data used in each column are restricted to women with the education level in the column header.
Imputed earnings result from a linear regression of demographics on wages conditional on employment.
Net Taxes is federal, state and fica (sum of employer and employee) tax liabilities net of tax credits,
including EITC. AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps assume 100 percent recipiency among those eligible
based on income. Net Taxes and Transfers is the net of federal, state and fica (sum of employer and
employee) tax liabilities and credits, AFDC or TANF payments and food stamp benefits.
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Table 6: Micro and Macro Responses to Changes in Taxes and Benefits
Instrumental Variable Regressions
(1) (2)
LHS Variable Participation Rate: Kˆi Employment Rate: Hˆi
Micro Response
Taxes Plus Benefits -0.034 -0.033
[0.002]*** [0.002]***
Num. Obs 773367 773367
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.77 0.70
Inc Gain from Employment (2010USD) 14259.0 14259.0
Tax Elasticity -0.63 -0.66
Macro Response
Avg Taxes Plus Benefits within Labor Market -0.030 -0.027
[0.017]* [0.018]
Num. Obs 4284 4284
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.74 0.67
Inc Gain from Employment (2010USD) 12479.3 12479.3
Tax Elasticity -0.51 -0.51
Notes: (* P<.1, ** P<.05, *** P<.01) Standard errors clustered on state level. The sample is restricted to single
women aged 18-55. The data include March CPS for 1984-2011 and Outgoing Rotations Groups for 1994-2010.
The first column uses labor force participation as the outcome variable, the second column uses employment
status. Taxes Plus Benefit is the net of federal (including EITC), state and fica (sum of employer and employee)
taxes plus the benefits an individual would be eligible for at no earnings, adjusted for national recipiency rates.
The Micro Response regressions use individual level data and include controls for age, age-squared, race, ethnicity
and fixed effects for number of children and State x Year x Month fixed effects, all interacted with education. The
Macro Response regressions use data that are collapsed to the state-year cell, each cell receives equal weight in
the regression. Regressions include controls (all interacted with education) for percent black, percent hispanic,
average age, age-squared, number of children and fixed effects for state and year and CPS region time trends.
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Table 7: Alternative Estimates of Participation and Employment Responses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Region Div X Year Reg X Year No No State State- Full
Time Trend FE FE Pre-Trends Taxes Unemp. Take-up
Micro Participation Response
Taxes Plus Benefits -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.038 -0.034 -0.019
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]***
Num. Obs 773367 773367 773367 773367 773367 773367 773367
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
Income Gain from Employment 14259 14259 14259 14259 14501 14259 15475
Tax Elasticity -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.72 -0.63 -0.38
Macro Participation Response
Avg Taxes Plus Benefits -0.030 -0.035 -0.034 -0.039 -0.031 -0.031 -0.008
within Labor Market [0.017]* [0.025] [0.020]* [0.017]** [0.024] [0.017]** [0.007]
Num. Obs 4284 4284 4284 4284 4284 4284 4284
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74
Income Gain from Employment 12479 12479 12479 12479 12695 12479 13914
Tax Elasticity -0.51 -0.58 -0.56 -0.65 -0.53 -0.53 -0.14
Macro Employment Response
Avg Taxes Plus Benefits -0.027 -0.031 -0.026 -0.034 -0.038 -0.031 -0010
within Labor Market [0.018] [0.026] [0.022] [0.019]* [0.026] [0.017]** [0.009]
Num. Obs 4284 4284 4284 4284 4284 4284 4284
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Income Gain from Employment 12479 12479 12479 12479 12695 12479 13914
Tax Elasticity -0.51 -0.58 -0.49 -0.64 -0.72 -0.57 -0.20
Notes: (* P<.1, ** P<.05, *** P<.01) Standard errors clustered on state level. The sample is restricted to single women
aged 18-55. The data includes March CPS for 1984-2011 and Outgoing Rotations Groups for 1994-2010. Our baseline
specification from Table 3 is contained in column (1). Column (2) replaces region-specific linear time trends with division-
by-year fixed effects. Column (3) replaces region-specific linear time trends with region-by-year fixed effects. Column (4)
drops region-specific linear time trends. Column (5) is our baseline specification but drops state taxes, including state EITC
supplements, from both the OLS and IV tax liabilities. Taxes Plus Benefit is the net of federal (including EITC), state and
fica (sum of employer and employee) taxes plus the benefits an individual would be eligible for at no earnings, adjusted for
national recipiency rates. Column (6) controls for the state unemployment rate interacted with education. Column (7) is our
baseline specification but assumes 100 percent take-up rates for AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps for the computation of the
imputed tax liability and the simulated instrument.
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Table 8: Participation and Employment Responses: Heterogeneous Labor Market Condi-
tions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression Coef. Extrapolated Marg. Effects
Marginal Effect Interaction Weak Strong
of Tax Liability of Tax Liab. Labor Market Labor Market
with Labor
Market Meas.
Panel A: Micro Participation
6-mo change in unemp -0.034 0.0011 -0.033 -0.036
[0.002]*** [0.0004]***
State unemp. rate -0.035 0.0012 -0.030 -0.039
[0.002]*** [0.0003]***
Unemp above 9 pct -0.035 0.0053 -0.029 -0.035
[0.002]*** [0.0013]***
Panel B: Macro Participation
6-mo change in unemp -0.029 0.0043 -0.024 -0.035
[0.017]* [0.0030]
State unemp. rate -0.034 0.0011 -0.029 -0.039
[0.018]* [0.0012]
Unemp above 9 pct -0.031 0.0089 -0.022 -0.031
[0.017]* [0.0052]
Panel C: Micro Employment
6-mo change in unemp -0.033 0.0007 -0.032 -0.034
[0.002]*** [0.0005]
State unemp. rate -0.033 0.0015 -0.028 -0.039
[0.002]*** [0.0003]***
Unemp above 9 pct -0.033 0.0074 -0.026 -0.033
[0.002]*** [0.0018]***
Panel D: Macro Employment
6-mo change in unemp -0.027 0.0030 -0.023 -0.030
[0.018] [0.0031]
State unemp. rate -0.035 0.0018 -0.027 -0.042
[0.019]* [0.0013]
Unemp above 9 pct -0.029 0.0112 -0.017 -0.029
[0.017]* [0.0060]*
Notes: (* P<.1, ** P<.05, *** P<.01) Standard errors clustered on state level. The Micro Response regres-
sions use individual level data and include controls for age, age-squared, race, ethnicity and fixed effects for
number of children and State x Year x Month. The Macro Response regressions use data that are collapsed
to the state-year cell observations, each cell receives equal weight in the regression. Regressions include
controls for percent black, percent hispanic, average age, age-squared, number of children and fixed
effects for state and year and CPS Region time trends. Weak and strong labor markets marginal effects as-
sume the market indicator is two standard deviations above or below the mean for the continuous variables.
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Figure 8: The Variation in Taxes plus Benefits
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(b) Macro Variation in Taxes plus Benefits
Notes: The top figure shows the variation in taxes plus benefits for high school dropouts by number of children
normalized such that 1984 equals one. Taxes plus benefits is the net of federal (including EITC), state and
fica (sum of employer and employee) taxes plus the benefits an individual would be eligible for at no earnings,
adjusted for national recipiency rates. The bottom figure shows residuals from a regression of year fixed effects
on the state level average taxes plus benefits with state means added back to the residual, then normalized
such that 1984 equals one. Taxes plus benefits is the net of federal (including EITC), state and fica (sum of
employer and employee) taxes plus the benefits an individual would be eligible for at no earnings, adjusted for
national recipiency rates.
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Figure 9: Optimal Tax and Transfer Schedule Comparing KKLS Formula
with Saez (2002) Formula
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(a) Comparing KKLS vs. Saez (2002) formula: Post vs. Pre-
tax income
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(b) Comparing KKLS vs. Saez (2002) formula: Employment
tax rates
Notes: Simulations of the optimal tax and transfer schedule under alternate assumptions on employment
and participation responses. The optimal schedule is simulated for 5 income groups, corresponding to the 4
education groups in the empirical section and zero income. Distribution of the income groups is calibrated
using CPS data. We show the optimal schedule for the lowest 4 groups where the variation of interest lies. The
figure uses the participation and employment responses estimated in the paper. The line with circles uses the
optimal welfare formula derived in this paper. The dashed line with plus signs uses the Saez (2002) formula
based on the estimated macro responses in this paper, while the solid line uses the estimated micro employment
responses in this paper.
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Figure 10: The Effect of Changing the Macro Participation Effect on the
Optimal Tax and Transfer Schedule
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(a) KKLS formula with alternative macro vs micro participa-
tion rates: Post vs. Pre-tax income
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KKLS Formula: 2 * Macro/Micro Part Ratio
(b) KKLS formula with alternative macro vs micro participa-
tion rates: Employment tax rates
Notes: Simulations of the optimal tax and transfer schedule under alternate assumptions on employment
and participation responses. The optimal schedule is simulated for 5 income groups, corresponding to the 4
education groups in the empirical section and zero income. Distribution of the income groups is calibrated
using CPS data. We show the optimal schedule for the lowest 4 groups where the variation of interest lies. The
top figure shows the post vs. pre-tax income relationship while the bottom figure shows the employment tax
rates. The line with circles shows the optimal tax schedule given the empirical estimates and the KKLS formula.
The solid line shows the optimal schedule if the macro responses are multiplied by 0.5 and the line with plus
signs if they are multiplied by 2.
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Figure 11: Optimal Tax and Transfer Schedule in Weak vs. Strong Labor
Markets
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(a) KKLS formula: Post vs. Pre-tax income
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(b) KKLS formula: Employment tax rates
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(c) Saez (2002) formula: Post vs. Pre-tax in-
come
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(d) Saez (2002) formula: Employment tax
rates
Notes: Simulations of the optimal tax and transfer schedule under alternate macro par-
ticipation responses. The optimal schedule is simulated for 5 income groups, correspond-
ing to the 4 education groups in the empirical section and zero income. Distribution of
the income groups is calibrated using CPS data. We show the optimal schedule for the
lowest 4 groups where the variation of interest lies. The top two figures use the KKLS opti-
mal tax formula, the bottom two figures the Saez (2002) optimal tax formula using Macro
employment effects. The line with circles corresponds to the benchmark simulation us-
ing the estimated, participation and employment responses. The solid line shows the
tax schedule using the weak labor market estimates from Table 4 based on the 6 month
change in the unemployment rate. The line with plus signs shows the tax schedule for
the corresponding strong labor market estimates from Table 4.
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Part III
Labor Market Outcomes of Veterans with Post-2001 Service Time
13 Introduction
The Unites States military is comprised of over 2 million individuals as
of 2013, including active and reserve components. Next to the public edu-
cation system, the impact of military training on the economy’s aggregate
human capital may be larger than any other institution. There are many
reasons military service might affect future, post military, labor market
outcomes. The military offers intensive training across many disciplines
that individuals may be able to leverage in the private labor market after
separation. Indeed, Mangum and Ball (1987) show that the likelihood of
transferring military training is to civilian employment is similar to the
likelihood of transferring training from vocational or technical colleges.
Less tangibly, leadership, self confidence and discipline developed in
the military may also increase an individual’s productive capacity in the
civilian labor market. Even when a service member finds employment in
the same occupation as they would have without military training, these
soft skills may increase the individual’s productivity or allow them to get
earlier promotions, resulting in higher potential wages. Federal legisla-
tion has also affected veterans employment capabilities through programs
including “Feds Hire Vets”, helping men and women with past military ser-
vice find employment in the federal government65 and “Troops to Teach-
ers”, a program that helps place eligible veterans in public schools as
65See www.fedshirevets.gov for more details.
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teachers66. On the other hand service members often enter the military
shortly after high school, sacrificing or delaying post-secondary education.
By delaying post-secondary education learning skills may deteriorate, re-
sulting in fewer years of enrollment, or less effective learning upon return
from service.
The nature of military service changed dramatically in response to the
attack on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001. The United States responded with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
leading to the longest and most dangerous deployments seen by service
members since the Vietnam war. During these deployments, soldiers im-
plemented their training in ways prior service members rarely did on the
battlefield. It is plausible that this type of experience might lead to higher
returns in the civilian labor market when compared to deployments dur-
ing a time of relative peace – pre-2001. However, being a solider post-2001
carried a much higher risk of combat exposure. Soldiers with combat ex-
posure are diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a condi-
tion linked to lower employment rates and lower wages (Savoca and Rosen-
heck, 2000), much more often than counterparts deployed to non-combat
zones (Cesur, Sabia, and Tekin, 2013).
In this paper, I analyze the effect of military service on subsequent labor
market outcomes for veterans with post-2001 service time compared to
labor market outcomes of veterans whose service is limited to the pre-2001
era. While a sizable literature quantifying the effect of military service on
job market outcomes already exists, the main contribution of this paper is
66See troopstoteachers.net for more information.
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to describe how the effect differs across types of military experience.
The literature on labor market outcomes of veterans studied soldiers
at least as far back as World War II. Cross-sectional comparisons between
World War II veterans and non-veterans of the same age revealed that vet-
erans earned more on average and exhibited lower rates of unemployment.
Even when controlling for differences in observable demographics, the life-
time earnings of World War II veterans were around 10 percent higher
than similar non-veterans (Rosen and Taubman, 1982). The authors note
that this result might be anticipated by the armed service selection crite-
ria: while the majority of men from eligible cohorts served in the military
during World War II, those who did not were often unfit for service, physi-
cally or otherwise. Controlling for positive selection, World War II veterans
earned no more than similar non-veterans, perhaps even earning less (An-
grist and Krueger, 1994). However, those who reported using their voca-
tional military training in their civilian careers enjoyed long term earnings
premiums. Veterans who did not use their training in their civilian careers
did not exhibit earnings premia, suggesting that the benefits of military
vocational training may be job-specific (Fredland and Little, 1980).
In contrast to World War II veterans, earnings comparisons suggest
Vietnam veterans, on average, earn less than non-veterans (Berger and
Hirsch, 1983). While military conscription via the draft was determined,
in part, by random assignment, minorities and individuals from lower so-
cioeconomic backgrounds who had fewer resources to avoid the draft were
over-represented in the pool of veterans (Cooper, 1977). This leads to the
opposite selection problem that researchers face when analyzing World
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War II veterans. In a seminal paper, Angrist (1990) uses the draft as a
source of randomly assigned risk of Vietnam service in an instrumental
variables framework and finds that the effect of Vietnam-era service is a
15 percent earnings reduction measured in the early 1980s, many years
after the military experience.
Many of these veterans were subject to extreme stress for prolonged pe-
riods of time. According to the National Survey of the Vietnam Generation
(NSVG), over 20 percent of Vietnam era veterans suffer from PTSD. PTSD
is often coincident with other mental health problems including substance
abuse and sleep disorders67. A combination of mental disorders may in-
hibit an individual from assimilating back into society, make it harder to
find work, or reduce productivity in the workforce. Savoca and Rosen-
heck (2000) use the NSGV to study the effect of psychiatric disorders of
Vietnam-era veterans on their labor market experiences. They find that
PTSD significantly lowers the likelihood of working and the hourly wages
of those working. Specifically, a veteran diagnosed with lifetime PTSD was
8.5 percentage points less likely to be working than a veteran without
PTSD. Among those working, veterans with PTSD earned an hourly wage
$3.60 (in 1999 dollars) less than a veteran without PTSD.
The post-Vietnam military experience is distinct from the World War II
and Vietnam era in a number of important ways. First, since the end of
the draft in 1973, the United States military has filled its ranks with an
entirely volunteer force. Results from the above body of literature may
not generalize to those who volunteer for military training. Second, the
67For more on PTSD see www.ptsd.va.gov
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Vietnam conflict was followed by an extended period of relative peace. Far
fewer military personnel were subject to long tours of duty in hostile en-
vironments. To the extent that the earnings and employment penalties
suffered by Vietnam veterans can be explained by mental health issues
deriving from long combat tours (Savoca and Rosenheck, 2000), the effect
of peacetime military service will be different from wartime military service.
Soldiers serving during the 1980s received higher earnings than com-
parable civilians during their service time and were employed at higher
rates post-service. Long-run civilian earnings for service members of this
time period are only modestly greater than those without service time and
actually lower for white service members (Angrist, 1998), in part because
returns from a year of military experience in terms of future earnings are
about half of the returns from a year in the civilian labor force (Crane and
Wise, 1987).
A third way in which the military has changed since Vietnam is the
dramatic increase in the number of women in the military, from around
50,000 in 1973 to nearly 250,0000 by 1988. This inspired a strand of
literature studying the effects of military service on women. Conclusions
are not altogether different from the findings on male veterans: positive
returns to military participation, but negative returns to additional years
in the military, consistent with a screening explanation (Stranahan, 1998),
and a wage disadvantage for white, but not for non-white female veterans
(Mehay and Hirsch, 1996).
Lastly, the nature of military experience again changed significantly af-
ter the events of September 11, 2001. Since the end of the conflict in
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Vietnam and up to the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
United States military conducted smaller scale–or in the case of Operation
Desert Storm in 1991–much shorter military exercises. Peace-time train-
ing is a very different experience compared to service time post-September
11. Specifically, the likelihood of a war-zone deployment increased dra-
matically post-2001. War experience significantly increases the probability
of mental health disorders (Hoge, Auchterlonie, and Milliken, 2006, Cesur,
Sabia, and Tekin, 2013) in addition to, for obvious reasons, increases in
physical disability. Since individuals with mental health disorders such
as PTSD suffer earnings penalties (Savoca and Rosenheck, 2000), some of
the benefits from military training may be offset by combat induced mental
health disorders.
In general, the literature suggests recent veterans enjoy higher earnings
(Humensky, Jordan, Stroupe, and Hynes, 2013, Kleykamp, 2013) and tend
to be employed at a lower rate (Faberman and Foster, 2013, Humensky,
Jordan, Stroupe, and Hynes, 2013, Kleykamp, 2013). However the effects
are heterogenous: female veterans tend to enjoy a premium while males
suffer a penalty (Gottschalck and Holder, 2009). Even within the sub-
sample of female veterans, the earnings premium is concentrated among
older female veterans, while younger female veterans may actually suffer
an earnings penalty (Prokos and Padavic, 2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 14 briefly intro-
duces relevant information regarding military contracts, Section 15 de-
scribes the data used for empirical analysis, Section 16 lays out the em-
pirical strategy and discusses the results, Section 17 concludes.
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14 Military Contracts
The nature of military contracts has important implications for the em-
pirical analysis. This section briefly describes the aspects of military con-
tracts relevant to this paper.
The most basic eligibility requirement is that an entrant must 18 years
or older (or 17 with parental consent). The applicant must also pass an
aptitude test and a physical.
Once an individual enlists, military service can be broken up into three
categories: active duty, active reserve, and inactive ready reserve. Active
duty is a full time job and these service members, by and large, do not
participate in the civilian labor market. Active reserve members train with
their unit on a regular basis, typically one weekend a month and two weeks
in the summer. These service members are usually able to participate in
the civilian labor force concurrent with their active reserve service time
(though many are full time students). Inactive ready reserve members do
not typically train on a regular basis. In general, a service member of
any type is eligible to be activated for a deployment. Active reservists and
inactive ready reservists become active duty service members in the event
of a deployment and return to their prior status upon completion of the
deployment.
Regardless of the branch of service, all initial contracts are for a pe-
riod of eight years. During those eight years there are many options for
service status. An individual can begin service as either active duty or
active reserves, and many individuals will change from the initial status
to another status before completion of the eight year obligation. If an in-
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dividual enlists in active duty, the active duty portion of the contract can
be as short as two years. The remaining obligation can be served in a
reserve component or in the inactive ready reserve. Service members join-
ing a reserve component typically are active reservists for a period of at
least six years, followed by inactive ready reserve for any remaining time.
A service member may opt to re-enlist during their initial (or subsequent)
contract, extending their obligation for additional time, beyond the initial
eight years.
15 Data
The data used throughout this paper are taken from the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) provided by Integrated Public Use Micro Data Sam-
ples (IPUMS) at the University of Minnesota, (Ruggles, Genadek, Goeken,
Grover, and Sobek, 2015). The ACS surveys for this paper contain a 1%
random sample of the U.S. population for each year from 2000 to 2014.
Survey participants change from year to year. Among the survey questions
in the ACS is whether the individual served active duty military time dur-
ing several distinct time intervals: Vietnam Era, 1975-1980, 1980-1990,
1991-2000, 2001-present68. Importantly, these data identify individuals
who served active military time since 2001 separate from individuals that
only served active time pre-2001.
From the sample, I drop individuals younger than 20 years of age since
that is the youngest an individual can be upon completion of the active
68Individuals that only served in a reserve component but were never activated are
indistinguishable from non-veterans. Reported active duty time could have been an over-
seas deployment or domestic active duty time.
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portion of a military contract (without early separation). I also drop in-
dividuals over the age of 45 to exclude individuals who were of military
age during the Vietnam era; someone who was 45 years old in 2000 would
have been 20 in 1975 at the end of the Vietnam war. There is a chance that
the resulting sample could include a small number of Vietnam veterans; I
drop all veterans who report Vietnam era service time from the sample as
well. I also exclude from the ACS anyone who is still on active duty.
All of the veterans in this sample began their military career on a vol-
unteer basis, which creates a selection problem: if individuals choose to
volunteer in a systematically and unobserved way, and if the unobserved
characteristics that determine military service also affect labor market out-
comes, then comparisons between veterans and non-veterans will be bi-
ased. The focus of this paper is to compare veterans with one type of
experience against veterans with another type of experience; therefore I do
not have to address this type of selection.
However, there is a separate type of selection I must address. Since
the motivations for, and the consequences of, military service changed
so dramatically after 2001, it is probable that the type of person willing to
volunteer after 2001 is very different from the type willing to volunteer pre-
2001. To the extent that these types are unobserved and correlated with
subsequent labor markets outcomes comparisons will again be biased. To
address the selection problem, I will compare veterans who report active
duty service time between 1990 and 2001 but without post-2001 service
to veterans with both 1990-2001 and post-2001 service. Veterans that
have both pre and post-2001 service made the decision to join the military
121
under similar circumstances as veterans with only pre-2001 service time.
This method does not completely address the selection issue; military
contracts are for a fixed period of time. A typical initial enlistment contract
requires eight years of service, after which the soldier can choose to reen-
list or separate from the military. If different types of individuals choose to
re-enlist after 2001 systematically along unobserved characteristics, and
if those characteristics are correlated with labor market outcomes, selec-
tion bias will still be an issue. Empirically however, re-enlistment rates
in 2001 and 2002 are very close to the average rate from 1995 to 2002
(Chun, 2005)69, suggesting that this type of selection along unobservables
is less relevant.
Tables 9 and 10 describe the ACS data for men and women, respec-
tively, across three subgroups: non-veterans, veterans with service during
the 1990 to 2001 period but not since, and individuals with both 1990-
2001 service and post 2001 service time. There are significant demo-
graphic differences between non-veterans and veterans in terms of racial
composition, age and household size. Veterans tend to be older and are
more likely to be married than non-veterans. Hispanic individuals are
overrepresented, and Asian individuals are underrepresented in the male
veteran population. Black females are overrepresented, in the female vet-
eran population while Hispanic and Asian females are underrepresented.
However, the differences across types of veterans is much less pronounced.
Age, race, ethnicity and marital status are all very similar across veteran
69For example, among single Army National Guard members with fewer than 7 years
of service, retention rates were 59.8 and 64.0 percent in 2001 and 2002, compared to a
1995-2001 average of 62.3. See Chun (2005) for more analysis.
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types, those with post-2001 service tend to have, on average, about a half
year more schooling. Simply comparing averages, veterans with post-2001
service appear to earn more than veterans with 1990-2001 service and
rates of employment are similar, if slightly lower for recent veterans.
16 Empirical Strategy and Results
The primary goal of this paper is to compare estimates of the labor
market impact of post-2001 military service to voluntary military service
in a prior period. The labor market outcomes I consider are the rate of
employment and earnings, conditional on employment.
16.1 Earnings Conditional on Employment
To measure the effect of post-2001 service on earnings (conditional on
employment) compared to pre-2001 voluntary service, I estimate the fol-
lowing regression separately by gender with the subset of data reporting
positive earnings:
LogEarningsi = b0 + b1Veti + b2Vet2001i + gXi + dt + #i
where Veti equals one if individual i reports active service time between
1990 and 2001, Vet2001i indicates post-2001 active military service. Xi is a
vector of demographics including a quadratic for age, controls for race and
ethnicity, marital status, urban residence, and number of children, state
and educational achievement fixed effects. dt is a year fixed effect. Column
1 of Tables 11 and 12 display the results from this regression for men and
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women, respectively. The coefficient on post-2001 service vet represents
the earnings premium veterans with post-2001 service time receive, on
average, relative to similar veterans without post-2001 service. For men,
the earnings premium is 2.8 percent, while for women it is 6.8 percent.
Column 2 adds a minority indicator variable interacted with both veteran
era-groups. The earnings premium for minority post-2001 male veterans
is even higher than that of white post-2001 veterans. The earnings pre-
mium for female post-2001 veterans does not appear to be different across
race.
16.2 Within and Across Occupations
Military service could increase earnings through several channels. The
experience may provide new occupational opportunities that the individual
wouldn’t have had it if not for the military service, perhaps the individual
was a military police officer which qualifies them for police work as a civil-
ian. On the other hand, some of the pay premium may simply be due to
transferable general human capital that makes the individual more pro-
ductive in the field they would have found themselves in, regardless of
service. It could also be the case that employers feel compelled to pay
veterans more for a similar position.
In this section, I explore the channel through which post-2001 veterans
obtain higher earnings by including occupational fixed effects70. If post-
2001 military service increases earnings primarily through occupational
opportunities to veterans that would not have been available without post-
70Occupations are defined by rather broad set of 25 categories, examples include: Food
Preparation, Financial Specialists, Protective Services.
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2001 service (but earn the same as other veterans within the occupation),
adding occupational fixed effects would significantly reduce the coefficient
estimates for the post-2001 veteran indicator variable. If, on the other
hand, post-2001 veterans earn more than other veterans within occupa-
tions, then adding occupational will not have meaningfully change the
coefficient estimate for the post-2001 veteran indicator.
To examine the channel through which the post-2001 veterans obtain
an earnings premium I estimate the following regression with the subset
of individuals who report positive earnings:
LogEarningsi = b0 + b1Vet2001i + b2NonWhitei ·Vet2001i+
b3Veti + b4NonWhitei ·Veti + g1Occupationi + g2Xi + dt + #i
Column 3 of Tables 11 and 12 displays the results. Including occu-
pational fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the post-2001 earnings
premium by roughly half. Male post-2001 veterans earnings premium
within occupation is about 1 percentage point smaller than the estimate
without occupational fixed effects for both white and non-white veterans.
For females the earnings premium within occupation drops to essentially
zero compared to 6.8 percent without regard to occupation. For female
post-2001 service members, the earnings premium appears to be linked to
occupational opportunity, which does not appear to be the case for male
veterans.
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16.3 Rate of Employment
I now turn to a different question: do post-2001 veterans tend to be em-
ployed at different rates than other veterans whose service ended prior to
2001? As discussed above, veterans who serve post-2001 are at a higher
risk of long deployments compared to those who served in prior periods.
These long deployments interrupt the civilian labor market experience for
active and inactive reservists. Those returning from a long overseas de-
ployment are also at a higher risk of returning with physical or mental
disability. On the other hand, employment programs exist to assist veter-
ans with employment, potentially countering some of the negative effects
of a long deployment. To explore the effect of post-2001 service on employ-
ment rates I estimate the following regression on the full sample:
Employedi = b0 + b1Veti + b2Vet2001i + gXi + dt + #i
where Employedi equals 1 if the individual reports current employment.
The veteran indicator variable and the vector containing control variables,
Xi are the same as in sections 16.1 and 16.2. Column 4 of Tables 11
and 12 display the results of this regression and Column 5 includes an
indicator variable for minority, interacted with veteran type. Relative to
other veterans, male veterans with post-2001 are 2.1 percentage points
less likely to be employed. However, the results in column (5) suggest
that the reduction in employment is only apparent for white males, non-
white males with post-2001 are employed at the same rate as comparable
veterans with earlier service time. Female post-2001 veterans are 4.1 per-
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centage points less likely to be employed, and as shown in Column 5, this
result is regardless of race. Previous literature suggests that post-Vietnam
era veterans are employed at lower rates (Faberman and Foster, 2013, Hu-
mensky, Jordan, Stroupe, and Hynes, 2013, Kleykamp, 2013). Columns
4 and 5 in Tables 11 and 12 reinforce this notion and suggest that specif-
ically those that served post-2001 are employed at even lower rates.
16.4 Robustness to Alternative Samples
The sample used in sections 16.1-16.2 contains veterans with post-
2001 and 1990-2001 service and veterans with 1990-2001 service but not
post-2001 service. However both sets contained service members with pre-
1990 service. In this section I estimate the same regressions as above with
alternative samples that may provide more similar control and treatment
groups, at the cost of a smaller sample size.
One potential issue with the baseline sample is that if one compares
veterans in the same year across these two veteran types, veterans with
post-2001 service will, by construction, have more recently separated from
the military. Veterans with post-2001 service separated from the military
sometime between 2001 and 2013, veterans without post-2001 service
separated sometime between 1990-2001. It is possible that the results
above are picking up the effect of more recently being an active duty soldier
as opposed to anything specific about the post-2001 service.
To control for time since separation I restrict the data to 2000-2004 and
2010-2014. I also drop post-2001 veterans from the 2000-2004 era so that
the only veterans in the early sample are veterans with 1990-2001 service
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but without post-2001 service. I also drop veterans without post-2001
service from the latter period. Then I create a wave variable to identify the
year within the sub-sample, specifically the wave variable equals 1 in both
2000 and 2010, 2 in both 2001 and 2011, 3 in both 2002 and 2012 and so
on. This way post-2001 veterans interviewed in 2010 are being compared
to veterans without post-2001 service interviewed in 2000, the idea being
that these two types of veterans will have been separated from the military
for a comparable amount of time. The rest of the control variables remain
the same as previous regressions including the time fixed effects. Since
the data in this specification do not have pre and post-2001 veterans in
any given year, the year fixed effects – and the evolution of real wages – are
calibrated by non-veterans in each year.
Column 2 of Tables 13 and 14 display results for these wage regres-
sion, Column 2 of Tables 15 and 16 contain results for the employment
regressions. Generally speaking, many of same conclusions can be drawn
from this regression as from the regressions using the full sample. Post-
2001 veterans tend to earn more than, and tend to be under employed
relative to veterans without post-2001 service. There are some differences
though, the earnings premium for male post-2001 veterans appears not to
depend on race for this sample, and is of similar magnitude to the earn-
ings premium estimated for minority post-2001 veterans from the baseline
sample. The earnings premium estimate for female post-2001 veterans de-
clines with this sample but is less precisely estimated. Estimates of post-
2001 service effects on employment (Tables 15 and 16) are slightly smaller
for males but nearly identical for females.
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Column 3 in Tables 13 - 16 restrict the baseline sample to only veter-
ans. Results for female veterans are nearly identical to that of the baseline
sample. For males, the earnings again is heterogenous across race while
the employment results are nearly identical.
Another potential issue with comparing veterans with post-2001 service
against veterans without post-2001 service is that those with post-2001
service likely enlisted more recently. Indeed, veterans without post-2001
service report military service between 1980-1990 more often than post-
2001 veterans. In an attempt to align enlistment dates I reduce the base-
line sample to exclude veterans with pre-1990 military service. Columns
4 - 6 of Tables 13 - 16 display analogous regressions to the first three
columns, using the sample that excludes veterans with pre-1990 service.
The employment regressions – Tables 15 and 16 – are quite robust to
sample choice, white male and female post-2001 veterans appear to be
underemployed while minority male post-2001 veterans appear to be em-
ployed at the same rate as comparable veterans without post-2001 service.
The wage regressions – Tables 13 and 14 – on the other hand, are less ro-
bust to these alternate specifications. Specifically, estimates in Column 5
suggest little to no earnings premium for veterans with post-2001 service
over similar veterans without post-2001 service. Although these coeffi-
cients are estimated with less certainty; one could not rule out effects of
a size similar to the other specifications for men, and small positive wage
premia for women.
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17 Conclusion
The military experience in the United States changed dramatically af-
ter 2001. Military utilization rates increased dramatically with the onset
of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This paper provides evidence that vet-
erans with service time after 2001 tend to be underemployed compared
to similar veterans without service after 2001. However, conditional on
employment, post-2001 veterans earn at least as much as over veterans
without post-2001 service. This wage premium is greater for minority men
and for women, regardless of race. When controlling for occupation, the
estimated wage gap between veterans and non-veterans declines suggest-
ing occupational opportunities created by military experience may be the
important channel propagating wage premium.
The results across gender are different in some important ways. Over-
all, wage premiums for female pre and post-2001 veterans are much larger
than for men. While some of the earnings boost for veterans without post-
2001 service is explained by minority earnings, minority status seems to
have little effect for female veterans with post-2001 service. Furthermore,
occupational fixed effects explain nearly all of the wage premium for fe-
male post-2001 veterans, suggesting that occupational opportunities af-
forded by post-2001 service is an important channel through which these
veterans are increasing their earnings. Female post-2001 veterans are
underemployed to a much greater degree than for males.
Overall this paper provides evidence that the labor market experience
for veterans with post-2001 service is fundamentally different than com-
parable veterans without post-2001 service. Furthermore, this paper pro-
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vides evidence that the labor market experience is quite different for female
veterans than for male veterans.
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Table 9: Variable Means for Men (2000-2014)
’90-’01 ’90-’01 and
Non-veterans Service Post-’01 Service
Real Wage Earnings 37817.4 46204.5 49084.4
Real Wage Earnings (cond on pos) 45560.1 51689.2 54017.2
Employed 0.783 0.849 0.839
Female 0 0 0
Children at home 0.399 0.557 0.580
Married 0.481 0.639 0.688
Age 32.73 36.09 35.92
Years of education 13.15 13.54 14.00
Black 0.107 0.129 0.126
Hispanic 0.164 0.0813 0.0923
Asian 0.0606 0.0235 0.0316
Lives in City 0.353 0.285 0.352
Number of Observations 5513416 184102 46453
Notes: Data include the 1 percent ACS samples from 2000 to 2014. The sample is restricted to
men aged 20-45 who are not full time students nor currently an active military service member.
The first column summarizes data for non-veterans. The second column summarizes data
for veterans who report active service between 1990 and 2001 but not after 2001. The third
column summarizes data for veterans who report active service time both during during the
1990 to 2001 period and after 2001. Earnings are reported in real 2010 dollars.
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Table 10: Variable Means for Women (2000-2014)
’90-’01 ’90-’01 and
Non-veterans Service Post-’01 Service
Real Wage Earnings 23430.5 29713.8 34206.9
Real Wage Earnings (cond on pos) 31036.6 36785.2 42179.2
Employed 0.694 0.729 0.698
Female 1 1 1
Children at home 0.567 0.678 0.660
Married 0.540 0.574 0.604
Age 33.10 35.53 34.79
Years of education 13.58 14.03 14.57
Black 0.117 0.216 0.229
Hispanic 0.148 0.0797 0.0994
Asian 0.0640 0.0286 0.0398
Lives in City 0.355 0.293 0.379
Number of Observations 6112929 34432 9756
Notes: Data include the 1 percent ACS samples from 2000 to 2014. The sample is restricted
to women aged 20-45 who are not full time students nor currently an active military service
member. The first column summarizes data for non-veterans. The second column summarizes
data for veterans who report active service between 1990 and 2001 but not after 2001. The
third column summarizes data for veterans who report active service time both during during
the 1990 to 2001 period and after 2001. Earnings are reported in real 2010 dollars.
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Table 11: Male Veterans with 1990-2001 Service
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage: Employed Employed
Occ. Cont.
Post-2001 0.028 0.021 0.012 -0.021 -0.025
Veteran (0.0050)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0055)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0053)⇤⇤ (0.0020)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0022)⇤⇤⇤
Minority 0.042 0.034 0.023
Post-2001 Vet (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0052)⇤⇤⇤
Veteran 0.050 0.041 0.015 -0.0011 -0.0070
(0.0023)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0025)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0025)⇤⇤⇤ (0.00092) (0.0010)⇤⇤⇤
Minority Veteran 0.051 0.059 0.032
(0.0060)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0058)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0023)⇤⇤⇤
Observations 4783218 4783218 4783218 5743971 5743971
R2 0.354 0.354 0.394 0.129 0.129
Notes: (* P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01) Data include the 1 percent ACS samples from 2000 to 2010.
The sample is restricted to men aged 20-45 who are not full time students nor currently an active
military service member. The dependent variable in Column 1 is log wages and the sample is
restricted to those with positive earnings. Independent variables include veteran status and control
variables: a quadratic for age, controls for race and ethnicity, marital status, urban residence, and
fixed effects for number of children, state, year and educational achievement. Column 2 interacts
an indicator variable for individuals whose race is not white with veteran status. Column 3 includes
occupational fixed effects. The dependent variable in Column 4 is employment. Column 5 interacts
an indicator variable for individuals whose race is not white with veteran status.
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Table 12: Female Veterans with 1990-2001 Service
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage: Employed Employed
Occ. Cont.
Post-2001 0.068 0.065 0.016 -0.041 -0.041
Veteran (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ (0.015)⇤⇤⇤ (0.015) (0.0051)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0060)⇤⇤⇤
Minority 0.0067 -0.0066 -0.0022
Post-2001 Vet (0.029) (0.028) (0.011)
Veteran 0.080 0.062 0.015 -0.0062 -0.019
(0.0062)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0072)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0070)⇤⇤ (0.0024)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0028)⇤⇤⇤
Minority Veteran 0.064 0.066 0.047
(0.014)⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0054)⇤⇤⇤
Observations 4650557 4650557 4650557 6157117 6157117
R2 0.239 0.239 0.295 0.078 0.078
Notes: (* P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01) Data include the 1 percent ACS samples from 2000 to 2010.
The sample is restricted to women aged 20-45 who are not full time students nor currently an
active military service member. The dependent variable in Column 1 is log wages and the sample is
restricted to those with positive earnings. Independent variables include veteran status and control
variables: a quadratic for age, controls for race and ethnicity, marital status, urban residence, and
fixed effects for number of children, state, year and educational achievement. Column 2 interacts
an indicator variable for individuals whose race is not white with veteran status. Column 3 includes
occupational fixed effects. The dependent variable in Column 4 is employment. Column 5 interacts
an indicator variable for individuals whose race is not white with veteran status.
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Table 13: Robustness to Alternative Samples: Wages Men
90-01 Service Start 90-01
Adj Vets Adj Vets
Post-2001 0.021 0.070 -0.0092 0.031 0.015 0.0087
Veteran (0.0055)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0088)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0050) (0.0065)⇤⇤⇤ (0.010) (0.0062)
Minority 0.042 -0.0074 0.047 0.046 -0.0047 0.045
Post-2001 Vet (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ (0.021) (0.011)⇤⇤⇤ (0.016)⇤⇤⇤ (0.024) (0.014)⇤⇤⇤
Veteran 0.041 0.012 – 0.044 0.057 –
(0.0025)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0048)⇤⇤ – (0.0030)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0060)⇤⇤⇤ –
Minority Veteran 0.051 0.083 – 0.047 0.069 –
(0.0060)⇤⇤⇤ (0.011)⇤⇤⇤ – (0.0070)⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ –
Observations 4783218 2829221 206778 4724169 2809136 147729
R2 0.354 0.354 0.192 0.354 0.354 0.187
Notes: (* P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01) All columns are regressions with the log of wages as the dependent
variable. Independent variables include veteran status and control variables: a quadratic for age, controls
for race and ethnicity, marital status, urban residence, and fixed effects for number of children, state, year
and educational achievement. Column 1 is the baseline regression from Table 11, provided here for reference.
Column 2 restricts data to two time periods: 2000-2004 and 2010-2014. The only veterans included in the
2000-2004 period are those without post-2001 service. The only veterans included in the 2010-2014 period are
veterans with post-2001 service time. Column 3 uses the same sample as the baseline specification in Column 1
but drops nonveterans. Columns 4 - 6 are analogous to Columns 1 - 3 but drop any veterans with active service
prior to 1990.
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Table 14: Robustness to Alternative Samples: Wages Women
90-01 Service Start 90-01
Adj Vets Adj Vets
Post-2001 0.065 0.040 0.061 0.041 -0.010 0.038
Veteran (0.015)⇤⇤⇤ (0.024) (0.016)⇤⇤⇤ (0.017)⇤⇤ (0.027) (0.019)⇤⇤
Minority 0.0067 -0.022 0.013 0.053 0.039 0.062
Post-2001 Vet (0.029) (0.046) (0.028) (0.033) (0.050) (0.033)
Veteran 0.062 0.057 – 0.062 0.092 –
(0.0072)⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ – (0.0084)⇤⇤⇤ (0.016)⇤⇤⇤ –
Minority Veteran 0.064 0.13 – 0.047 0.099 –
(0.014)⇤⇤⇤ (0.025)⇤⇤⇤ – (0.016)⇤⇤⇤ (0.029)⇤⇤⇤ –
Observations 4650557 2790791 35725 4641907 2787913 27075
R2 0.239 0.244 0.136 0.239 0.244 0.134
Notes: (* P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01) All columns are regressions with the log of wages as the dependent
variable. Independent variables include veteran status and control variables: a quadratic for age, controls
for race and ethnicity, marital status, urban residence, and fixed effects for number of children, state,
year and educational achievement. Column 1 is the baseline regression from Table 12, provided here for
reference. Column 2 restricts data to two time periods: 2000-2004 and 2010-2014. The only veterans
included in the 2000-2004 period are those without post-2001 service. The only veterans included in the
2010-2014 period are veterans with post-2001 service time. Column 3 uses the same sample as the baseline
specification in Column 1 but drops nonveterans. Columns 4 - 6 are analogous to Columns 1 - 3 but drop
any veterans with active service prior to 1990.
Table 15: Robustness to Alternative Samples: Employment Men
90-01 Service Start 90-01
Adj Vets Adj Vets
Post-2001 -0.025 -0.012 -0.024 -0.023 -0.021 -0.021
Veteran (0.0022)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0035)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0021)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0026)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0040)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0026)⇤⇤⇤
Minority 0.023 0.014 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.026
Post-2001 Vet (0.0052)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0083) (0.0047)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0061)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0095)⇤⇤ (0.0057)⇤⇤⇤
Veteran -0.0070 -0.016 – -0.0074 -0.010 –
(0.0010)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0020)⇤⇤⇤ – (0.0012)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0025)⇤⇤⇤ –
Minority Veteran 0.032 0.038 – 0.026 0.023 –
(0.0023)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0044)⇤⇤⇤ – (0.0027)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0054)⇤⇤⇤ –
Observations 5743971 3446197 230555 5679223 3424547 165807
R2 0.129 0.134 0.063 0.130 0.135 0.065
Notes: (* P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01) All columns are regressions with employment status as the dependent
variable. Independent variables include veteran status and control variables: a quadratic for age, controls for race
and ethnicity, marital status, urban residence, and fixed effects for number of children, state, year and educational
achievement. Column 1 is the baseline regression from Table 11, provided here for reference. Column 2 restricts
data to two time periods: 2000-2004 and 2010-2014. The only veterans included in the 2000-2004 period are
those without post-2001 service. The only veterans included in the 2010-2014 period are veterans with post-2001
service time. Column 3 uses the same sample as the baseline specification in Column 1 but drops nonveterans.
Columns 4 - 6 are analogous to Columns 1 - 3 but drop any veterans with active service prior to 1990.
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Table 16: Robustness to Alternative Samples: Employment Women
90-01 Service Start 90-01
Adj Vets Adj Vets
Post-2001 -0.041 -0.042 -0.040 -0.040 -0.041 -0.042
Veteran (0.0060)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0094)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0062)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0067)⇤⇤⇤ (0.010)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0071)⇤⇤⇤
Minority -0.0022 0.029 -0.00076 0.0071 0.030 0.011
Post-2001 Vet (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013)
Veteran -0.019 -0.024 – -0.025 -0.024 –
(0.0028)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0053)⇤⇤⇤ – (0.0032)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0064)⇤⇤⇤ –
Minority Veteran 0.047 0.038 – 0.051 0.043 –
(0.0054)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0098)⇤⇤⇤ – (0.0061)⇤⇤⇤ (0.012)⇤⇤⇤ –
Observations 6157117 3726490 44188 6146725 3723002 33796
R2 0.078 0.080 0.051 0.078 0.080 0.055
Notes: (* P<.10, ** P<.05, *** P<.01) All columns are regressions with employment status as the dependent
variable. Independent variables include veteran status and control variables: a quadratic for age, controls for race
and ethnicity, marital status, urban residence, and fixed effects for number of children, state, year and educational
achievement. Column 1 is the baseline regression from Table 12, provided here for reference. Column 2 restricts
data to two time periods: 2000-2004 and 2010-2014. The only veterans included in the 2000-2004 period are
those without post-2001 service. The only veterans included in the 2010-2014 period are veterans with post-2001
service time. Column 3 uses the same sample as the baseline specification in Column 1 but drops nonveterans.
Columns 4 - 6 are analogous to Columns 1 - 3 but drop any veterans with active service prior to 1990.
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Part IV
Theoretical Appendix to Chapter II
The Lagrangian associated to the government’s program writes:
L(t)
def⌘
I
Â
i=1
(Ti + b)Hi(t)  b  E+ 1lW (U1(t), ...,UI(t), u(b)) (26)
18 Derivation of Equations (14) and (15)
Differentiating (26) with respect to Tj and using Equations (10) and (13)
gives (14). Differentiating (26) with respect to b gives:
∂L
∂b
=  1+
I
Â
i=1
hi +
I
Â
i=1
(Ti + b)
∂Hi
∂b
+
u0(b)
l
∂W
∂b
+
I
Â
i=1
∂Ui
∂b
∂W
∂Ui
Differentiating Ui(t) ⌘ Pi(t) (u (Ci(t))  di) + (1 Pi(t)) u(b) with respect
to b gives:
∂Ui
∂b
= (1  pi)u0(b) + piu0(ci)

∂Ci
∂b
+
∂Pi
∂b
u(ci)  di   b
pi u0(ci)
 
Using h0 = 1   ÂIi=1 hi and Equations (13) and (16) leads to (15). From
∂Ci
∂Ti
= ∂Wi∂Ti   1 and for j 6= i,
∂Ci
∂Ti
= ∂Wi∂Ti , the sum of (14) for all Tj minus
Equation (15) leads to:
0 =
0
Â
i=1
hi +
I
Â
i=1
(Ti + b)
 
I
Â
j=1
∂Hi
∂Tj
  ∂Hi
∂b
!
 
 
g0h0 +
I
Â
i=1
gihi
!
(27)
+
I
Â
i=1
gihi
 
I
Â
j=1
∂Wi
∂Tj
  ∂Wi
∂b
!
+
I
Â
i=1
gihi
u(ci)  di   u(b)
u0(ci)
 
I
Â
j=1
∂Pi
∂Tj
  ∂Pi
∂b
!
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In the absence of income effects, a simultaneous change in all tax lia-
bilities and welfare benefit DT1 = ... = DTi =  Db induces no changes
in wages, conditional employment probabilities not employment levels, so
that ÂIi=1
∂Wi
∂Ti
= ∂Wi∂b , Â
I
i=1
∂Pi
∂Ti
= ∂Pi∂b and Â
I
i=1
∂Hi
∂Ti
= ∂Hi∂b . Plugging these equal-
ities in (27) leads to: g0h0 +ÂIi=1 gihi = 1.
18.1 Derivation of Equation (19)
Let A denotes the square matrix of rank I whose term in row j and col-
umn i is ∂Ci∂Tj +
∂Pi
∂Tj
u(ci) di u(b)
pi u0(ci)
. The optimal tax formula (14) can be rewritten
in matrix notations:
0 = h|{z}
Mechanical effect
+
dH
dT
· (T+ b)| {z }
Behavioral effects
+ A · (g h)| {z }
Social Welfare effects
(28)
However, Equation (10) implies that: dUdT =  A · dUdT
   Micro. Moreover, from
Ki(t) = Kˆi(U (t)), we get that: dKdT = dUdT · dKˆdU and dKdT
   Micro = dUdT    Micro · dKˆdU .
We thus get that:
 A = dU
dT
·
 
dU
dT
    Micro
! 1
=
dK
dT
·
 
dK
dT
    Micro
! 1
whenever dKˆdU is invertible, in which case Equation (28) can be rewritten as
(19).
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19 The Matching model
We consider a matching economy where on each labor market i, the
constant returns to scale matching function gives the employment level
hi as a function Mi(ni, ki) of the number ni of vacancies posted and the
number ki of participating job seekers (Pissarides and Petrongolo, 2001).
Creating a jobs costs ki > 0 and generates output yi > ki when a worker is
recruited. Hence, the different types of labor are perfect substitutes.
Each vacancy is matched with probability qi = Qi(qi)
def⌘ Mi(ni,ki)ni =
Mi(1, 1/qi), which is decreasing in tightness qi def⌘ ni/ki. Firms create
jobs whenever the expected profit qi(yi   wi)   ki is positive. As more
vacancies are created, tightness decreases until the free entry condition
qi(yi   wi) = ki is verified. The conditional employment probability is an
increasing function of tightness through pi = P(qi)
def⌘ Mi(ni,ki)ki = Mi(qi, 1).
Therefore, the conditional probability pi is a decreasing function of the
gross wage through pi = Pi
⇣
Q 1i
⇣
ki
yi wi
⌘⌘
, which determines the labor de-
mand function pi = Li(wi).
Under risk neutrality and proportional bargaining (20), one has for any
j 6= i that ∂Wi∂Tj = 0, thereby
∂Pi
∂Tj
= 0 from pi = Li(wi), and finally
∂Ui
∂Tj
= 0 from
(10). Moreover, we get from pi = Li(wi) and (10) that:
∂Ui
∂Ti
=

 1+ ∂Wi
∂Ti
✓
1+
wi
pi
∂Pi
∂wi
wi   Ti   di   b
wi
◆ 
pi
As µi 2 (0, 1) denote the elasticity of the matching function with respect
to the number of job-seekers, we get dpipi = (1  µi)
dqi
qi
and dqiqi =  µi
dqi
qi
, so
dpi
pi
=   1 µiµi
dqi
qi
. Log-differentiating the free-entry condition ki = qi (yi   wi)
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leads to dqiqi =
wi
yi wi
dwi
wi
. So, we get dpipi =  
1 µi
µi
wi
yi wi
dwi
wi
, i.e: wipi
∂Pi
∂wi
=   1 µiµi
wi
yi wi
and:
∂Ui
∂Ti
=

 1+ ∂Wi
∂Ti
✓
1  1  µi
µi
wi   Ti   di   b
yi   wi
◆ 
pi
Equation (20) implying that wi Ti di byi wi =
bi
1 bi and
∂Wi
∂Ti
= 1  bi, we get:
∂Ui
∂Ti
=

 1+ (1  bi)
✓
1  1  µi
µi
bi
1  bi
◆ 
pi =
bi
µi
∂Ui
∂Ti
    Micro (29)
when µi > 0 and bi < 1, which ends the proof of Proposition 3.
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Online Appendix to Chapter II
20 Theory
20.1 The case without unemployment responses
In this Appendix, we consider the case where wages can freely adjust,
but the conditional employment probability is exogenous at pi 2 (0, 1] (so
dP
dT = 0) and where the different types of labor are substitutable. More
specifically, we assume that the different types of labor hi and capital Z
produce a numeraire good sold in a perfectly competitive product market
under a constant returns to scale technology F(h1, ..., hI ,Z).71 We further-
more assume the rate of return to capital, r > 0, is exogenous. The latter
assumption can be viewed either by considering a small open economy and
assuming perfect capital mobility, or by considering the steady state of a
closed economy with infinite horizon savers. The assumptions of exoge-
nous unemployment rates and constant returns to scale seem plausible
in the long run, even though they ruled out job rationing considered by
Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2015) which are plausible in the short run.
We then get that:
Proposition 4. If the unemployment rates are exogenous, the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale and dCdT is invertible, the optimal
71We hence generalize Saez (2002) who considered perfect substitution across the dif-
ference types of labor through the production function:F(h1, ..., hI) = ÂIi=1 wi hi, where wi
stands both for the productivity of labor in occupation i and for the wage in the corre-
sponding labor market.
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tax schedule is given by:
0 = (1  gj)hj +
I
Â
i=1
(Ti + b)
∂Hi
∂Tj
     
Micro
(30)
and depends only on microeconomic employment responses.
Proof: In the absence of unemployment responses to taxation ∂Pi∂Tj = 0,
the matrix A of corrective terms ∂Ci∂Tj +
∂Pi
∂Tj
u(ci) di u(b)
pi u0(ci)
coincides with dCdT . We
thus get: dKdT =  dCdT · dKdT
   Micro and dHdT =  dCdT · dHdT    Micro. Equation (14) then
successively leads to:
0 = h  dC
dT
· dH
dT
    Micro · (T+ b) + dCdT · dKdT
    Micro ·
 
dK
dT
    Micro
! 1
· (g h)
0 = h  dC
dT
· dH
dT
    Micro · (T+ b) + dCdT · (g h)
0 =
✓
dC
dT
◆ 1
· h  dH
dT
    Micro · (T+ b) + g h (31)
where the last equality requires the matrix dCdT to be invertible.
Moreover, the firm’s profit function verifies
P(w1, ...,wI , r)
def⌘ max
h1,...,hI ,Z
F(h1, ..., hI ,Z) ÂIi=1 wi hi   r Z. Applying the enve-
lope theorem leads to ∂P∂wi =  hi, thereby dP =  ÂIi=1 hi dwi  Z dR. Because
of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, we get that dP = 0,
which together with the assumption of an inelastic return of capital leads
to 0 = ÂIi=1 hi
∂Wi
∂Tj
. In matrix notation, this implies that h is an eigenvec-
tor of Matrix dWdT associated to eigenvalue 0. Hence, h is an eigenvector
of Matrix dCdT associated to eigenvalue  1, so dCdT · h =  h and eventually
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⇣
dC
dT
⌘ 1 · h =  h. Therefore Equation (31) simplifies to:
0 = 1  g h+ dH
dT
    Micro · (T+ b)
which corresponds to (30).
This result may look surprising and is also due to the specific repre-
sentation of the labor supply responses along the intensive margin in the
occupation model of Saez (2002). Stiglitz (1982), Naito (1999) propose al-
ternatively a two-skills version of the Mirrlees model with intensive labor
supply responses where low skilled and high skilled labor are imperfect
substitutes. Stiglitz (1982) shows that the labor supply of the high skilled
workers needs to be upward distorted (negative marginal tax rate for high
skilled workers), unless the elasticity of substitution across the two types
of labor is infinite. This result of Stiglitz (1982) looks at odds with the re-
sult above. Saez (2004) explains this discrepancy by the fact that in Stiglitz
(1982) when a high skill worker earns the gross income intended to a low-
skilled one, he does so keeping her high skill productivity. In other words,
a worker’s skill is portable across the different income levels in Stiglitz
(1982) but not in Saez (2004). Therefore, a change in the low skilled gross
wage affects the self-selection incentive constraint in Stiglitz (1982) and
Naito (1999), as well as in the continuous income model of Rothschild and
Scheuer (2013), while in the occupation model of Saez (2004) and Lee and
Saez (2008), when an individual works in a low-skilled job, she has a low
productivity. The occupation model captures not only extensive (participa-
tion) responses but also educational choice along the intensive margin in
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the long-run while the models of Stiglitz (1982) and Naito (1999) focus on
the short-run hours of work and in-work effort responses along the inten-
sive margin. ⇤
21 Simulations
We simulate the optimal tax schedule using a similar approach as Saez
(2002). We denote the current tax system with the vector of occupation tax
rates t0. The correpsonding density weights in the observed economy are
given as h0i = Hi(t0).
21.1 System of Equations
The system of equations the determines the optimal tax schedule is
given by the budget constraint:
b+ E =
I
Â
i=1
(Ti + b) Hi(t) (32)
and the first order condition for each of the I income groups set to zero.
Since we simulate the model in the no cross effects case we have that
∂Hj
∂Ti
= 0 for j 6= i and therefore:
(1  gi)hi + gihi
∂Kk
∂Ti
    
w,p
  ∂Kk
∂Ti
∂Kk
∂Ti
    
w,p
=  (Ti + b)∂Hi∂Ti (33)
for i = 1, ..., I
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Finally the first order condition for the optimal benefit level b (equation
10 in the main text) can be simplified under a no cross effects assumption
for benefits (see below) to:
0 =  (1  g0)h0 +
I
Â
j=1
(Tj + b)
∂Hj
∂b
(34)
In order to solve the system of equations we also have to parameterize
gi(Ti) and hi(Ti). For the former we follow Saez (2002) and assume that
gi = 1lcni with the curvature parameter n = 0.5 - the version in the paper -
and n = 1 shown in the appendix. However, there is a complication, since
ci = wi(t)  Ti, but we do not have an estimate of how taxes affect pre-tax
earnings. Therefore for the purpose of calculating the welfare weights, we
will keep pre-tax earnings fixed at the observed levels and calculate ci as
ci = wi(t0)  Ti.
For hi we use a first order Taylor approximation that is straightforward
to implement given our estimates of the marginal taxes:
hi = h0i +
∂Hi
∂Ti
⇣
Ti   T0i
⌘
+
∂Hi
∂b
⇣
bi   b0i
⌘
(35)
Equations (1), (2) and (3) for i = 1, ..., I thus constitute a system of I+2
equations and I+2 unknows: the marginal value of public fundsl, the
transfer for the unemployed b and the tax levels Ti for i = 1, ...., I.
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21.2 First Order Condition for b
If we assume that benefits at zero do not affect pre-tax earnings or job
finding probabilities for the working population, we get that:
∂Cj
∂b
=
∂Wj
∂b
=
∂Pj
∂b
= 0 (36)
for j 6= 0. In this case, equation (10) simplifies to:
0 =  h0 +
I
Â
j=1
(Tj + b)
∂Hj
∂b
+ g0k0 +
I
Â
j=1
gjhj
"
1  pj
pj
u0(b)
u0(cj)
#
(37)
The first term:  h0 is the direct budget cost, the second term is the
budget cost coming from employment responses. The third term repre-
sents the welfare effect of giving $1 to the unemployed. The last term rep-
resents that an increase in b also benefits all individuals who participate
in the labor market but fail to find a job. Note that they have a different
welfare weight (which is because we defined social welfare as a function
over expected utilities).
Suppose that the social welfare function is linear in individual expected
utilities (benthamite). In that case: u
0(b)
u0(cj)
= g0gj . In that case equation (37)
becomes:
0 =  h0 +
I
Â
j=1
(Tj + b)
∂Hj
∂b
+ g0k0 +
I
Â
j=1
g0kj
⇥
1  pj
⇤
=  (1  g0)h0 +
I
Â
j=1
(Tj + b)
∂Hj
∂b
(38)
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22 Description of Data Sources and Cleaning Steps
22.1 Data Sources
The empirical analysis combines information from several sources. This
subsection describes each of the data sources used in this paper. In the
subsections below, we describe how each of these are used to construct
our final dataset.
1. Current Population Survey (CPS): The CPS is a monthly survey, spon-
sored by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), and is the main source of labor market statistics for
the United States. The CPS sample is an overlapping panel of house-
holds that are randomly selected to participate in the survey. Infor-
mation (including labor force status) is asked about each member of
the household. For the first four months after their selection, house-
holds are surveyed monthly on the calendar week of the 19th of each
month about their labor market activities for the previous week. After
their four months, households are not surveyed for eight consecutive
months. Following the eight month of not being surveyed, house-
holds are surveyed again for four additional consecutive months. This
is sometimes referred to as a 4  8  4 sampling scheme. Households
are asked about their regular weekly earnings and hours of work only
in their fourth or eighth month of interviews. These households form
the outgoing rotation group (ORG). Every March, the CPS supple-
ments its standard questionnaire with additional questions on de-
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mographic characteristics and annual income, among others.72 This
supplement is referred to as the March annual data or the March
Supplement. The March Supplement includes those scheduled to
be interviewed in the March monthly CPS survey, as well as non-
Hispanic White households with children 18 or younger and minority
(Hispanic and non-Hispanic non-White) households drawn from CPS
households that are in their eight month “off-period”. We choose to
supplement the ORG data with the March annual data because it
increases our sample of households with children, especially lower
income-households.
Our individual (and aggregate) employment and labor force participa-
tion data comes from the monthly ORG and the March annual data
of the CPS. In addition to the labor market variables, we extract de-
mographic information on state of residence, education attainment,
marital status and number of children for CPS respondents. The
March annual data spans the time period 1984-2011, while the ORG
data (from IPUMS) spans 1994-2010. Thus, each observation in the
ORG and March annual data corresponds to a unique individual that
is in a given month and year. Approximately 40 percent of our ob-
servations are interviewed in March, with the remaining observa-
tions (from the ORG) being equally distributed across the remaining
months.73
72While questions about labor force status (the empstat variable described in more detail
below) are the same for the ORG and March supplement, some variables are not. For ex-
ample, as we discuss below, annual earnings (the incwage CPS variable) are only available
for those in the March Supplement. We use this information to impute earnings for all
ORG and March Supplement households in year-by-education group cells.
73From 1984 to 1993 we only have data from the March Supplement, so all observations
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2. Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP): We use informa-
tion from the 1985 to 2008 SIPP panel’s to construct AFDC/TANF
and food stamp take-up rates for households with various numbers
of children and income levels in each local labor market. We describe
this procedure in detail in the following subsection.74
3. Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED): We inflate all dollar amounts
to 2010 levels using the national Consumer Price Index for All Ur-
ban Consumers (CPI) from the FRED. In some specifications, we also
control for the seasonally-adjusted state unemployment rate. This
information is also obtained from the FRED.
4. NBER TAXSIM software: Given the year, a household’s state of res-
idence, number of children and earnings, we calculate their net tax
liability using the NBER TAXSIM software.75
5. Welfare Benefit Calculator: We use our own calculator constructed
from the Welfare Rules Database. Given the year, a household’s state
of residence, number of children and earnings, we approximate wel-
fare (AFDC and TANF) and food-stamps benefits.
22.2 Data Cleaning
22.2.a CPS Data
The CPS data cleaning process is divided into the following steps:
for this period are for the month of March.
74We sometimes refer to the AFDC/TANF and food stamps programs as “welfare” pro-
grams.
75See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for a detailed description of the TAXSIM software.
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1. Correctly assign the number of children to the mother of a household
2. Keep only non-military single women
3. Drop observations with illogical responses
1. We first pool the ORG and March annual CPS cross-sections and
merge this data to the FRED CPI and unemployment data. At this stage,
we have 29,916,758 person-month-year observations spanning the 1984
to 2011 period. Each observation represents a unique individual. Next, we
assign the number of children a mother is responsible for. This number is
different for welfare benefit eligibility than for tax purposes. Specifically,
welfare benefits vary with the number of children under the age of 18 in
the household, whereas for tax purposes a child must be under the age
of 19, or younger than 24 but in school. The key input in the raw CPS
data for this calculation is the momloc variable. This variable indicates
whether a respondent’s mother is living in the household, as well as her
“person number” if she is living in the household. For example, if there an
individual’s mother is not living in the household the value of the momloc
variable would be equal to “00”; if the mother is the head of household, the
value of the momloc variable would be “1”.
To determine the number of children in the household for welfare ben-
efit purposes, we sort the pooled CPS data by households and count the
number of children under 18 living in the household. We assign this num-
ber to the head of household. Note that this number will include those
that are not biological children of the household head, consistent with
the way welfare benefits are typically calculated. See Appendix B (below)
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for more details about welfare benefit calculations. For respondents be-
tween the ages of 16 and 24, the CPS variable schlcoll indicates whether
the respondent was in high school or college during the previous week.
The CPS variable empstat indicates the respondent’s labor force status. We
assign those that report not being in the labor force because they are in
school (empstat = 33) or who report being in college or university full time
(schlcoll = 3) and who are between the ages of 18 and 24 as children of the
head of household. We add this count to the number of minors above in
order to calculate the correct number of children for tax purposes.
2. After having assigned children to female household heads, we re-
strict the sample to non-military single women between the ages of 18 and
55 in the ORG and March annual supplement. Specifically, dependent
children (7,449,217 observations), males (10,674,890), married women
(7,093,086), those who report being less than 10 years older than their
youngest child (1,977), those not in the ORG or March data (2,908,023),
those under the age of 18 or over the age of 55 (600,843), those in the mil-
itary (924) are dropped from the sample. At this state, we have 1,187,798
person-year observations spanning the 1984 to 2011 period.
3. We also drop observations where there is evidence that the data are
contaminated. The CPS variable wkswork1 (available in the March Sup-
plement only) indicates the number of weeks the respondent worked for
pay in the previous year. The incwage (also available in the March Supple-
ment only) variable captures the respondent’s reported pre-tax earnings.76
76In contrast to the labor force status questions that are asked each month for all CPS
(ORG and March Supplement) respondents, the wkswork1 and incwage variables are only
available for the March Supplement. This information is used below to estimate annual
earnings for tax and welfare purposes.
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We drop women that claim positive earnings for the previous year (i.e.
incwage > 0) yet report not working (wkswork1 = 0) (9,771 observations).
4. In the final data cleaning step we exclude those who report be-
ing full-time students (149,472 observations), those with more than seven
children (215), those that report having negative non-employment (other)
income (1,464), those that are the only person in their state-year-month
education category (562). Dropping this final group is necessary for spec-
ifications where we estimate models with state-by-year-by-month fixed ef-
fects. Finally, we exclude those with a Bachelor’s degree or higher, as they
are unlikely to be affected by the tax-schedule at the bottom of the income
distribution (234,343 observations).
The number of children assigned to a mother is an important input into
eligibility for welfare benefits and for net tax liabilities. We assess how our
measure of the number of children a mother is responsible for compares
with the reported value in the CPS (the nchild variable in the CPS) in the
cleaned sample. The following table reports the difference between our
calculation and the reported number of children in the CPS. A value of 1
means that we calculate a female head of household to be responsible for
one more child than she claims to be her own. For example, a respon-
dent might fail to count any non-biological children she is responsible for.
A value of 0 means that our measures are identical, while a value of-1
means the female head of household claims more of her own children in
the CPS than we calculate. An example of this case could occur if a re-
spondent counts a non-school age child living at home; our calculations
would exclude this child for both welfare eligibility and tax purposes.In
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the overwhelmingly majority of case (90.23 percent), our calculated num-
ber matches the number reported in the CPS.
Dkids Count Percent Cumulative Percent
-7 4 0.00 0.00
-6 9 0.00 0.00
-5 46 0.00 0.01
-4 245 0.02 0.03
-3 1,969 0.20 0.23
-2 14,442 1.43 1.66
-1 70,288 6.97 8.63
0 909,305 90.23 98.86
1 8,028 0.80 99.66
2 2,253 0.22 99.88
3 803 0.08 99.96
4 256 0.03 99.99
5 83 0.01 100.00
6 24 0.00 100.00
7 5 0.00 100.00
Total 1,007,760 100.00
22.2.b SIPP Data
We use information from the SIPP to calculate welfare (AFDC/TANF)
and food stamp take up rates. The SIPP data cleaning process is divided
into the following steps:
1. Extracting raw SIPP data
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2. Ensure the data are comparable across SIPP panels
3. Calculate the number of children (under 18) in a family
4. Keep only single, non-military women age 18 to 55
5. Drop observations with illogical responses
6. Calculate welfare (AFDC/TANF/food stamps) take-up rates
1. We first pool cross sections from the 1985 to 2008 SIPP panels
that span the years 1985 to 2012.77 Respondents in each SIPP panel are
interviewed every four months (a wave) for a two to four years.78 Thus,
each observation in our pooled cross-section is a person-month; the raw
data include 24,401,516 such observations. We do not use the 1984 panel
since it does not include individuals from Alaska, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Utah and Vermont. Also, the 1984 panel does
not differentiate between children’s full time and part-time student status
that is important for calculating welfare benefit eligibility.
2. Some variable names and response values differ across SIPP waves.
For example, the variable indicating the age of the respondent is called age
in the 1990 to 1993 SIPP panels, but is called tage beginning in the 1996
panel. Also, total family unemployment income is called f unemp in the
1990 to 1993 SIPP panels; the variable name changes to t f unemp beginning
77At the time we extracted the raw data the most recent wave of the 2008 SIPP panel
was wave 13 that covered the September 2012 to December 2012 period. As discussed
below, we only use data up to 2011 to be consistent with the CPS data. At the time
of writing, the most recent wave of the 2008 SIPP panel is wave 16, which covers the
September 2013 to December 2013 perod.
78There are 14 SIPP panels; annual, overlapping panels from 1984 to 1993, 1996, 2001,
2004 and 2008.
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in 1996. Thus, the next step in the data cleaning process ensures that the
data are comparable across SIPP panels. We use the code and crosswalk
from the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) website that makes
the 1990 to 2008 SIPP panels comparable.79 We borrow from this code for
earlier panels to ensure the comparability.
3. We calculate the number of children in a family as follows. We
use information in the SIPP to designate women as family heads. Family
heads can be living in the same household as their parents. In these
cases, the woman would be designated as a sub-family head if she also
has a dependent child. We classify all female family or sub-family heads
as heads of household. Each person-month observation in the SIPP has
common “family-level (or sub-family level)” variables, such as the number
of children in the family/sub-family. We use this common family-level
variable to calculate the number of children (that are under the age of 18,
reside in the same household, and are related through birth or adoption)
a female family or sub-family head is responsible for. 80
4. Next, we restrict the sample to single non-military women between
the ages of 18 and 55, as with the CPS data. First, we drop obser-
vations from the 2012 calendar year (116,624 observations). We drop
males (11,640,919), those under 18 or over 55 (6,062,223), married women
(3,959,793), those that are not heads of household (825,927), full-time stu-
dents (120,822), those in the military (2,570), as well as a small number
of those with more than seven children due to a lack of program data on
79http://ceprdata.org/sipp-uniform-data-extracts/
80Since we only use the SIPP for welfare take-up rates we don’t need to worry about
children over 18 that are still dependents.
157
these households (467).
5. As with the CPS data, we drop observations where there is evidence
that the data are contaminated. We drop women who claim positive earn-
ings for the previous year yet report not working. We also drop those that
report working the previous year but have zero earnings (86,892 observa-
tions). The resulting sample size is 1,585,279.
6. We calculate AFDC/TANF and food stamps recipiency rates based
on cells defined by an individual’s year of observation, education group,
and number of children. We calculate recipiency rates for each of these
programs separately as follows. Using the cleaned SIPP data, we define
our cells as follows. The four education groups are: less than a high
school diploma (or equivalent), high school diploma, some college (or an
associate’s degree), and a college degree. The number of children groups
are {0, 1, 2, 3+}. The year of observation groups are {1984   1988, 1989  
1993, 1994   1998, 1999   2003, 2004   2008, 2009   2011}. The interaction of
these groups leads to 96 cells. Thus, each observation in the SIPP will
we an element of one of these cells. We calculate the fraction of individ-
uals receiving AFDC/TANF and food stamps by calculating the fraction of
women in each cell that report receiving benefit income.81 Since women
with no children are ineligible for AFDC/TANF benefits, the recipiency rate
is zero in one quarter of the cells. In the empirical section we collapse the
recipiency rates for the pre- and post-1996 years (after major welfare re-
form) for each education group. This leads to eight recipiency rates, one
for each education group before 1996, and one for each education group
81The person-month probability weights in the SIPP are used to calculate these aver-
ages.
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after 1996.
22.3 Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables of interest are (a) the micro labor force partici-
pation rate; (b) the macro participation rate; and (c) the macro employment
rate. We use information on the reported labor force and employment sta-
tus from ORG and March CPS respondents to construct these three vari-
ables. The empstat variable (available for both the ORG and March Sup-
plement) in the CPS indicates a respondent’s employment status for the
previous week.82 The possible values for this variable are (i) “Not in labor
force”, (ii) “Unemployed”, and (iii) “Employed”.83 For some years additional
detail on a respondent’s labor force status is available, but we do not use it
in this paper. For example, information on whether those out of the labor
force are unable to work is available for most years in the time period we
study. In other years, reasons for being out of the labor force due to being
in school full time is also available.
From the empstat variable we define an indicator variable equal to one
if a CPS respondent is in the labor force and zero otherwise. Specifically,
those that are coded as being ”Unemployed” or ”Employed” are in the labor
force. Our macro measure of labor force participation aggregates this vari-
82The monthly CPS interviews (including those for the March Supplement) occur dur-
ing the week of the 19th of the month. The baseline labor force status questions for
each month (and therefore apply to the ORG and March samples) ask respondents about
whether they were working, working but temporarily absent, searching for a job or not
working and not searching for a job during the previous week, referred to as the “reference
week” (i.e. the week of the 12th of the month).
83An individual is employed if he or she reports working or temporarily absent from a
job during the CPS reference week. An individual is unemployed if they report not being
employed but actively searching for a job during the reference week.
159
able to the state, year and education group level (our definition of a local
labor market). Similarly, we define an employment status indicator equal
to one if a CPS respondent reports being “Employed” and zero otherwise;
the employment/population rate. The macro employment status variable
aggregates the employment status dummy variable to the state, year and
education group level.
22.4 Tax and Benefit Variables
Our independent variables of interest are the net tax liability, after-tax
income and welfare benefits of respondents. We assign each person in
our CPS sample, the net tax liability and benefit amount corresponding
to their state, year, education group, number of children and imputed
earnings level. The first step is to impute earnings.
22.4.a Preliminaries: Imputed Earnings
We impute earnings as follows. The incwage variable, available for in-
dividuals in the March Supplement, indicates each respondent’s pre-tax
wage and salary income for the previous calendar year. For those with
positive earnings, we take the natural logarithm of this variable. Next, for
each year and education group (high school dropouts, high school grad-
uates, and some college), we regress the log earnings on a set of demo-
graphic variables. The demographic variables are: a linear and quadratic
term in age, dummies for race (hispanic and black) and urban/rural sta-
tus and state fixed effects. The predicted values from these regressions
(for each year and education group) are assigned to all CPS respondents,
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regardless of their work status. This amount is inflated (or deflated) to
2010 dollars.
22.4.b Calculating Tax and Welfare Benefit Variables
Given imputed earnings, as well as a the TANF/AFDC and food stamps
take-up rates, calculate the net tax liability and welfare benefits. We
use the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database84 and TRIM385 program
rules to create an AFDC/TANF benefit calculator. For tax credits and lia-
bilities we use the NBER’s TAXSIM9 software86.
Micro Tax and Benefit Variables: Let wm,e,s,t,n be the imputed annual
earnings for individual m with education level e, n number of children and
living in state s in year t (the predicted values described earlier). The micro
tax and benefit variables are calculated as follows:
1. We define earnings groups over a grid: wm,e,s,t,n 2 {200, 400, 600, ..., 120000},
and assign individuals in the CPS to one of these groups based on
their imputed earnings.87
2. For t 2 {federal taxes, state taxes, payroll taxes, AFDC, TANF, food
stamps}, define Ft(w, s, t, n) be the tax liability or welfare benefit for
an individual with earnings wm,e,s,t,n, with n children, living in state s
in year t. We calculate Ft separately for federal, state or payroll tax
liabilities, as well as AFDC, TANF and food stamp benefit levels using
our welfare calculator and TAXSIM9.
84http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/WRDWelcome.cfm
85http://trim3.urban.org/
86http://users.nber.org/ taxsim/taxsim9/
87Those with predicted earnings greater than $120,000 are topcoded at $120,000.
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3. After-tax income for each individual in the CPS is calculated as fol-
lows:
cm,e,s,t,n = wm,e,s,t,n   FFederal(w, s, t, n)  Fstate(w, s, t, n)  FFica(w, s, t, n)
+FTANF/AFDC(w, s, t, n) + FFoodStamps(w, s, t, n)
where FTANF/AFDC(w, s, t, n) and FFoodStamps(w, s, t, n) is the annual level
of benefits for women with n children, income w, living in state s, in
year t, multiplied by the welfare take-up rate for groups defined by
year, education and number of children. This accounts for the fact
that the take up of these programs is less than 100 percent.
Macro Tax and Benefit Variables: The macro tax and benefit variables
are calculated as follows.
1. Let Ne,n be the number of individuals with education e and n children
in our CPS sample.
2. Let Ne be the number of individuals with education e.
3. Calculate the proportion of children in each education group
ae,n =
Ne,n
Ne
4. Calculate Ft(w, s, t, n) as above
5. For each state, year and education level, calculate
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MacroTaxs,t,e =
7
Â
n=1
Ft(w, s, t, n)⇥ ae,n
6. Assign a macro tax (or after-tax income) and benefit variables to re-
spondents in the CPS using analogous definitions as above.
22.4.c Instruments
Welfare benefits and tax liabilities, including tax credits such as the
EITC, are endogenous to a taxpayer’s earnings. We deal with this endo-
geneity using a simulated instrumental variables strategy. Our strategy
exploits changes in tax and benefit rules across states over time between
those with different numbers of children. Identification relies on holding
fixed the distribution of income, which may be endogenous to tax policy.
Our instruments are calculated as follows:
1. Calculate income centile bounds. First, we inflate the imputed in-
come variable wm,e,s,t,n (see above) to 2010 dollars using the CPI. Using
these imputed real incomes for all individuals from 1984 to 2011, we con-
struct the percentiles of the empirical earnings distribution. We record the
income cutoffs for the lower and upper bounds of each centile.
2. Next, for each education group across all years, we compute the
percentage of individuals in each centile.
3. Third, for each year we compute the mean nominal earnings in each
centile, conditional on real earnings in that year being within the bounds
of the centile from step 1.
4. For each year, state and number of children (0,1,...,7), we calculate
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the federal, state and payroll taxes for each centile at the mean nominal
level of earnings in step 3 using the NBER TAXSIM calculator. We also cal-
culate the level of AFDC/TANF and food stamps benefits at this earnings
level using the welfare calculator.
5. Finally, we are ready to construct our micro instruments. For each,
year, state, education group and number of children, we aggregate the
net tax and benefit liabilities from step 4 across centiles using the fixed
education distribution from step 2. This leaves us with a tax variable that
varies by year, state, education group and number of children.
6. For our macro instruments, we first calculate the distribution of
the number of children (0,1,...,7) for each education group for all years
and states. We then construct our macro instruments by aggregating the
micro instruments from step 5 across family types, using the distribution
of the number of children by education level.
22.5 Variable List
For convenience, this subsection provides a list of all variables used in
the empirical analysis. Since we use information from several sources, we
record which dataset each variable originated from. Definitions for each
variable are also included.
CPS Variables:
• age: age of CPS respondent
• sex: gender of CPS respondent (1 for males and 2 for females)
• hisp, nonwhite, black: race dummy variables from the CPS
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• marst: marital status of CPS respondent (7 categories); singles are
either divorced, widowed or never married
• momloc: indicates whether a CPS respondent’s mother lives in the
household. A value of 00 indicates that the mother is not in the
household. Otherwise, the CPS person number of the respondent
is coded. For example, if a CPS respondent’s mother is the head of
household, her person number would be 1.
• state f ip: state of residence of CPS respondent
• schlcoll: Indicates whether CPS respondent’s between the ages of 16
and 24 are in school. The acceptable responses are (CPS coded values
in parenthesis): NIU (0), high school full time (1), high school part
time (2), college or university full time (3), college or university part
time (4), does not attend school, college or university (5)
• educ: a respondent’s education attainment. The categories are (along
with their coded values in the CPS in parenthesis):
– NIU or no schooling: separate categories for no information avail-
able
(001) or preschool/kindergarten (002), as well as a summary cat-
egory (000)
– Grades 1-4 inclusive: separate categories for each of grades 1
to 4 (011 to 014), along with a summary grades 1 to 4 category
(010)
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– Grades 5 or 6: separate categories for grades 5 and 6 (021 to
022), along with a summary grades 5 to 6 category (020)
– Grades 7 or 8: separate categories for grades 7 and 8 (031 to
032), along with a summary grades 7 to 8 category (030)
– Grade 9: CPS respondent completed grade 9 (040)
– Grades 10: CPS respondent completed grade 10 (050)
– Grade 11: CPS respondent completed grade 11 (060)
– Grade 12: separate categories for 12th grade completed with no
diploma (071), 12th grade completed by diploma status unknown
(072), 12th grade completed with a high school diploma or equiv-
alent (073), as well as a summary variable for any one of these
three categories (070)
– 1 year of college: CPS respondent completed one year of college
and did not earn a degree (080 to 081)
– 2 years of college: separate categories for Associate’s degree, oc-
cupational or vocational program (091), Associate’s degree, aca-
demic program (092), as well as a summary variable for each of
these two categories (090)
– 3 years of college: CPS respondent completed three years of col-
lege (no bachelor degree) (100)
– 4 years of college: CPS respondent completed four years of college
and earned a bachelor’s degree (110 to 111)
– 5+ years of college: separate categories for 5 years of college
(121), 6 years of college (122), completed a Master’s degree (123),
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completed a professional school degree (124), completed a doc-
torate (125), as well as a summary variable for any one of these
categories (120)
• hsDrop: dummy variable equal to 1 if a CPS respondent has less than
a high school diploma (value of educ < 72); 0 otherwise (constructed
variable)
• hsGrad: dummy variable equal to 1 if a CPS respondent has a high
school diploma (value of educ   72 and educ  73); 0 otherwise (con-
structed variable)
• college: dummy variable equal to 1 if a CPS respondent has an asso-
ciate’s degree, vocational certificate or attended some college but did
not complete a certificate or degree program (value of educ > 73 and
educ < 110); 0 otherwise (constructed variable)
• bachelor: dummy variable equal to 1 if a CPS respondent has a bach-
elor’s degree or higher (value of educ   110); 0 otherwise (constructed
variable)
• wkswork1: number of weeks a CPS respondent worked during the past
calendar year
• yearWork: dummy variable equal to 1 if wkswork1 > 0; 0 otherwise
(constructed variable)
• incwage: reported pre-tax wage and salary income
• hrswork: reported number of hours worked during the previous week
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• weekWork: dummy variable equal to 1 if CPS respondent worked a
positive number of hours during the previous week; 0 otherwise (con-
structed variable)
• uhrswork: number of hours a CPS respondent normally works during
the week
• hoursWork: estimated number of hours worked last year; equal to
wkswork1 ⇤ uhrswork (constructed variable)
• empstat: a CPS respondent’s employment status. The categories are
(along with their coded values in the CPS in parenthesis):
– NIU (00)
– CPS respondent in the armed forces
– CPS respondent’s labor force status, conditional on being in the
labor force: separate categories for employed at at work (10), em-
ployed but was temporarily not at work during the reference week
(12), unemployed and an experienced worker (21), unemployed
and a new worker (22) and a summary unemployed variable (20)
– CPS respondent’s status (not in the labor force): separate cate-
gories for does housework (31), unable to work (32), in school full
time (33), other (34), does unpaid work (35)
• l f p ind: Labor force participation status dummy variable; equal to
one if respondent is in the labor force (empstat   10 and empstat  22);
zero otherwise (constructed variable)
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• emp ind: Employment status dummy variable; equal to one if respon-
dent is employed (empstat   10 and empstat  12); zero otherwise (con-
structed variable)
23 Description of Welfare Program Rules and Calculation of Benefits
In this Appendix, we provide a brief description of the transfer programs
that low-income families are eligible for. In particular, we summarize the
following programs: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (TANF), Tem-
porary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), and the Supplemental Nutri-
tion Assistance Program (SNAP). The SNAP program is often referred to as
“food stamps”. For simplicity, we refer to these programs collectively as
“welfare”. After describing these programs, we describe how we calculate
individual welfare benefits using the rules published in the Welfare Rules
Database88 and TRIM389, managed by the Urban Institute.
23.1 Description of Welfare Program Rules
23.1.a Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
The AFDC program was introduced in 1936 to provide financial assis-
tance to children from low-income families. The program was replaced in
1997 by the TANF program following the passage of the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which we de-
scribe below. AFDC benefits were administered by the federal government,
through the Department of Health and Human Services, although states
88http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/WRDWelcome.CFM
89http://trim3.urban.org
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shared in the program’s costs and rule-making authority. In particular,
states were able to determine individual eligibility and benefit levels, sub-
ject to federal guidelines and program requirements.
Families with children under the age of 18 that are residents of the state
and whose children are living with them were eligible for AFDC benefits if
they met the state’s standard of need. A family was considered needy, if
their monthly income was below a specified level; some types of income,
such as child support payments, the EITC, and allowances for child care
expenses, were disregarded for the purposes of determining eligibility.90
As income increased above the disregard, a family’s AFDC benefit was
reduced until they were no longer eligible for benefits. Families that were
eligible for the AFDC were automatically eligible for other entitlements,
such as Medicaid and food stamps.
23.1.b Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)
Two criticisms of the AFDC program was that the high claw-back rates
on benefits and no duration limit on benefits provided a disincentive to
work. These criticisms, among others, led to the replacement of the AFDC
by the TANF program in 1997 as part of the PRWORA. In general, the
primary difference between the AFDC and TANF programs is that the lat-
ter provides states with much more flexibility in choosing eligibility re-
quirements, benefit levels, work requirements and phase-out rates. Under
TANF, states are provided with block grants to finance their own programs,
90A household’s eligibility also depended on meeting asset tests set by the federal and
state governments.
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provided that they help achieve four goals set forth in the PRWORA.91 The
four goals are: (i) provide assistance to children from needy families, (ii)
end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promot-
ing job preparation, work and marriage, (iii) reduce out-of-marriage preg-
nancies, and (iv) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent
families. States must ensure that TANF benefit recipients meet work re-
quirements to remain eligible for benefits, with some exceptions.92 The
work requirements are that recipients: (a) must work as soon as they are
job ready and no later than two years after initially receiving benefits and
(b) work a minimum number of hours per week. Federal TANF rules also
impose time limits on the receipt of (cash) benefits. Income (and asset)
cutoffs for TANF eligibility varies significantly across states.
23.1.c Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP or food stamps)
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP or food stamps)
provides assistance to low- and moderate-income families to purchase food
items. Rules for the food stamp program are determined by the federal gov-
ernment and is funded through United States Department of Agriculture.
The program is administered by states that have some discretion in setting
household income reporting requirements and choosing what the program
is called in their state. SNAP benefits are delivered each month to house-
holds via a magnetically encoded payment card, known as an Electronic
91The basic (nominal dollar) block grant for each state was set in 1996. States with
faster population growth are eligible for larger block grants, and states can be eligible for
more funding to deal with increased case loads during recessions.
92The activities that fulfill the work requirement varies by state.
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Benefits Transfer (EBT) card. After applying and getting approved for ben-
efits, recipients receive their EBT card. States credit EBT cards for eligible
households monthly. This card, similar to a debit card or a bank card, is
accepted to purchase food items.
Eligibility for food stamps is primarily determined by a household’s
monthly income. The income test is increasing in family size. For house-
holds with one individual in 2015, the monthly income cutoff is $1,265.
The monthly income cutoff for households with two, three and four mem-
bers is $1,705, $2,144 and $2,584 respectively. A household’s monthly
allotment is calculated as
FS = (MaxBen  0.3 ⇤ [(1  EIDed) ⇤ EI +OtherInc  StDed  Shelt])
where MaxBen is the maximum allotment determined annually and de-
pendant on the household size, EIDed is the earned income deduction,
OtherInc is unearned income, which includes AFDC or TANF benefits,
StDed is a standard deduction and Shelt is a shelter expense deduction93.
23.2 Calculating Individual Welfare Benefits
We calculate expected annual AFDC, TANF and SNAP benefits for each
woman in our CPS sample using two databases of ruels. For every state
and for each year from 1996 to 2013, the Welfare Rules Database con-
tains detailed information on benefit levels (by household size), eligibility
requirements, income disregards, work requirements and other details.
For years prior to 1996 we use the AFDC rules from the Urban Institute’s
93There is also an asset test of $2,250 in financial resources. Recipients between the
ages of 18 and 50 without dependent children also face work requirements. In particular,
they are only eligible to receive SNAP benefits for three months in a 36 month period if
they do not participate in a workfare or employment training program.
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TRIM3 program structured similarly to the Welfare Rules Database. We as-
sume that households have not exhausted their welfare eligibility through-
out the analysis. We model the initial parameters of the welfare programs,
some of the income disregards expire or change after extended periods of
sustained earnings. We use this information to construct separate welfare
calculators for AFDC/TANF and food stamps. For each year and state,
this calculator takes income, state, year and number of children and uses
state disregards, claw-back rates and income tests to compute a house-
hold’s monthly level of benefits. We multiply the level of monthly benefits
by twelve as our measure of annual benefits for the OLS regressions.
Figure 12 provides some example budget sets that our welfare / tax
calculator generates. The figures show the different components that
create the difference between pre- and post-tax income: food stamps,
TANF/AFDC, state taxes and federal taxes. Both panels show the bud-
get set of a single individual with 2 dependent children. As can be seen in
the two examples (California and New York), food stamps have a structure
like a negative income tax but with a cliff at the end, leading to a notch
in the tax schedule. TANF pays a large amount at zero income and is
then phased out though at different rates in different states (much slower
in California for example). State taxes are essentially absent in Califor-
nia in the relevant range, but the federal EITC creates a sizable bump in
the 8 to 15 000 income range. In New York, state taxes create a small
positive transfer at low incomes due to a state EITC, but have a negative
effect above 30 000. The two figures highlight that there is substantial
heterogeneity in these programs across states.
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Figure 13 shows the variation in the overall budget sets across number
of children, time and states. Panels (a), (b) and (c) show how the budget
sets by number of children have evolved in Ohio from 1984 to 2000, high-
lighting how the transfers have become more EITC-like with lower phase-
out rates and somewhat smaller transfers at the bottom. Panels (c) to (f)
show different states in the year 2000, revealing substantial heterogeneity
in the shape and structure of these schedules. For example California’s
transfer schedule implies tax rate close to zero at low incomes up to around
10,000 but then the tax rate due to phase out of various programs is close
to 100 percent between 10,000 and 30,00 for a single parent with two chil-
dren. Compared to this Texas provides much higher work incentives (and
much lower transfers at zero income). Overall these figures highlight the
type of variation that identifies our micro responses (within labor market
differential changes in taxes across children) and macro responses (across
state and year changes on the labor market level).
174
Table 17: Recipiency Rates of Transfer Programs
(1) (2)
Period 1984-1996 1997-2011
Panel A: Food Stamps
HS Dropout 0.414 0.406
HS Graduate 0.187 0.225
Some College 0.101 0.146
College Graduate 0.012 0.022
Panel B: AFDC/TANF
HS Dropout 0.489 0.209
HS Graduate 0.230 0.100
Some College 0.170 0.062
College Graduate 0.030 0.011
Notes: Recipiency rates are calculated using the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation. These data reflect the recip-
iency rates of single women aged 18-55 who are not full time
students or in the military, consistent with the data used for
the empirical analysis from the CPS. An individual is counted
as a recipient of either food stamps or AFDC/TANF if they
received a transfer in any amount from the program. The re-
cipiency rates for food stamps include single women without
children. The recipiency rates for AFDC/TANF include only
single mothers (single women without children are not eligible
for the benefit).
175
Table 18: OLS Regressions
(1) (2)
LHS Variable Participation Employment
Panel A: Micro Response ∂Kˆi∂Ti
micro ∂Hˆi
∂Ti
micro
Taxes Plus Benefits (Ti + b) -0.006 -0.006
[0.001]*** [0.001]***
Num. Obs 773367 773367
Panel B: Macro Response ∂Kˆi∂Ti
∂Hˆi
∂Ti
Avg Taxes Plus Benefits 0.007 0.009
within Labor Market [0.001]*** [0.001]***
Num. Obs 4284 4284
Table 19: Reduced Form Regressions
(1) (2)
LHS Variable Participation Employment
Panel A: Micro Response ∂Kˆi∂Ti
micro ∂Hˆi
∂Ti
micro
Taxes Plus Benefit with takeup: sim -0.055 -0.052
[0.003]*** [0.003]***
Num. Obs 773367 773367
Panel B: Macro Response ∂Kˆi∂Ti
∂Hˆi
∂Ti
Avg Taxes Plus Benefit with takeup: sim -0.027 -0.025
[0.014]* [0.015]
Num. Obs 4284 4284
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Figure 12: Budget Set Components
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Notes: The figure shows the budget sets of a person with 2 children broken up by the
individual components. The 45 degree line would be post-tax income in the absence
of any taxes. The dashed blue line is pre-tax income plus foodstamps. The red line
adds TANF, the green line adds state taxes and finally the yellow line adds federal taxes
(including the EITC) and FICA taxes. Panel (a) shows the budget set for California in
the year 2000. Panel (b) shows the budget for New York in the year 2000. The x-axis
corresponds to pre-tax earnings, and the y-axis to post-tax and transfer income. Each
line corresponds to the budget set of a single individual with either zero, one or two kids.
The black line represents the 45 degree line.
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Figure 13: Example Budget Sets for Selected States and Years
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Notes: The figure shows the budget sets of individuals in our sample by number of chil-
dren for a selected sample of states and years. The x-axis corresponds to pre-tax earnings,
and the y-axis to post-tax and transfer income. Each line corresponds to the budget set
of a single individual with either zero, one or two kids. The black line represents the 45
degree line.
178
Figure 14: Optimal Tax and Transfer Schedule Comparing KKLS Formula
with Saez (2002) Formula, Redistribution parameter n = 1
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(a) Comparing KKLS vs. Saez (2002) formula: Post vs.
Pre-tax income
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(b) Comparing KKLS vs. Saez (2002) formula: Employ-
ment tax rates
Notes: The figure corresponds to Figure 2 in the main paper, but with the parameter
measuring preferences for redistribution n set to equal 1 instead of 0.5. Simulations of
the optimal tax and transfer schedule under alternate assumptions on employment and
participation responses. Distribution of the 4 income groups is calibrated using CPS data
and corresponds to the 4 education groups in the empirical section. The figure uses
the participation and employment responses estimated in the paper. The blue line uses
the optimal welfare formula derived in this paper. The green line uses the Saez (2002)
formula based on the estimated macro responses in this paper, while the red line uses
the estimated micro employment responses in this paper.
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Figure 15: The Effect of Changing the Macro Participation Effect on the
Optimal Tax and Transfer Schedule, Redistribution parameter n = 1
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(a) KKLS formula with alternative macro vs micro partici-
pation rates: Post vs. Pre-tax income
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(b) KKLS formula with alternative macro vs micro partici-
pation rates: Employment tax rates
Notes: The figure corresponds to Figure 3 in the main paper, but with the parameter
measuring preferences for redistribution n set to equal 1 instead of 0.5. Simulations of
the optimal tax and transfer schedule under alternate assumptions on employment and
participation responses. Distribution of the 4 income groups is calibrated using CPS data
and corresponds to the 4 education groups in the empirical section. The top figure shows
the post vs. pre-tax income relationship while the bottom figure shows the employment
tax rates. The blue line shows the optimal tax schedule given the empirical estimates and
the KKLS formula. The red line shows the optimal schedule if the macro responses are
multiplied by 0.5 and the green line if they are multiplied by 2.
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Figure 16: Optimal Tax and Transfer Schedule in Weak vs. Strong Labor
Markets, Redistribution parameter n = 1
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(a) KKLS formula: Post vs. Pre-tax income
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(b) KKLS formula: Employment tax rates
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(c) Saez (2002) formula: Post vs. Pre-tax
income
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(d) Saez (2002) formula: Employment tax
rates
Notes: The figure corresponds to Figure 4 in the main paper, but with the parameter
measuring preferences for redistribution n set to equal 1 instead of 0.5. Simulations of
the optimal tax and transfer schedule under alternate macro participation responses.
Distribution of the 4 income groups is calibrated using CPS data and corresponds to the
4 education groups in the empirical section. The top two figures use the KKLS optimal
tax formula, the bottom two figures the Saez (2002) optimal tax formula using Macro
employment effects. The blue line corresponds to the benchmark simulation using the
estimated, participation and employment responses. The red line shows the tax schedule
using the weak labor market estimates from Table 4 based on the 6 month change in the
unemployment rate. The green line shows the tax schedule for the corresponding strong
labor market estimates from Table 4.
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